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ABSTRACT
Saunders, Richard L. PhD. The University of Memphis. December 2012.
“Encouraged by a Little Progress: Voting Rights and the Contests over Social Place and
Civil Society in Tennessee’s Fayette and Haywood Counties, 1958–1964.” Major
Professor: Aram Goudsouzian.
Between 1958 and 1964 the citizens of black-majority populations in adjoining
West Tennessee counties struggled to claim and exercise citizen’s rights to participate in
civil society. Voting rights activism among the black community was answered with an
economic embargo conducted by county officials and the business community. Voting
rights were the fracture point in civic society as both counties made the change from
tenant to mechanized agriculture and wrestled over the civil and economic position of a
no-longer-necessary laboring population.
This study examines voter registration as a catalyst of socioeconomic change and
social discourse in rural America. During the 1960s traditional plantation agriculture and
sharecropping collapsed for good under the weight of postwar economic modernization,
civic awareness among the black populace, and the inability to provide a defensible legal
argument for traditional segregation against challenges by federal liberalism. Chapters
examine the general economic and social setting prior to 1958 and social assumptions
involved in dependency/paternalism relationships, including the stated and unstated
concept of place in these stratified societies; the awakening and assertion of civic
participation among the black populace and why voting challenged well-established
dependency/paternalism relationships; tactics of economic repression adopted to coerce
registered voters to leave the county or return to dependence; the role of federal
investigators and the Justice Department combating segregation and replacing one form
of liberalism with another; the efforts and results of activists from outside Tennessee; and
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the range of responses among the white communities. Includes a timeline of the local
conflict (1940–2012) as an appendix.
This work argues that the political challenge over voting in these two counties
represented fundamental opposing perspectives and differing interpretations of the nature
of rights within in the public sphere. Racism and segregation involves abstract views
about the fundamental way American civil society is constructed, for which color served
as a convenient marker.
(328 pages)
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PREFACE
A letter by Haywood County, Tennessee schoolteacher Currie Boyd in July 1958
was the first spark in a decade-long struggle for black citizens’ participation in society.
The conflict involved processes as varied as agricultural succession and land
consolidation, post-war economic modernization and urbanization, farm mechanization,
and public educational policy. On the surface these actions constituted an argument about
racial segregation and the rights of property owners in ordering civic affairs. On a much
deeper level, this struggle for domination on one side and parity on the other was an
argument about the nature of American society.
Like any attempt to recount the past—even in a small locale—the story is large
enough and involved enough that all the individuals and elements involved cannot be
included. I have erred on the side of inclusivity where possible, but leaving out someone
or something or some experience has been required for the sake of illuminating the larger
shifts and themes. Most individual stories here are thus illustrative rather than the
substance of the narrative itself. This study employs liberalism and conservatism, and
liberals and conservatives, through the text, but only in the context of locally established
power and social order, not the general American political uses with which most readers
will be familiar.
Civil rights efforts of the 1960s were local facets of a perpetually unresolved
struggle to define and redefine the fundamental nature of rights guaranteed under the U.S.
Constitution. The Founding Fathers would probably have couched this discourse as the
widely invoked but never-defined—and certainly never resolved—struggle for “liberty.”
The arguments between John Locke’s and John Stuart Mill’s political philosophies were
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only given a linguistic context, not definition, by the Constitution. Partly because there
were no common definitions of liberty or of rights, our national history has unfolded
around these issues. Far more than an argument about race or voting or segregation, the
Haywood-Fayette story reflects a local struggle about deeply American principles. In
fact, I have tried hard to avoid using the term civil rights, and never use Civil Rights
Movement, partly because we do not often look beyond circumstances to the abstract
ideals that civil rights efforts intended to remedy. I employ italics to alert readers to
subtleties of meaning and interpretation: italicized words, beyond routine emphasis, are
terms (words having a single meaning), separate from general usage.
I have tried to get around, under, or beyond the Great Triumvirate of U.S. social
history—race, class, and gender—to peer at some of the conflicting ideas about how
American society is created and expected to operate. With a nod to my father, a
sociologist, I sense that there are assumptions and ideals that hardly qualify as ideas, yet
shape the way we perceive and respond to those around us. In The Southern Diaspora
James Gregory points out that those who fled the South became participants in shaping
American culture and shared in community building. They did not merely react to it. He
challenges scholars to get beyond motivations to understand consequences. I like to think
I do so in this study.
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Introduction
Equality of rights is the first of rights.1
There is a monotony about the injustices suffered by the poor that perhaps
accounts for the lack of interest the rest of society shows in them. They never win.
It’s just boring. 2
A conflict over voting in two rural Tennessee counties attracted attention and
intervention from organizations as diverse as the U.S. Department of Justice, activist
groups from the Midwest, the national officers of NAACP, and local citizens who finally
found sufficient strength in numbers to challenge the political status quo. That effort was
countered by formal and informal means at the hands of individual county officials, the
local elite of land and business owners, and an affiliate group of the Citizen’s Council
movement. The well-documented struggle over free access to the ballot, however, was
only one facet of a deeper social shift and part of a much larger story of socioeconomic
changes facing rural America in the mid twentieth century. These Tennessee counties
constituted the northernmost and last outposts of “traditional” Southern plantation
agriculture in the United States. The changes represent the a rural agrarian world forced
into a post-agricultural capital economy. As small and localized as they were, above the
quiet lines of determined would-be voters and an economic embargo looms a large,
abstract, and very old Constitutional issue, a question which both the district and circuit
courts faced repeatedly, and one which is at the core of the conflict: the fundamental
tension about the nature of private or individual rights within a public or civic society.

1

Undated note, Charles Sumner papers, Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.

2

Dwight McDonald, “Our Invisible Poor,” New Yorker, 1963 Jan 19.

1

Defining who exactly the Constitution meant by “We, the People of the United States . . .”
has been one of the key issues in the nation’s unfolding history.
This study ties together the largely separate stories of activism and social change
in Fayette County and Haywood County, Tennessee between 1958 and 1964. It dips a
bucket into the tidal forces of postwar America, just at the point where the wave of
modernization crested over this corner of the rural South. Retail chains were beginning to
replace local stores, new cash crops shifted the investments needed to grow them, and the
power of an elite was lessened as another group found new power in participation; but
focusing only on political or economic change is not an adequate explanation for the
conflict. It relates only that something happened, but not why. “No adequate assessment,”
David Eltis reminded students of slavery, “can ignore the systems of beliefs with which
the economic environment invariably interacts.” 3 Thus it is that our swirling bucket,
brimming with details of the Haywood-Fayette story, settles into loose sediments of
discursive or thematic layers. Floating at the surface is the fluid, complex story of people
of two rural counties engaged in an argument over voting rights during the 1960s.
Beneath the surface floats a turbid layer of interaction and inquiry, the stated and unstated
rules of place that facilitated interaction in a segregated society. At this level the study
will look at the challenge that voting represented to the rigid partition socially imposed
from above. Settled at the bottom, far beneath the immediate issues of cotton shacks and
courthouse steps, floats an abstract layer of competing views about how American society
should be constructed and who should participate.

3

David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), 3.

2

Even knowing the sediments and their composition, there are parts of this story
which, lacking first-hand sources, are historically irrecoverable. While many
organizational records and interviews exist for both black citizens and outside activists,
virtually no records of any sort exist to document the thinking of the few embattled
moderates in either county. Even less, by design, exists for conservative white activists:
no records meant no subpoenas. The handful of interviews gathered by FBI investigators
and the accounts by black tenants relating interactions with their employers and
businessmen provide some clues. Newspaper columns provide a few social reckoning
points for attitudes, but little real action. Entirely absent is an important comparative
benchmark: the experiences of the small number of white sharecroppers and tenants from
both counties. Dependence relationships that existed for black tenants can only be
assumed to apply (similarly, if not identically) to white tenants. There is no evidence to
believe that they do, but there is no compelling reason to believe that they do not, either.
Precisely how much weight class carried in agricultural tenancy compared to race, is, at
this point, an open and unanswerable question.
My approach to the study has been shaped by my career as an archivist and
librarian, one spent helping researchers with genealogy and local history in three very
different states. I have come to feel strongly that local history is not merely local because
life is not entirely local. Local history must draw in broader contexts for it to be relevant
to those who did not live it, and so in this work I sample the layers in my bucket and
address several ambitious themes. Where some dissertations explore a particular theme or
perspective—whiteness, labor, or women, for example—I try to walk entirely around the
overall story in the various chapters. Certainly it does not address all the possible

3

approaches to understanding this conflict, but at least touches on the major strains and
influences involved. The first chapter sketches a broad outline for tidal forces originating
well beyond the period and locales. Populational shifts, agricultural diversification, field
mechanization, and the stresses of post-war rural modernization provide a socioeconomic
backdrop of changes already affecting rural life in West Tennessee prior to 1958. The
second chapter describes the collision between differing views of citizenship, introducing
figures and events in the history of black sharecroppers; it describes their awakening to
civic individualism and efforts to assert the rights and responsibilities of citizens. The
third and fourth chapters lay out three broad opposing strategies that set the stage for
chapter five, which discusses federal investigators and the legal structure involved in the
assertion of political liberalism and the consolidation of rural conservatism. The sixth and
seventh chapters discuss contributions of social activists that minimized immediate
outmigration and provided ballast for a population cut from their dependent moorings to
paternalism. An eighth chapter discusses the array of responses to black civic awakening
within the white communities. The concluding chapter revisits changes in the economic
setting and ties together broad themes woven through the work.
An overview of literature
As urban industrialism changed the national landscape, rural West Tennessee
contributed its share of agricultural people to the large migrations out of the South and
into streets and boroughs of cities in the West, Midwest, and Northeast. The outward
trend accelerated during and after the Second World War. Many Tennessee newspapers
ran a regular column of happenings among expatriates living in Detroit or Chicago. This
study falls within the last stages of what has been called the “second great migration.”

4

Industry changed the face of America, but affected rural areas differently than the centers
of urban concentration. 4 This is not a labor-history study, but it seems clear that the labor
arrangement of rural sharecropping involves different dynamics of expectations and
power than the urban, union, and immigrant-dominated works illustrated by central
works in the field. 5
Differences between urban and rural settings may divide the civil rights
experience more deeply than previously thought. Recent studies of the development and
decline of liberal activism during the civil rights period describe movements that are
essentially urban and middle class. Students for a Democratic Society and the larger New
Left movement involved relatively privileged white college students. 6 The panoply of
black organizations such as the NAACP and Southern Christian Leadership Conference
drew heavily on the business, education, and religious elites among black Americans. 7

4

James N. Gregory, The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White
Southerners Transformed America (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2005). A counter argument
about the nature of national population shift is presented in Luther J. Adams, “‘Headed for Louisville:’
Rethinking Rural to Urban Migration in the South, 1930–1950,” Journal of Social History 40, no. 2 (Winter
2006): 407–430.
5

At least in Tennessee counties, gender, too, seems to be rolled up with this different form of labor
than the urban/wage dynamic treated in works like David Roediger’s twins, The Wages of Whiteness: Race
and the Making of the American Working Class (New York: Verso, 1991) and Working toward Whiteness:
How America’s Immigrants Became White (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Thomas A. Gugulielmo, White
on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890–1945(New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
2003); and /or Bruce Nelson, “Organized Labor and the Struggle for Black Equality in Memphis during
World War II,” Journal of American History 80 (1993 Dec): 952–988.
6

Douglas. C. Rossinow, The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in
America (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, c1998); Kevin Mattson, Intellectuals in Action: The Origins of
the New Left and Radical Liberalism, 1945–1970 (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, c2002);
David Barber, A Hard Rain Fell: SDS and Why It Failed (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, c2008).
7

Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925–1950
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1987); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a
Dedicated Band of Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution (New York: BasicBooks, 1994). The
premises of the legal action have been critiqued by Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007); Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights
Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (New York: Free Press, 1984). The work on King
and SCLC is voluminous. Among the best are David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr.

5

Even the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE), which are remembered for their hard work in rural areas, were rooted
in and drew strength primarily from urban centers. 8 Civil rights was an issue perhaps
more real and immediate to the rural poor as to those in urban areas, and in its story study
suggests how much richer the understanding of civil rights will be as it includes nonurban areas and figures that did not have a place in the national spotlight. The civil rights
history of individual locales, especially in rural areas, has been less exhaustively studied.
Notable exceptions are the Greensboro sit-ins 9 and the local-level actions in other
Southern states. 10 Even these are large-scale studies. Small-scale, truly local studies are
comparatively less common. 11 One such story was the Memphis sanitation workers’
strike from February to April 1968, a conflict over administrative recognition and civic
and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: William Morrow, 1986); Thomas R. Peake,
Keeping the Dream Alive: A History of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from King to the
1980s (New York: P. Lang, 1987); Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern
Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King Jr. (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1987).
8

Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1981); August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights
Movement, 1942–1968 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973).
9

Miles Wolff, Lunch at the Five and Ten: The Greensboro Sit-ins, a Contemporary History (New
York: Stein and Day, [1970]); William Chaffee, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina
and the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980); Carole Boston Weatherford,
Freedom on the Menu: The Greensboro Sit-ins (New York: Puffin, 2007).
10

Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom; John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights
in Mississippi (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, c1994); Emilye Crosby, A Little Taste of Freedom: The
Black Freedom Struggle in Claiborne County, Mississippi (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press,
2005); Glenn T. Eskew, But for Birmingham: The Local and National Movements in the Civil Rights
Struggle (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1997).
11

But certainly not unknown; the literature is growing. Groundwork: Local Black Freedom
Movements In America, ed. Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard (New York: New York University,
2005); J. Todd Moye, Let the People Decide: Black Freedom and White Resistance Movements in
Sunflower County, Mississippi (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2004); Crosby, A Little Taste of
Freedom; Jill Ogline Titus, Brown’s Battleground: Students, Segregationists, and the Struggle for Justice in
Prince Edward County, Virginia (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2011); Lance Hill, Deacons
for Defense: Armed Resistance and the Civil Rights Movement (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press,
2004); Charles McKinney, Greater Freedom: The Struggle for Black Educational and Political Equality in
Wilson, North Carolina, 1941–1953 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2010).

6

paternalism grounded in segregated labor practices, which began locally but quickly drew
the attention of national figures and organizations and came to a crescendo in the murder
of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Its various facets continue to be studied at length. 12
Struggles like the Sanitation Strike attract attention because they successfully
translate into symbols of a larger reality or effort. In the glare of scholarship on urban
Memphis, save for a few newspaper articles the rest of rural West Tennessee largely has
escaped scholarly notice. A web of personal narratives dealing with the Fayette County
facet of the rural-Tennessee story is provided in the classic collection of oral histories
titled Our Portion of Hell. Haywood has been most effectively addressed by Richard
Couto in his book Lifting the Veil. 13 Each of these provides sound historical summaries.
This study probes the settings, specific circumstances, and ideas fueling those who
pushed rights efforts, and pushed against them. Scholarship of the past few decades
which has touched West Tennessee has focused on race and class as platforms for social
action and reaction, but the movement was understood by its first generation of scholars
as, at its heart, an argument over the nature of national citizenship. 14 Justice Department

12

In the interest of space I mention only select recent works, including Laurie B. Green, Battling
the Plantation Mentality: Memphis and the Black Freedom Struggle (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina
Press, 2007), which ties events to Memphis, where many families fled after being evicted; Michael K.
Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois
Press, 1993); Michael K. Honey, Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King’s
Last Campaign (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2007).
13

Our Portion of Hell, Fayette County, Tennessee: An Oral history of the Struggle for Civil Rights,
ed. Robert Hamburger (New York: Links Books, 1973); Linda T. Wynn, “Toward a Perfect Democracy:
The Struggle of African Americans in Fayette County, Tennessee to Fulfill the Unfulfilled right of the
Franchise,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 55, no. 3 (1996): 202–223; Richard A. Couto, Lifting the Veil: A
Political History of Struggles for Emancipation (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1993). A new
collection of oral histories, compiled by a daughter of activists John and Viola McFerren, will enrich later
studies.
14

The major study of voting rights is Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South,
1944–1969 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1976) and his succeeding volume, In Pursuit of Power:
Southern Blacks and Electoral Politics, 1965–1982 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1985). Jack Bass,
The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequences since 1945 (New

7

efforts in West Tennessee represented one of the first steps toward that goal. Partly
because Fayette County’s half of the story gained better press, it became clear early on
that the voting rights story represented a historic turning point in the exercise of
American voting rights. Burton Joel Arhens’s anonymously authored study of the federal
actions and missteps in West Tennessee was written and published almost before the
situation was resolved, and within a short time others joined the discussion. 15 In the
process, scholars and writers quickly perceived that the civil rights movement was a
collision between deeply held perceptions of American rights, even as it became clear
that the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was too limited to address the scale of the entrenched
problem. 16
York: Basic Books, 1976). As Price’s report noted, Tennesseans wrestled over segregation but most of the
state did not experience voting conflicts; Bobby L. Lovett, The Civil Rights Movement in Tennessee: A
Narrative History (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 2005) is important for the broader temporal
context. The origins of the civil rights “movement” have been stretched by Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for
Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue. 2v. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978);
Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville: Univ. of
Tennessee Press, 1984); Ward, Defending Democracy; David A. Nichols, A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower
and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007); Burke Marshall,
Federalism and Civil Rights (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1964);
15

“Private Economic Coercion and the Civil Rights Act of 1957,” Yale Law Journal 71, no. 3
(1962 Jan): 537–550; Burke Marshall, “Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights,” Law and
Contemporary Politics 27, no. 3, The Electoral Process, part 2 (Summer 1962): 455–467. Challenges
between liberalism and conservatism in the context of Tennessee specifically are treated in Normal L.
Parks, “Tennessee Politics since Kefauver and Reese: A 'Generalist' View,” Journal of Politics 28, no. 1
(1966 Feb): 144–168; Harry Holloway, “Fayette County, Tennessee: The Quest for a Negro Majority,”
chapter 4 of The Politics of the Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City Organization (New York:
Random House, 1969). Will Sarvis noted the importance of legal involvement in local action and makes
introductory comments that relate directly to West Tennessee. Will Sarvis, “Leaders in the Court and
Community: Z. Alexander Looby, Avon N. Williams Jr., and the Legal Fight for Civil Rights in Tennessee,
1940–1970,” Journal of African American History 88, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 42–58. John Doar provided a
first-hand reminiscence in “Work of the Civil Rights Division,” 1–14, but focuses on better-known efforts
in Mississippi and Alabama.
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This study takes a consciously broad view of the topic, addressing the
perspectives of as many sides in the conflict as possible, and involving those who both
pushed for civil rights and pushed against them. Kate Sampsell-Willmann notes that few
scholars “have considered integrating unfettered economic participation as an essential
element of full citizenship into the primary civil rights thesis.” 17 That function was a
fundamental reality in this struggle. The voting rights efforts cannot be meaningfully
separated from the economic setting of labor and ownership, and neither can escape the
changes of technology. This is more than a Civil Rights story, or a labor story, or a
race/segregation story. It is hopefully a window into the complexity of life at a time and
place.
The existing historiography on this story focuses on the actions of local figures,
tending to overlook the contributions and activities that came into the communities from
beyond the counties. It omits entirely the ideas and concerns of white community
members. Robert Hamburger's oral history collection, Our Portion of Hell, compiled in
1971 and released a few years later, is particularly important. The book preserves
important records of the Fayette County efforts. At the same time, it shaped the direction
of future discussion by asking participants to describe personal actions in their
interviews. The record of county activists thus naturally emphasized local participation
while unintentionally putting into the background the contributions by non-resident
supporters and outside organizations. Since Our Portion of Hell is at the foundation of
later studies, the role of external organizations and individuals has been substantially
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overlooked. 18 One notable exception has receded into anonymity; Step By Step, published
by the Cornell-Tomkins activists, reports the experiences of an activist-driven voterregistration drive prior to the 1964 primary and general elections.
Given this traditionally local approach it is unsurprising that scholarship has
treated the subject similarly. The first substantive secondary consideration of the west
Tennessee conflict appeared in The Politics of the Southern Negro, written less than a
decade after the legal questions were resolved but while the civil rights struggles in both
counties were still being fought daily. It still provides one of the most accurate
assessments of the situation. Richard A. Couto's Lifting the Veil provides an excellent
examination of the Haywood County actions in the much longer but strictly local context
of the community. His section covering 1959–1963 is drawn primarily from personal
interviews and National Association for the Advancement of Colored Persons (NAACP)
records. But while the NAACP had a larger, yet still limited presence in Haywood, it was
purposefully kept corralled in Fayette. Perhaps the most comprehensive historical
examination generated thus far is Linda Wynn's article "Toward a Perfect Democracy."
She draws in the national context more effectively than earlier work but addresses
primarily the Fayette County side of the events, and chiefly those involving Tent City.
Other scholars have presented works on topics that intersect the Fayette/Haywood civil
rights story, but if mentioned at all in the secondary literature the civil rights efforts in
rural west Tennessee are portrayed as a summary footnote. 19
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This observation is no intended slight to the book's importance. Our Portion of Hell, Fayette
County, Tennessee: An Oral History of the Struggle for Civil Rights, ed. Robert Hamburger (New York:
Links, 1973). The original interview recordings are in the collection of the Schomburg Center, New York
Public Library.
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Southern white conservatism has become an important topic in academic circles
over the past decade.20 Grace Hale argues that one key to understanding white backlash
to the civil rights movement is as deep as the Civil War itself. Where once slaves held no
inherent standing in society, civic identity was specifically defined for them in the larger
public sphere by law. The status of being owned—or of merely being capable of being
owned—set antebellum blacks beyond meaningful civic or social participation. The
Confederacy’s presumptions had been discredited by the Emancipation Proclamation, and
ostensibly buried with finality by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Reconstruction attempted to reconnect Confederate states with the Union while replacing
the racially exclusive political participation with an inclusive one, but the whole conflict
and its aftermath left a fundamental question effectively unresolved: “what would
citizenship mean in a world without slaves?” 21 In sociological rather than political terms
her question might be rephrased: “how would American civil society be constructed in a
world where former slaves were now defined as citizens?” In the 1870s federal appointee,
social observer, and novelist Albion Tourgée generalized the post-war position of
Southern whites toward their former slaves: “We have no ill will towards the colored

African Americans in Fayette County, Tennessee to Fulfill the Unfulfilled Right of the Franchise,"
Tennessee Historical Quarterly 55, no. 3 (1996): 202–223, reprinted in slightly revised version under the
same title in Trial and Triumph: Essays in Tennessee's African American History, ed. Carroll Van West
(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2002), 390–419; Cynthia A. Bond Hopson, Times of
Challenge and Controversy; Voter Registration in Haywood County 1960–61: A Content Analysis of Local,
Regional, and National Newspaper Coverage (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2005). Most
tangential works are cited elsewhere.
20
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Movement (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1994).
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man as such and in his place; but he is not our equal, can not be made our equal, and we
will not be ruled by him, or admit him as a coordinate with the white race in power.”22
The roots of the South’s conservative, exclusionary public are clear. A hundred years later
little had changed.
Both sides of the voting-rights conflict in Fayette and Haywood counties had to
strip away several hard layers of built-up tradition to arrive at a common understanding
of citizenship and of a citizen’s privilege to participate in the civic sphere as an
individual. That process only began during the period this study addresses.
Reconstruction had scrubbed away the overt, top layer of de jure limits that usually
proscribed what whites could do and blacks could not. Redemption, however, laid down
grimy new layers of cultural expectations and informal boundaries defining place relative
to each other in terms of both race and class. Scholars often refer to the twentieth
century’s post–Reconstruction world as segregation. In the mid 1950s, segregation was
admirably defined by C. Vann Woodward as:

an interlocking system of economic institutions, social practices and customs,
political power, law, and ideology, all of which function as both a means and ends
in one group’s efforts to keep another (or others) in their place within a society
that is actually becoming unified . . . . [T]he crux of segregation is the monopoly
by the dominant group over the political institutions of the state.”23

Woodward did not limit segregation only to color-defined or economically defined
majority populations. The key word is dominance. Woodward’s definition provides an
22

Albion W. Tourgée, A Fool's Errand (New York: Fords, Howard & Hulbert, 1879), 121–122.
This remarkable and generally overlooked novel is a careful, astute assessment of opposing post-war
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the Situation,” “The Southern Idea of the Northern Idea,” and the Northern analogs.
23

C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974),
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excellent structure for exploring why voting was such a threat in Tennessee’s two blackmajority counties. Segregation, as Woodward defined it, described external, imposed
factors. Recent scholarship involving the “civil rights era” (1940–1968) has begun to
examine other strata of sociology and psychology that reinforced relationships from
within, layered beneath segregation. Laurie Green invokes plantation mentality against
freedom, both terms used in the 1960s. “Their use of the term imbued the idea of freedom
with complex and historically specific meanings, which involved dismantling racist
practices that influenced everyday life and rejecting racial identities that associated
blackness with servitude and even inhumanity.” The “plantation mentality” which
concerns Green was built upon the expectations and attitudes shaping an individual’s
work and personal relationships across the color line. Her term is qualitatively similar to
my use of “dependence/paternalism.”
Jason Ward points out that to Southern whites, defending democracy “referred
simultaneously to a racial worldview and a political order. They considered black
disfranchisement and segregation essential to maintaining a society governed by and for
whites.” 24 Ward is correct, but there is a deeper current that scholars seem to have
overlooked thus far: the nature of the American public itself. “Defending democracy”
was a claim of exclusive ownership to the public. In another time, but just as truthfully,
novelist John Steinbeck reminded readers of The Grapes of Wrath that “The quality of
owning freezes you forever into 'I,' and cuts you off forever from the 'we.'” 25 To
Steinbeck, that we was inclusive. A generation later West Tennessee’s local black activists
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and their white supporters agreed. This study uses a small corner of rural America to look
at a collision between differing concepts about the nature of American civic society.
It could be argued that the Southern Redeemer governments acted boldly and
openly to reject the colorblind participatory political liberalism mandated by
Reconstruction. They reconfigured antebellum structures of power and control over rural
black populations, first using economic power (control of personal debt) and then using
Jim Crow laws to reinstitute de jure separation between the privileged and unprivileged.
Only those with privilege were defined as “American society.” 26 Since the civic body
could not include those who were unfit for public service, participation in civic life was
limited to members of the strata who were. Membership to that social stratus was only on
individual merit and the agreement of other members; the adoption of poll taxes
disenfranchised poor whites equally effectively as former slaves. Laissez faire policies
and traditions (economic liberalism), set in place at the state level during Redemption,
gave real-property owners unchallenged domination of the working poor and lent them
effective control of local economics. 27 Eventually the “old-boy network” connected
workers, landowners, local and state officials in intersecting but not overlapping circles
of rights and obligations. At its roots, Southern society became a collection of colordenominated, individual fealties and obligations that could always be dominated by
individuals with the most power, greatest resources, or best personal connexions. Across
26
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a century the South refined the system through not only law, but custom, education, and
expectation. It was woven into the very fiber of society’s being.
***
This is not a simple story of heroic black activism in the face of hard-eyed white
repression. Life is not simple. It is a fact, however, that by the early 1960s human field
labor had outlived its technological and economic usefulness. In a dispassionate,
historical context, a drastic social change in these two counties was inevitable; neither
county could have a modern existence on the terms (and in the conditions) inherited from
its past, no matter how jealously guarded. But if the change encroaching on Haywood and
Fayette counties was inevitable, the terms of the confrontation over change was not.
Relating the nature and process of what changes did happen and how people on both
sides chose to respond to that change is the matter of this story.
Yet, we must never lose sight of the point that accounting our past by merely
telling of broad sweeps of change and development is partially dehumanizing. Individuals
act in intensely personal and often conflicting and inconsistent ways. In individual human
terms, the change crashing over Haywood and Fayette counties was frightening: painful,
unsettling, and motivated often by the callous self-interest of the powerful and merely
imposed on others. There are many mistakes and few genuine heroes here. Mostly we
have real people struggling to choose hastily between quickly receding options, choices
that they may not understand fully and probably don’t like.
Human history is organic, a vine with roots in the deep, layered soil of experience
and with tendrils that unfold messily long beyond today and tomorrow. Historical studies,
however, are an arrangement of cut flowers. An historian must choose between

15

blossoming circumstances, decide when and where to snip, and arrange the bouquet.
These struggles did not spring whole and unbidden from the cotton fields of West
Tennessee and did not pass from the scene without seeding future challenges. In the
interest of space (and time—mine) I aspire to relate chiefly the elements of this story
relating directly to voting rights and its direct aftermath. I must leave out any careful
treatment of events which set the stage, including the 1940 attempt to lynch Burton
Dodson in Fayette County, and the grimly effective repression in Haywood County that
culminated in Elbert Williams’ lynching in 1941. Both harrowed the ground out of which
the events of this study grew.
This study addresses only the first third of the overall social conflict that in these
two counties made up the entire decade of the 1960s. I leave for later effort examination
of the tension and activism surrounding the school desegregation conflicts of the mid and
late 1960s, and the fight for socioeconomic development and fair housing practices of the
1970s. Both efforts involved virtually the same characters on both sides and in both
counties. Even within the limited scope of the voting rights story I must necessarily not
treat the West Tennessee Voter Project, which was active in Tipton and Hardeman
counties as well as Fayette and Haywood in 1965–66, and only treat lightly the Fayette
Haywood Work Camps. Both merit separate study. The related and sometimes connected
stories in Hardeman, Tipton, and Lauderdale counties remain to be told. There are also
some striking differences between the counties’ experiences that I cannot yet answer. For
instance, the academy movement succeeded in Fayette but failed to gain traction in
Haywood. The Ku Klux Klan succeeded (temporarily) in Haywood but not in Fayette at
all, whereas the Citizens’ Council succeeded in Fayette but not in Haywood. I would like
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to know why. I must also leave women’s experience and resistance to dependence and
segregation to be explored by other scholars.
Voter registration was the straw that broke the local socioeconomic camel’s back:
in this rigidly stratified society, social structure and economics were inextricable. The
push for civic involvement arose at the moment when traditional plantation agriculture
gave way to modern power technology. There was no reason to retain large rural
concentrations of a working underclass—particularly a civically active underclass. The
hordes of cheap laborers that had been key assets prior to 1958, “suddenly became” a
social, economic, and political problem that whites first wished, then expected, to go
away. For local elites, the problem was worsened by legislative and judicial liberalism,
particularly the aftermath of the Baker v. Carr case, which was settled by the Supreme
Court in 1962 but did not really affect local politics until a mandated redistricting and
reapportionment in 1964 and falls beyond the scope of this study.
At its heart, this study treats opposing interpretations of American society: the
civic public as exclusive v. inclusive social space. The great contribution made by the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren was to conclude that national citizenship
was not exclusive, tiered, or stratified: a citizen was a citizen irrespective of color or local
conventions. Federal power denied white Tennesseans in these counties the ability to
enforce their traditional mores, while insisting the American public included minorities
and members of the economic underclass. Here is how it happened in West Tennessee.
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Chapter 1
Local Society and Economics Prior to 1958:
The Setting
The main economic problem confronting southern farmers for three generations
after 1865 was an excess of rural population in relation to developed land
resources. 1
The entire economy of the cotton section has changed or is faced with a change. 2
On 12 July 1958, thirty-three year old schoolteacher Currie Boyd sat down and
typed out a succinct four paragraph letter—a request, really. Boyd held a masters’ degree
in education from Ohio State University. He had eleven years teaching experience to his
credit. He owned and worked the small family farm. Two months earlier he had moved
sixty miles home from Decaturville, Tennessee, to Stanton, in the far southwest corner of
Haywood County, where his mother was retiring from her school-teaching position. On
the strength of a verbal agreement with county school superintendent Joe Naylor, Boyd
would take her place at one of the community’s two schools. On a return trip to wrap up
business in Decaturville in late June, the county registrar had reminded him to change his
voter registration from Decatur County to Haywood County to reflect his new residence.
State elections were scheduled for early August.
In the first week of July, just before registration closed prior to the county primary
election, Boyd drove the dozen miles from Stanton into Brownsville and climbed to the
top floor of the courthouse. He handed his Decatur County voter registration card to
Virginia Farrow. She held dual appointments as clerk for the county Employment Office
1

Gilbert. C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More: Southern Agriculture, 1865–1980 (Frankfort: University
Press of Kentucky, 1984), xii.
2

“New Tenure Arrangements Offer Possibilities In Area,” Fayette Falcon, 1958 Jul 31.
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Figure 1.1

Currie P. Boyd, 1960.3

and for the Haywood County Election Commission. Boyd asked if she would please enter
his name on the Haywood County voting records. She stared at the card in her hand
quietly for a moment before handing it back with an apology, suggesting he speak with
sheriff “Tip” Hunter or to the clerk of the county court. Puzzled, Boyd walked across the
street to the office of Haywood County court clerk J. R. Moore. A deputy sheriff was
lounging against a desk. Boyd stalled with small talk until the deputy left the office.
When he was able to talk with Moore without other intrusive ears, he explained that he
had been referred by the voter registration clerk and handed Moore his voter registration
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Times-Herald, [1960 Sep 22], clipping in OFCCLW records.
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card. Moore looked at it silently for a few moments. “Currie,” he said handing it to Boyd,
“you’d better take this back to Decatur County. We’ve never registered any here.” 4
Any? Any what? In the historical and social context of Brownsville, Tennessee in
1958 the implication was straightforward. Nothing needed to be stated to be clearly
understood. Boyd was turned away because he was black. In the next few weeks he made
the same request and was deflected by not only Moore, but also the Haywood County
voting registrar himself, the chairman of the county election commission, two election
commission members, and several other county officials. Boyd not only failed to
complete the registration before registration closed, but within a week of his visit to the
courthouse he was fired from his teaching position in county schools. Currie Boyd’s letter
to the U.S. Department of Justice, written shortly before his employment was terminated,
ended not with a complaint but with a request for information: “Will you be so kind as to
inform me as to what steps I should take so that I may vote?” 5 He never did get a
satisfactory response—not from the Justice Department, certainly not from county
officials. Within two months of his letter the voting registrar surrendered her position, the
election commission members had resigned, and state-appointed replacements had
refused to serve. A year later Boyd was still waiting for an answer.

4

Couto, Lifting the Veil, 189–193, quoting an unspecified Boyd interview; Volunteer Civil Rights
Commission hearings, 1960 Jan 31, Congressional Record, 1960 Feb 8, p. 2079–2080.
5
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In both counties, voting was tied up with race, race was linked with labor, labor
arrangements existed for cotton, and cotton was everything. To understand why a civic
duty represented a social and economic issue in these counties, one has to understand the
setting in these counties and changes already stirring within their cotton economies.
Cotton and society
“Cotton is king,” crowed James Henry Hammond on the floor of the U.S. Senate
in 1858. 6 Cotton cultivation rescued the South from national irrelevance as elsewhere the
steamy breath of the Industrial Revolution cranked up its steely muscle. Short-staple
cotton, a row crop, requires a much different production effort than field crops like cereal
grains. Cotton cultivated without modern fertilizers, herbicides, defoliants, or machinery
remains heavily labor intensive throughout the growing season. To produce cotton on a
large scale requires large numbers of farmhands as a power source. Working alone with
basic horse- or mule-drawn equipment, a single farm worker could conceivably plow,
sow, and harvest eighty acres of wheat in a season. Similarly equipped, the same hand
could profitably tend and harvest no more than about ten acres of cotton, and usually
less—but at an income parity. 7
During the early years of settlement, though the opportunity of Tennessee’s
inexpensive open land (usually) allowed poor men to become comfortable in self
sufficiency, it was the rich men, those who arrived with resources to invest beyond their
6

Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. James H. Hammond, of South Carolina
(New York: John F. Trow & Co., 1866), 311–322. Hammond was invoking an earlier work: An American
[David Christy], Cotton is King; or, The Culture of Cotton and its Relation to Agriculture, Manufactures,
and Commerce to the Free Colored People, and to Those Who Hold That Slavery Is In Itself Sinful
(Cincinnati: Moore, Wilsatch, Keys, 1855).
7

No hard figures exist for this comparison. I make it based on informal comments made by former
sharecroppers with whom I have spoken and a rough average of the land allotments in both Fayette and
Haywood counties.
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own labor, who became richer. Based on the soil and the crops it could support, one
institution replicated quickly by settlers was plantation agriculture and the chief source of
power that worked it—slaves. Virtually no African slaves worked Tennessee fields.
Tennessee's slave population was assembled from the domestic American slave trade,
which transferred excess laboring population from the declining farms of the seaboard
states to new opportunities inland, and still later from the American interior to Texas. The
intensive-labor demand for cotton cropping was responsible for the high concentration of
black slaves in the state’s southwestern counties and slavery’s relative absence elsewhere
across the region. Labor-intensive cotton agriculture, supplying mills of the early decades
of the Industrial Revolution, had fueled the United States’ westward expansion and killed
Thomas Jefferson’s hope that slavery could be dispersed quietly out of existence without
conflict or effort in the original seaboard states. The high price of cotton in the
international market and the estimated value of cotton exports were the fiscal support on
which the Confederacy staked its hopes for dissolving the Union when its elected
representatives could no longer dominate national politics.
As shown in Table 1.1a, the United States population census reveals that as early
as 1830, over a third of Haywood County’s population consisted of individuals who could
not have chosen to settle in the county on their own. Table 1.1b, showing the same
decennial counts for Fayette County, reveals even higher real numbers and percentages.
On the cusp of the Civil War, both counties had populations that were nearly two-thirds
enslaved. More than other West Tennessee counties, Haywood and Fayette faced directly
two uncomfortable issues that the Civil War failed to resolve: what labor system would
replace plantation slavery? What were freedmen’s rights? The programs to serve former
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Table 1.1 Racial demographics from settlement to the civil rights period, by
selected decades. 8
a. Haywood County

Census
1830
1860
1890
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960

white
popl.

%

3,505
8,165
7,989
8,467
8,836
10,133
9,989
9,055

65.71%
42.46%
33.91%
33.30%
33.90%
36.58%
38.11%
38.71%

black
popl.
1,829
11,067
15,569
16,959
17,227
17,566
16,220
14,336

%
34.29%
57.54%
66.09%
66.70%
66.10%
63.42%
61.89%
61.29%

b. Fayette County.

Census

white
popl.

%

black
popl.

%

1830
1860
1890

5,474
8,826
8,386

59.55%
36.28%
27.89%

3,718
15,501
21,682

40.45%
63.72%
72.11%

1920
1930
1940

7,972
7,796
8,343

25.31%
26.98%
27.52%

23,526
21,095
21,977

74.69%
73.02%
72.48%

1950
1960

8,090
7,646

29.39%
31.12%

19,440
16,927

70.61%
68.88%

slaves, such as the Freedman’s Bureau, rested on the presumption that they desired and
would be afforded a citizen’s economic existence, with access to land, credit, and civil
participation, in addition to the value of their personal labor.9

8

Richard L. Saunders, “The Racial Demographics of West Tennessee: An Essay Based on U.S.
Census Data, 1830–2000,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 60 (2007): 122–153. The tabular
dataset is available at http://scholarship.utm.edu/64. Comparing crop-yield figures to slavery suggests that
at least in Tennessee the “peculiar institution” corresponds directly to cotton cultivation and no other crop
or industry, including tobacco. Unpublished study by the author, 2009.
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Even after the conclusion of the war in 1865 and the ability to move ostensibly at
will during and after Reconstruction, the concentrations of blacks in these two counties
not only maintained pre-war levels, but they actually increased significantly as
sharecropping was adopted to replace plantation agriculture and extend the economic
power of white landowners. Replacing personal slavery with personal debt, black farm
laborers remained essentially immobile, both geographically and socially in terms of
class. When Jim Crow laws of the state’s Redeemer government disenfranchised the new
citizens, they became effectively unable to “vote with their feet” and escape their
situation, either. 10 As a result, black concentrations consistently remained exceptionally
high well throughout the twentieth century. Figure 1.2 shows a graphic representation of
population across the state from the 1920 census and illustrates a key point that sets these
two counties apart from the rest of the state: Haywood and Fayette counties are the only
counties to ever have minority white populations at any point in their history.
The center of national cotton production had shifted to Texas and California by
1900. Cotton culture in the Deep South and Midsouth still dominated many local
economies. The Cotton Exchange in Memphis remained the key spot market for cotton
brokers in 1960, but by then Tennessee’s total cotton production, concentrated in the core
of cotton counties around Memphis, amounted to about three-quarters of a million bales.
During the same year Texas alone produced 4.4 million. Excluding Louisiana and
Arkansas, four
9

Reconstructions: New Perspectives on the Postbellum United States, ed. Thomas J. Brown (New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006).
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My use of tenancy includes both sharecroppers and renters. Debt kept the former in place to
continue staffing Southern agriculture. To walk away from it was Ronald Reagan’s solution to local poverty
more than a century later. Lawrence I. Barrett, “The White House Sensitivity Gap,” Time, 1982 Feb 1. The
phrase is ascribed to economist Charles Tiebout.
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Figure 1.2

“Per Cent of Negroes in Total Population, by [Tennessee] Counties:
1920.” 11

transmississippi Western states (Texas, California, Oklahoma, New Mexico) outproduced the rest of the thirteen Old South states combined. 12
The tabular census data for these two counties also reflects the larger shifts in the
national population at the same period. The declining black population in each county
following the First World War, mirrors the movement of blacks out of the rural South for
wage work in regional urban centers such as Memphis, Nashville, and St. Louis, and to
national magnets like Chicago and Detroit; by the Second World War, that movement
found new destinations on the urban West Coast. But whites, too, were leaving at
approximately an equal rate. This trend squares with the much larger exodus James N.
Gregory describes in his recent summary of the “Southern diaspora” of the twentieth
century. The numbers for these two Tennessee counties confirm Gregory’s assertion that
there was not one “great migration,” but rather two; the northward and westward Great
Migration of 1914–1918 was one facet of a much larger pattern that was less racial than it
11

US Bureau of Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States, Population 1920, v.3
Composition and characteristics of the population by states (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1922), 960.
12

US Bureau of Census, Cotton Production and Distribution: Year Ending July 31 1961, Bulletin
198 (Washington, D. C.: US Dept. of Commerce, 1961), 8. This figure was for ginned rather than running
(unginned) bales.
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was socioeconomic. In the case of these two rural counties, whites and blacks were both
leaving their corner of West Tennessee. Haywood County and Fayette County, Tennessee
represent the supply side of the rural-urban migration which had begun nationally in the
opening years of the Industrial Revolution, had accelerated after the Civil War, and
finally reached into the previously stable corners of American South after both the First
and Second World Wars. 13
Despite the declines, both Haywood and Fayette Counties retained large and
stable black laboring populations that remained tied to manual and animal-powered
cotton cultivation for more than a decade after the Second World War. Both Haywood and
Fayette counties adopted field machinery very slowly, almost as exceptions to the general
movement toward farm mechanization during the Depression. Also, the overall ratio of
white to black did not change dramatically. Both demographics declined because the
forces of modernism affected both groups similarly, and there was no direct competition
between them. The black population remained the clear majority until it became a matter
of “survival” for one population to actively push out the other.
This white-black balance survived through the 1950s due to three factors. First,
cotton cultivation was the base of the agricultural cash-crop economy in both counties.
Second, these cotton economies retained traditional postbellum debt-based sharecropping
tenancy, which organized and regulated most cotton production by dividing land and
labor into parcels small enough for single workers or worker-families. Third, there was a
low degree of agricultural mechanization, even after much of the rest of national cotton
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James N. Gregory, The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White
Southerners Transformed America (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2005). As noted in the
introduction, the “Great Migration” of black laborers out of the South has been heavily studied.
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production had mechanized. Southern counties which retained cotton as a significant part
of the local economy into the twentieth century retained a high percentage of their black
populations until 1960, despite mechanization.
As rural communities, the small towns and hamlets in Fayette and in Haywood
counties were, as historian Robert Weibe aptly phrased it, “island communities.” One
local woman recalled that with the end of the war “everything happened at once”: rural
electrification, road improvement, and the prevalence of consumer goods that most
people in the county—black and white—found remarkable. 14
Agricultural economics and land consolidation
Though the national locus of cotton agriculture shifted westward as the industry
modernized, the key cotton-producing regions of the old South and West Tennessee did
retain labor forms developed in the postbellum period. Sharecropping and rent tenancy
was common among black and white rural laboring families across the South but
concentrated deeply in the cotton-producing Delta, even as production shifted to other
regions of the country. Shown in Figure 1.3, Haywood and Fayette counties were tied by
crop and social structure to the Mississippi Delta. Resistance to social change was strong
in the historic cotton-growing area. As cotton cultivation expanded to an industrial scale
measured in millions of acres and bales, regions that lacked the Delta’s concentrated
labor force and field-labor tradition tended to develop and adopt more modern and
efficient power sources much more quickly. As soon as self-propelled mechanical power
was adapted for fieldwork, producers looked for ways to cut labor costs by mechanically

14

Robert H. Weibe, The Search for Order, 1877–1920 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967), xiii;
Anonymous interview, 2008 Oct 17. Transcript in possession of author.
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Figure 1.3

“The Delta of the Mississippi, the core of the segregation problem in the
United States.” Haywood and Fayette counties (at top) were tied more
closely to the social and economic conventions of the Delta than to other
Tennessee counties. 15

harvesting crops cleanly and effectively. By 1950, cotton harvesters had been the subject
of tinkering invention, patents, experiments, and field trials for a generation. 16 While
most of the country mechanized cotton production almost as quickly as the technology
could be invented and perfected, partly because the Delta retained a dependant and pliant
labor force, cotton production there did not mechanize on a large scale until after the
15

Illustration from The Southern Patriot, Special Supplement, 1963 Feb. Image has been adapted

slightly.
16

Charles S. Aiken, The Cotton Plantation South since the Civil War (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1998); Pete Daniel, Breaking the Land: The Transformation of Cotton, Tobacco, and
Rice Cultures since 1880 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1985).
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Second World War. There are thousands of local variations to the chicken-and-egg
question of whether the Delta cotton production mechanized late because it had a firm
grip on its labor force, or whether its grip on labor kept it from mechanizing until later. In
Fayette and Haywood counties, the latter reason is probably more accurate. There,
agricultural landowners seemed unwilling to incur the high costs to mechanize while they
had a reliable low-investment labor force. Only when the labor force began making
demands beyond the places custom allowed did the “costs” of manual field labor become
too high to be borne. Cotton could be cropped by outmoded field labor and things could
be “as they had always been” as late as 1960 because both counties were home to stable,
cheap, and dependent laboring populations.
Tables 1.2a and b illustrate one result that mechanization and modern agricultural
chemistry imposed on cotton cultivation. Between 1951 and 1969, cotton production
acreages in both counties declined by almost a third, while actual yields declined by only
about fifteen percent. The shifts reflect several closely integrated factors. One factor was
the adoption of field chemistry. The second was field mechanization, which transported
and distributed chemical fertilizers and herbicides as well as planted, cultivated, and
harvested crops. Motor-driven equipment expanded the reach of a single farmhand’s
labor dramatically, making it possible for fewer working hands to cultivate increasingly
larger acreages. 17 Mechanized equipment standardized and replaced laborious processes
at every stage of cotton cropping: the row-by-row, human and animal-powered field
preparation, planting, chopping (weeding), and eventually harvesting was replaced by
17

“Machinery Takes Over Cotton On Medlin Farm,” Fayette Falcon, 1959 Oct 22; “Negroes on
Southern Farms Drop 200,000 Since 1954,” Pittsburgh Courier (Southern ed.), 1961 Oct 28;
“Sharecroppers At End of Row In Deep South,” Pittsburgh Courier (Southern ed.), 1961 Dec 14 provide
contemporary comments on the effects of mechanization.
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Table 1.2. Cotton yields, by year. 18
a. Haywood County.
Census

acres

500lb
bales

1949
1954
1960

58,236
49,150
38,900

44,150
38,400
43,340

Census

acres

500lb
bales

1949
1954
1960

64,683
48,050
42,000

32,662
43,900
40,730

b. Fayette County.

ever-larger, tractor-drawn deep-furrow plows, row-seeders, sprayers, cultivators, and
harvesters. The higher value of the end product—better lint quality (and thus more
valuable cotton) cleanly picked slowly by hand—was offset by the messy, less efficient,
but much faster cultivation of sometimes dramatically larger acreages. Then also, if
tractors required expensive maintenance, they at least sat quietly in a shed and did not
make demands of their operators.
The human cost of agricultural mechanization was well understood by 1960.
Luther Adams summarized how New Deal income-parity payments, designed to increase
commodity prices by decreasing yields without crippling farm income, subsidized the
18

The figures represent ginned rather than running bales. Data for 1949 extracted from United
States Census of Agriculture: 1950, v.1 Counties and State Economic Areas, pt.20 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1952), 77–78, 120–121; for later years from summary statistics for 1954–2000 supplied at my request by
the National Agricultural Statistics Service. These figures should not be taken as absolute; an important
change in the way production figures were compiled is related in “Introduction,” Cotton Production and
Distribution, Year Ending July 31, 1961, Bulletin 198 (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1962), vii–viii.
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replacement of field labor with mechanical power. The unintended consequence of the
federal program to stabilize farm families was instead to generate the first broad series of
tenant and sharecropper evictions between 1935 and 1937. 19 By the Second World War it
was clearly understood that the adoption of mechanical power in the field would not
make existing workers more productive, it would simply render them obsolete. In 1941 a
Department of Agriculture report observed that “nearly every one of these tractors has
pushed a few tenants, sharecroppers, or hired hands out of jobs.” 20 Even social activists
in the heat of the Civil Rights Movement had to admit that “the process of taking over
sharecropped land to be worked by more efficient . . . machinery had been happening for
years, though very slowly.” 21 The shifts that activists discovered beneath white political
retrenchment were already well understood by agricultural economists like John L.
Fulmer. As early as 1949 Fulmer catalogued the social changes inherent to federal
subsidies, field mechanization, urbanization, crop succession, and land consolidation. 22
Adams observes that whereas the Great Migration of the 1910s had been motivated by
opportunity, the Second Great Migration of 1940–1970 resulted chiefly from landowners’
technological decisions, which changed the nature (and scale) of commercial agriculture
and effectively eliminated the market for manual labor that represented agricultural jobs.

19

Adams, “Headed for Louisville,” Journal of Social History, 409–410.

20

US Dept. of Agriculture, The Farm Security Administration (1941), 3–4, quoted in Broadus
Mitchell, Depression Decade: From the New Era Through the New Deal, 1929–1941 (1947; New York:
Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1961), 220–221.
21

Roger Phenix, “Haywood County History,” 38:9 Braden papers.

22

John Leonard Fulmer, Agricultural Progress in the Cotton Belt since 1920 (1950; Chapel Hill:
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2011). cf. Gilbert C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More: Southern Agriculture
1865–1980 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 180–206.
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Figure 1.4.

Surprinted postcards SK-55 (top) and SK-58 published by Curteich for
Thompson's Community Service, 1964. The quaint nostalgia of Fayette
County’s industrial base is fairly clearly implied. 23

23

10:8 Gabriner papers Mss 575. A copy of the SK-55 carrying a Somerville surprint can be found
in 1:6 WTVP records.
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Table 1.3. Tractors operating on farms, by year. 24
a. Haywood County
Census

Farms w/
tractors

Total
farms

1949
1954
1959

845
1,041
1,103

4,742
4,287
3,077

Farms w/
tractors

Total
farms

b. Fayette County.
Census
1949
1954
1959

662
736
866

5,015
4,189
3,313

Tennessee’s black-majority counties of Haywood and Fayette may have trailed the
national trend by a couple of decades, but modernization was economically irresistible.
Agricultural modernization would not fully take place in either county until the mid and
late 1960s, but figures from the agricultural censuses, related in Table 1.3, make it clear
that while the replacement of field labor by mechanization may have come later to these
two West Tennessee counties, the process was under way by 1960.
By 1960 the decline of field labor this last corner of the Southern cotton delta had
the same telling effect it had elsewhere two decades earlier. As one visitor to Fayette
County noted, “Mechanization of these farms has apparently been progressint [sic] more

24

US Bureau of Census, United States Census of Agriculture: 1954, v.1 Counties and State
Economic Areas, pt. 20 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1956), 96–97; ibid. 1964, v.1 State and County Statistics,
pt. 31 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967), 186–187, 260, 262. By 1959 animal power had been dropped from
the national surveys and local statistics.
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rapidly during the last several years and some termination of tenant arrangements is
apparently normal.” 25 Farm families noticed. “The mechanical pickers had been used in
the bigger fields down South for a long time,” remembers Alabama-born writer Rick
Bragg, “but it was the late 1960s before they began to gnaw their way through the fields
that ringed our lives.” 26
Labor surpluses and non-farm industrial development
Though the numbers of farms with tractors declined slightly in both counties, the
drop might be accounted for by the second outcome of mechanization—a drop in the
overall number of small farms and the consolidation of land holdings in the hands of
larger farm owners. Mechanization reduced the number of field laborers needed to
service crops. It also allowed smaller numbers of farmers to operate progressively larger
acreages. Since Reconstruction, this had been a region of rural small-farm families. That
fact of life was changing. In 1959, 92% of Fayette County’s and 89% of Haywood
County’s cotton-growing farms were less than twenty-four acres. Between 1959 and
1964, the change in harvested acreage overall was virtually identical: in both counties it
increased to nearly 120,000 acres from the 104,000 acres farmed five years earlier. The
number of farms harvesting fewer than twenty-nine acres of all crops fell from 2,515 to
1,640 in Fayette, and in Haywood from 2,123 to 1,473 respectively. At the same time, the
number of farms harvesting more than 200 acres of cropland increased from 58 to 143 in
Haywood, and from 59 to 114 in Fayette County. Each farm represents an average

25

Elmer Neufeld to Leo Driedger, 1961 Jan 11, “Fayette County – General, Jan 1961,” Section III
1909–1965 General Office Files, series A280 “Reprisals, Tennessee,” NAACP records.
26

Rick Bragg, All Over but the Shoutin’ (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 73.
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displacement of twenty-five manual-labor tenant families. Farmers may have been
declining, but farming remained a vibrant business. 27
Replacing field labor with field mechanization also contributed to concentrating
land ownership. Small farmers who attempted to continue cropping their own land soon
found the return on investment of a small-holding was inadequate. They often sold out,
assumedly to pursue non-farm wage work elsewhere. Even though a large percentage of
tenancy existed in both counties, newer forms of labor arrangements—a change to fixedwage labor—were making inroads. As shown in Figure 1.5, farm renting (cash renters,
crop renters, and sharecroppers) was common, but the large number of red dots in the
image shows sharecropping was in steep decline across the rural South well before the
civil rights movement really began. The similar decline in Fayette and Haywood counties
were not exceptions. As an agricultural production base, sharecropping was on its way
out well before 1960.
The net effect of field mechanization and land consolidation taken together meant
that the real number of farmers in the two counties fell by half between 1964 and 1969,
while the numbers of farms fell by more than half. The number of farms where total
annual income did not total $5,000 (a benchmark that is somewhat deceptive, since it
would have included non-farm incomes) was reduced by nearly two-thirds. Despite the
large farm-population decline, the cultivated acreage in Fayette declined by barely 10%

27

US Bureau of Census, United States Census of Agriculture: 1964, v.1 State and County
Statistics, pt. 31 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967), 261–262. Keep in mind that often a single owner
controlled several separate farm properties within the county that would have been counted separately. A
sharecropper's or tenant's allotment, though owned by someone else, would have been counted as a single
farm.
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Figure 1.5a

“Farms Operated by All Tenants,” 1950. 28

Figure 1.5b

“Farms Operated by Croppers—Increase and Decrease,” 1940–1950. 29

28

US Bureau of Census, United States Census of Agriculture: 1950, v. 5, pt. 5 “Farm Tenure: A
Graphic Summary, 1950” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1952), 25.
29

US Census of Agriculture: 1950, v. 5, pt. 5, p. 22.
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and increased by the same amount in Haywood. 30 By 1971 the broad base of Fayette and
Haywood’s traditional agricultural economies was clearly narrowing, eliminating huge
numbers of small farmers and consolidating control over land into fewer hands, while at
the same time expanding productive capacity for cash crops.
Control of the counties’ traditional agriculture and land was entrenched among
their elites. They were in the economic position to dominate the small local businesses
that catered to the needs of agricultural production. About the only individuals who did
not own or operate farm property were a few white store owners around the court squares
of both county seats. White landowning families had begun dominating farm and regional
nonfarm incomes a generation earlier. In Fayette, physician John W. Morris was the
county’s largest landowner and farmer, though his day business was a local medical
practice. Reuben Rhea Sr., who married into the land-wealthy Burnette family, owned
and operated the Gulf Oil distributorship in Somerville, which supplied service stations
and dry cleaners and delivered bulk fuel to farms. He was the majority owner in
Woodburn Farm, a huge holding just west of Somerville along Highway 64, and was a
director in the Somerville Bank and Trust.
Families like the Rheas, Yanceys, Cockeses, and Williamses clearly occupied the
economic high ground, which also gave them personal standing and influence over local
politics. They held enough fiscal capital from diversified investments that they could
absorb the expense of technological shifts and investments needed for crop succession
without undue pressure. Even the “middle” class landowners, those who farmed between
30

1969 Census of Agriculture, v.1 Area Reports, part 31 Tennessee, tables 2–4 (Washington, D.C.:
Dept. of Commerce, 1972), 193, 305. Keep in mind that the reported average for black sharecropping
families' incomes a decade earlier was about $860 annually, a figure that did not include “run money” or
employer credit advanced against crop shares. See also chapter 6.
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fifty and four hundred acres, were in a relatively stable economic position and able to
weather change. But the 1960 census figures show that both groups were distinct
minorities. The bottom three-quarters of the population, a sizable majority of which was
black, owned only their labor.
Thus, by 1958 agricultural mechanization was poised to create labor surpluses in
a pair of counties that had no other need or employment for unskilled field labor. The
majority black population had long been an important local asset; that same population
became a dramatic liability as fields and farms grew larger and tractors and harvesters
replaced hands and mules. Farm consolidation reduced the numbers of white farm tenants
as well. Although farm owners seemed not to mind losing surplus black farm labor,
without farm work the counties’ white elites were faced with losing their own sons and
daughters to out-migration as well. If stable non-farm employment could not be secured
locally, the minority population risked becoming a smaller minority.
Until field mechanization (particularly for cotton culture) redefined production
arrangements, no effort was made to develop employment beyond agriculture or
agricultural-service businesses until half a decade after the Second World War. In 1952
the H & C Table Co., a small-scale furniture manufacturer, established a plant in
Somerville. Other than agricultural service businesses or retail stores clustered around the
court squares, it was the first non-farm or farm-service employment opportunity in either
county. As outmigration increased and farm populations declined after the war, it became
clear that each county needed income alternatives to keep their children’s families at
home. To provide an anchor for those desirable (white) workers, both counties began
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organizing to court light industrial development by 1959.31 By that point, tenancy among
the counties’ white population was declining quickly but still accounted for the
overwhelming majority of work arrangements among the employed black population;
tenancy did not represent “a job” in the sense we think of it now. It was much more like
participation in a commune where every task was valued for its contribution to the whole.
By 1964 the counties had a scattering of small light-industrial plants that included the
Sarkes Tarkanian electronics assembly plant and a feed-mill manufacturer in Brownsville,
a pipe foundry in Rossville, steel tubing firm in Moscow, polyester resin plant in
Piperton, clothing assembly (sewing) plants near both county seats, and a bicycle seat
factory outside Somerville. They employed virtually no blacks. Both counties were
committed to attracting more businesses. Local industrial bonds were passed almost
annually in hopes that spurring development would help the communities to pull out from
near the bottom of national poverty rankings. With an untrained workforce and almost
every other county in the region offering the same incentives, industrial development was
an uphill fight to which Haywood and Fayette counties had come late. Not all industrial
change was positive. The Wells-Lamont glove sewing plant in Brownsville closed when a
sister plant elsewhere automated and absorbed its product line. 32
Sharecropping and tenancy, dependence and paternalism
At the close of the 1950s, economic existence in Fayette and Haywood counties
teetered between worlds. Black farmers owned approximately 11% of the land in Fayette
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Fayette Falcon, 1961 Dec 28. “Community to ‘Roll Out Red Carpet’ In Search of Industry,”
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County and paid about 10% of the county’s total tax income. 33 Far more of its black
citizens were involved in traditional tenant labor forms, defined by color, which
dominated both communities. Color also defined employment privilege in the emerging
non-farm economy. The small number of available industry jobs typically provided
secondary incomes, work for local women or non-farm incomes for white men who
farmed their land after work and on weekends. Agriculture remained the key to fiscal
stability in both local economies. Census statistics demonstrate how strong a grip
“traditional” plantation agriculture had over cash-crop production in these two counties.
Yet by the time that the first stirrings of civic identity and activism began among the
black population, and as the 1959 agricultural census data was reported, it was clear that
tenancy was in full flight. In the five years between 1954 and 1959—effectively before
the civil rights efforts in either county—the acreage harvested by tenants fell by 22% in
Fayette County and by 23% in Haywood. 34 The figure entered freefall in the next decade
and by 1970 sharecropping were essentially nonexistent. 35
Until the counties replaced them with other employment patterns in the late
1960s, tenancy arrangements defined existence and shaped interaction for the black and
white populations of both counties. For the large population of asset-less laborers,
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cropping on shares was a perpetually losing bet. In principle, tenancy was an agreement
that balanced assumed risks between the parties. A landowner contributed the land, seed,
and fertilizer for his half or third of the value of the crop produced by a tenant, calculated
at the end of the season. Depending on the arrangement and the reputation of the tenant,
power (animal or mechanical) and farm implements might be contributed by either party.
The tenant’s chief contribution was their time and effort during the crop cycle, and often
their family’s labor as well. Because shares of the crop were calculated only against yield
and expenses, the parties settled their claims against the remaining profit at the end of the
crop season in November or December.
Significantly, the halves or thirds arrangement addressed only the disposition of
the yield. The arrangement intentionally left open and unstated a tenant's need to sustain
themselves through the year. The fallacy of sharecropping “contracts” was that the
landowner and the laborer were contributing equivalent assets and were assumed to incur
equivalent risks and responsibilities. That was hardly the case. Tenants, black or white,
typically had little beyond their own hands, arms, backs, and those of their spouses and
children. Whites’ contributions to the paternal side of dependency revolved around
“furnishing.” Labor agreements were typically limited to a statement of shares (thirds or
halves being the landowner’s portion) and the use of a structure that would serve as a
dwelling. Since there was no wage implied and no cash changed hands, any other
payment or advance was “furnished” out of the landowner’s largess, not as an obligation
on their part. In a 1952 study of the legal aspects of sharecropping A. F. Robinson
observed that “‘there is an interesting ambiguity about sharecropping, which is often
revealed in subjective evaluation: the supplier of labor may choose to regard it as a form
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of tenancy, while the supplier of land may consider it as a labor hire arrangement.’ That
is, landlords and laborers did not have to explicitly stipulate whether an arrangement was
sharecropping or tenancy to agree to a contract, though the resulting ambiguity
sometimes led to conflict.” 36 Few institutions existed to support farm laborers since they
had few assets for collateral. Because a tenancy arrangement covered only the costs of
crop production and because tenancy bound them to an individual landowner until
settlement was made on a crop, sharecroppers relied on the landowner to supply basic
commodities against the value of the cropper’s share at harvest. Typically families were
allowed to use additional acreage for gardens, animals, and a corn crop, but corn did not
buy tires, or clothes, or pay medical bills. “It is their practice,” wrote an observer from
Chicago, “that money for living expenses is prorated over a five-month period, March
through July.” 37 “Run money” sustained a cropper during the spring, the time of year
when families were at their most vulnerable (spring planting required assets, and gardens
were not yet producing subsistence), but created an additional obligation against the
cropper’s share over and above the third or half owed by the cropping arrangement. By
the end of a year, because no other consideration was due a tenant other than the
percentage of the crop value at harvest, landowners had claim against the tenant’s share
for any credit, cash “run money,” or the value of “furnish” goods extended during the
year. Importantly, only the debt obligation was a matter of record, not the actual values of
36
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goods or credit supplied by a landowner, and the sharecropper was given no receipts.
Since the landowner typically maintained the only record of advances against credit (if, in
fact, kept at all), laboring tenants were forever at the mercy of the landowner’s statement
about the value of what had been extended to them and how much the crop brought
before the end of the year. Lacking any protection or recourse under the agreement, field
laborers were left dependent on the landowner by virtue of having a “contract” whose
terms were enforceable by only one side. 38 A good illustration of the way arrangements
worked in practice can be found in an informal report Robert Gabriner made of Willie
Williams’ cropping arrangement with his unnamed landlord.

Mr. Williams works the white man's land with about 5 other families and in return
gets 10 acres for his own profit. Williams is able to take 5 bales of cotton off his
small plots and makes $750 ($150 per bale). He pays $200 for using the white
man’s tractor and has debts on account usually amounting up toward $500. The
man works 12 hours a day for almost nothing. Who says these people are ‘lazy
niggers?’ They work harder than any of us. 39

Tenant families lived a hand-to-mouth existence in the best times and often
supplemented their farm work by cash work in some other employment. The John and
Viola McFerren family, a couple who became key figures in the rights struggle in Fayette
County, provide a good comparison. In 1971 Viola McFerren recalled that at the time
they registered to vote in 1959, they were farming eight acres of cotton as their cash crop
and about the same amount of corn, chiefly for family subsistence. Like many who could
not subsist strictly from sharecropping, John McFerren also did day labor of various
sorts. “He used to cut logs and haul timber where he could find it as a sideline,” his wife
38
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recalled. 40 Such day-labor conducted outside a dependency relationship typically paid
cash, whereas cash-crop income from cropping on shares was almost always entered once
annually, after the harvest, and was accounted by a complicated system of credit and
debit which was both calculated and recorded by the landowner alone. Anecdotally, those
who had no non-farm income seem to have farmed larger acreages than those who could
secure another income.
Income from cropping was always meager or conducted at a loss for the laborers.
Often their profit from a year’s labor was nominal. We have no production records that
would prove or disprove intentional exploitation by landowners and are left with the
anecdotal evidence of hard-time memories and hearsay assertions by former workers. It is
difficult however, not to question the stark inequities evident in living arrangements.
The hollow-eyed want of sharecropping was clearly not the lot of landowners.
While both counties were decidedly rural, few were “rich” except as measured by the
yardstick of local standards. Still, landowning families were distinctly better off than their
farmhands. Emmett and Ethel McNamee, for instance, enjoyed comfort and a
comparative opulence they simply denied Georgia Mae Turner, their tenant of thirty-eight
years. Turner, one of the earliest residents of Tent City, provided one of the few
unfettered first-hand accounts of tenant relationships in the region. “This tent is better
than my house with Mrs. McNamee,” she told James Forman and his tape recorder in late
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Figure 1.6

Typical tenant housing in Haywood County, 1966. 41

December 1960. “Lord, so many cracks in that house, you could shake hands with me
any time. You didn’t have to come to the door to do it. When it rained, it would be wet all
over the house, the hall, the porch, the kitchen. It would be just like I done scoured.”
Turner was admitted once a year to her landowners’ home as a personal treat and
compared it to the structure they provided her. “When it was cold, the wind would blow
through that house just like it do out of doors. Couldn’t take a bath in the winter. How can
you strip off in the house [when you] can’t keep warm with your clothes on?” She
reported that the McNamees felt that they were not in a position to provide her assistance
toward raising a barn for her animals, build a chimney for her shack, or even afford her
shoes, but carpeted the den of their modern home with a lion skin. 42
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The terms of verbal contracts and expectations are largely unrecoverable but may
be glimpsed in statements made by affiants and in investigation testimony. The terms of
a labor arrangement between landowner and tenant did not only involve labor on the cash
crop. Landowners typically “made house available,” provided land for garden privileges,
and provided other assets (usually run money or furnish goods), which to them was a
manifestation of personal generosity. In return they expected compliance and deference.
Tenancy agreements were typically fluid and informal obligations, “made and broken
orally.” 43 They were rarely formalized in writing. The agreement between George Crout
and brothers John S. and Murray Parks is typical. “In the past, in November, I would
always ask Mr. Murray Parks or his father before he died, ‘Well, Sir, how about a home
for another time.’ The Parks always said, ‘Well, it’s yours for the next year.’” 44 That was
it. The practice of “contracts” was a matter of long-standing tradition and interpersonal
relations rather than of tort contractual terms. Consequently an agreement could be
terminated by the tenant moving off the land and out of any accommodations a landlord
provided, or by a landlord requesting the tenant to leave. Since landlords needed their
laborers from the time the soil was first worked in March or April, and the crop ginned in
November and December, agreements tended to be regarded as due for renewal between
the first of December and the New Year and last for an entire crop season. While most
were annual arrangements, longer agreements—including grants of lifetime tenure—were
also relatively common. 45
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Focusing only on the economic inequities that were seemingly inherent with
tenancy masks the deeper arrangements that govern the way society was defined and
organized by sharecropping and by race. Tenancy was a putative contract—or landowners
seem to have regarded it as such, though virtually none were ever reduced to writing. The
owner-tenant agreement contractually established a relationship between theoretical
equals, but in practice the contract formalized an inequality that always left field hands—
black or white—dependent on employers willing to extend them help and sustenance as
patrons. Landowners were quick to point out that if a debt burden became too heavy it
was common for laboring families to disappear in the night, abandoning one tenancy to
pursue another start elsewhere. Such incidents were rarely prosecuted because another
tenant was always eager for “a place”; there was nothing to be gained from those who
carried away virtually nothing with them. More typical and virtually unmentioned was
that families worked for years, often decades, for the same landowners without ever
realizing an improvement in their conditions. The reality was that sharecropping drew
farm laborers into a dependency/paternalism relationship that they could not escape but
which dictated virtually every aspect of contact with other people and the larger
community.
Because laboring families (white and black) existed under the economic and
social protection of their landowning employers, white employers asserted the privilege
of telling tenants what to do beyond the work setting as well. Employers assumed that
they could and should define their tenants' attitudes and circumscribe their participation
in society at large. As nearly perpetual debtors, tenants were hardly in a position to argue
or resist. On a personal level, this was the manifestation of place ascribed to race
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generally. That relationship was manifested in every interaction between tenants and
anyone who might have contact with their employer. It affected even casual contact
between blacks and whites. In 1963 one white activist observed, “I’ve noticed that when
Negroes shake my hand the grasp is mealy, even from the most [physically] powerful
Negroes. But, I’ve also noticed that the same people go in for vigorous handshakes
otherwise. The fright is subtle.” 46
The west Tennessee counties of Fayette and Haywood both reflected the situation
summarized in Margaret Price’s influential report, The Negro Voter in the South, which
was released virtually at the same time as sparks of civic awareness began glowing
among the black majorities of both counties. Price observed that “counties of high Negro
population usually are high also in illiteracy and low in economic status, which leads to
dependency and susceptibility to pressure from the employing class.” 47 Price pegs a key
aspect of American rural racial segregation during the 1960s: it involved not merely the
marker of racial distinction but also economic and personal dependence on a superior
figure, typically an employer/landowner, which implies the existence of a social contract.
The dependency/paternalism relationship incidental to sharecropping and tenancy created
an unequal but definitely reciprocal suite of obligations that landowners were quite
willing to enforce.
***
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Economics, proximity, attitudes, demographics, and timing linked the two
counties in ways that geography and politics did not. Though they shared a border, both
counties were connected more closely to metropolitan Memphis than to each other. The
few direct links between civil rights efforts in both counties would be made by those who
came to participate from the outside: attorney James F. Estes, Justice Department
investigators, and later activists. Other than a few ineffective efforts at coordination, the
residents of each county would pursue their own agendas without cooperating directly.
As events would soon prove, the social stability in Haywood and Fayette counties
that whites identified as normal was really nothing more than an affirming fiction, a result
of being perched atop the unequal relationship of racially defined economic and political
equation of dominance and dependence. It existed because the traditional arrangement
could not be challenged successfully from the dependent side of the relationship; those
who enjoyed its privileges had no interest in changing affairs. Fayette County farmer and
part-time minister June Dowdy summed up traditional social relations in West Tennessee
in a sermon recorded in Cincinnati in 1961. “Race relation has been peaceful, yes, carried
on in a peaceful way in the past, because Negroes were satisfied to work as share
croppers, to work as wage hands, and to work as—at a low pay scale. They took the
white man’s word for everything. They took no part in the civic life of the community.”
Unable to account for a docility he did not espouse, Dowdy projected backward the only
explanation he could muster to explain why earlier generations had not acted out against
also-traditional injustice before the last years of the 1950s: “The older ones thought that
they were supposed to be subject to the will of the white man.” The experience of the
politically active Samuel McElwee family in Haywood County two generations earlier
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Figure 1.7.

West side of court square, Somerville, ca. 1961–1963. 48

suggests Dowdy’s perspective reflected only relationships he had known, but it is true
that civic identity and participation among blacks in Haywood and Fayette counties had
been forcibly repressed by the county’s white minority, bolstered by Tennessee’s Jim
Crow laws. Black sharecroppers’ “satisfaction” with their lot had become true as landand asset-poor blacks citizens who could not sustain themselves fell back upon
dependence as a survival mechanism. 49
By 1958, the residents of these two rural Tennessee counties were being pulled by
opposing forces. One force was the weight of tradition and stability, social inertia which
created an expectation that the relationships governing daily life in Somerville,
Brownsville, and their satellite communities would go on as it always had. The other
48
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force was the massive, slow, irresistible economic changes of postwar America. As the
nation boomed, areas around Haywood and Fayette were well on the way to
modernization. These two counties had long been stable exceptions, preserving by social
inertia a traditional system of dependency and paternal relationships even as modern
technology and views crept in. White citizens and their county leaders in West Tennessee
fully expected that modernity could be embraced and shaped on their own social terms
and for their benefit, a process that involved the majority populations of both counties—
black laboring families—only by omission.
So how much would be required to upset the increasingly delicate balance
maintaining tradition, and push these black majorities and white minorities into jangling
competition? Not much. No more than the weight of a few slips of paper in a ballot box.
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Chapter 2
Citizenships in a Segregated Society:
The Collision
We have probably gone as far as we can in the courts to obtain first class
citizenship. The rest of the work must be done at the local level. 1
Everything happened at once. 2
A month before Currie Boyd wrote his letter to the Justice Department, in June
1958 Mt. Zion Baptist Church hosted the Rev. James F. Estes of Memphis for its annual
Men’s Day Services. Estes held the pastorate of Vance Avenue Baptist Church on
weekends, but his weekday job was as attorney at law. His dual roles among the black
middle class provided him frequent speaking opportunities at various community
functions. In the pulpit at Mt. Zion Church, Estes repeated a message he shared often in
similar settings. He shaped the theme around a citizen’s duty in the Kingdom of God.
They had admitted their citizenship for Christ, he told his listeners, and thus “there was
no reason they should not ‘admit their citizenship for man.’” 3 Estes linked his audience’s
Christian faith directly to civil responsibility. One could not be a true Christian without
being an involved citizen as well, he proposed, invoking the Apostle James’ injunction
that “faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone” (James 2:17 AV). Being a citizen
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Figure 2.1

James F. Estes, January 1961. 4

meant pursuing a citizen’s duty, and that meant being a voter. This was a provocative new
idea at Mt. Zion Baptist Church, but by 1958 Estes had devoted nearly a decade to
refining the argument.
James F. Estes had actively pursued voting rights actions in Memphis, Jackson,
and Nashville since returning from military service and earning a Marquette University
law degree in 1949. One of very few black servicemen to hold an officer’s commission in
the U.S. Army during the Second World War, his post-war legal career had revolved
around local black veteran groups and institution building, notably the Tennessee
Veterans' Association and Veterans' Benefit Inc. Both of these non-profit organizations
were vehicles for community involvement and civic action among former servicemen.
Like politically active black veterans nationwide, Estes linked his work as a community
4
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organizer to both veterans and civic improvement through voter registration, individual
civic participation, and community institutional development. 5
The sermon deeply moved at least some among his audience. Mt. Zion deacons
Joe Patrick, Morgan Wright, and several others approached Estes after the meeting and
asked specifically if he would guide them through voter registration. Patrick, an
established black landowner, had “always wanted to vote,” and attempted to register in
time for the 1956 presidential election but been denied by county officials. Estes agreed.
A month later, Currie Boyd mailed his voter-registration complaint to the Justice
Department, probably unaware of what was happening a few miles south.6
Voter registration was limited to the first Wednesday of every month at the
courthouse in Somerville, making October 1958 the last registration date prior to the
November election. From his Memphis law office Estes wrote the Fayette County
Election Commission chairman, Somerville optometrist J. Basil Haddad, to be sure of the
monthly voter registration date and citizens’ responsibility to register and vote. Once
Haddad had confirmed the monthly arrangement in a written response, Patrick, Wright,
and four others presented themselves at the registrar’s office in the Fayette County
courthouse in Somerville. The registrar completed voter registrations for each man and a
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few spouses without incident, the county’s first black voters in two generations. 7 County
officials would exploit this seemingly small detail six months later.
By the end of the next registration the following month, about a dozen black
sharecroppers and some of their wives had managed to complete voter registrations.
Having even a small number of black residents register at nearly the same time looked
suspiciously like a challenge to the established order of county governance. Before the
general election was held on 4 November 1958, white landowners and employers
activated their traditional direct-control mechanism on the majority population: face-toface relationships with their employees, and invocations of paternal concern in the face of
possible danger. Initial responses to black registration followed time-honored
conventions. The well-oiled mechanism of dependency and paternalism worked
flawlessly in the face of this new challenge. One of the registrants, Will Selby, rented a
house from Oneida Parson; by the time he got home she had been told what he had just
done in town; she told Selby the same day to move out.8 Joe Patrick was called to banker
Ewing L. Hurdle’s office at the People’s Bank branch in Collierville. There the banker
privately told Patrick that he “feared for the Negro’s safety if he planned to exercise his
rightful voting privilege.” Hurdle admonished Patrick that he “was speaking to him as a
friend and didn’t want to see him get hurt.”9 The caution could have come from a
concerned friend and sympathizer, or from a cagy participant in intimidation, or been
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simply a measure protecting his investment, but the net effect was the same. News of the
individual warnings spread quickly through the small number of registered black farmers.
The county asserted that “Negroes are registered in this county, and did vote in the
election Nov. 4” but no one in the county could identify a black citizen who actually
voted.10
Trying to determine whether or not any blacks voted is much less significant than
understanding the precarious arrangements under which black field workers lived on a
daily basis, and how even an implied threat could curb action or initiative. Sharecroppers
existed in the mid twentieth century as the nation’s last subsistence-farming culture.
Living life on the edge of survival involves constant reminders that a slight interruption
could throw one into a fatal tailspin. The stability needed to pay down the heavy
obligation of annual debt depended largely upon the benevolence and protection of their
landowner. An accidental fire along one side of the cornfield, tires flattened on the tractor,
a reduction in allotted acreage—any unforeseen expense or interruption in income could
snap a cropper’s slender thread of subsistence. For two generations the white-eyed fear of
losing what little one could depend upon made sharecroppers in Fayette County cautious
and generally unwilling to assume personal risks. Though he was a landowner, warnings
like the one Patrick received had to be taken seriously. Living thinly on the margin
between subsistence and starvation, kept from disaster mostly through the agency of
white employers who owned the land they worked, tenants had little leverage to
challenge the terms of a dependence/paternal relationship. Landowners were the source
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of credit and credibility. “Mr. Charley” was supposed to look after his hands, and if he
thought enough to warn you, well. . . . The rumor of possible personal consequences for
voting was enough to keep virtually all of Fayette’s registered black voters from even
approaching the polls on election day. For those, like James Estes, who watched from
outside the county, the ploy was clear. “These negroes are still in fear because of having
registered, even tho they have not voted,” the lawyer observed the next week. “They have
expressed a desire that the federal government send representatives into their county to
make it reasonably safe for negroes to vote without intimidation or retaliation from
whites.” 11 Despite the setback, a few black residents in Fayette County, Tennessee had
successfully asserted that as individual citizens they could participate within the
exclusively public. This assertion of civic individualism challenged the nature of public
life as established and understood by the white minority.
After personal pressure kept most or all black Fayette County voters from the 4
November 1958 local election, James Estes considered options for increasing pressure on
the county indirectly. During a Veterans’ Day address in Memphis, visiting New York
congressman Adam Clayton Powell, the flamboyant Representative from Harlem and
only black member of Congress at the time, asserted that Haywood and Fayette citizens
had been denied their franchise in the general election held the preceding week. Powell’s
assertions drew a ripple of interest in the press, but no communications from him to any
other public official seem to exist in federal records. He may not have done anything
beyond make a few comments. Fayette County officials deflected criticism by pointing
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immediately (and without discussing numbers) to the black registrants whose names were
on the books. The Memphis Press-Scimitar approached the Justice Department about an
investigation in Haywood County, which a spokesman confirmed without comment.12
The order would have requested a “limited investigation” involving interviews of
complainants and county officials to confirm whether or not further investigation or
federal action was merited. No action was taken and no documents reporting the
November 1958 inquiries are known to survive. 13
The small group of black farmers blazed one short, halting step toward civic
participation in Fayette County. On the other hand, political activism among its black
citizenry was nothing new to Haywood County. There was a tradition—checkered,
certainly—of constructive black civic participation beginning with post-Civil War
Reconstruction. A branch of the Freedmans’ Bureau had operated in Brownsville until
1878. Samuel A. McElwee had been elected to the Tennessee legislature from Haywood
County. The participation did not last. During Redemption, newly empowered white
conservatives removed McElwee from office and chopped down the budding tree of
black civic involvement, forcing former slaves back into dependent subservience. Partly
because of that history, Haywood County was less tolerant of black efforts toward
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electoral, civic, or economic participation. In Brownsville of 1941, the organization of an
NAACP chapter and attempt to register black voters met a backlash of direct violence
that resulted in one of the last outright lynchings in the United States. The daily
intimidation and repression of paternalism were subtle but effective, yet it was the
arbitrary and terrifying apex of racial violence—lynching—meted out arbitrarily by the
same whites and county officials whom tenants had to trust for sustenance and paternal
protection, which was so deeply terrifying. A black tenant walked accommodatingly on
eggshells, especially when interacting beyond your landowner’s family, because you
were never certain how close to “Mr. Charley’s” line you stood. As a result, Haywood
County would not see even the token voter registrations of black voters. 14
The situation facing Brownsville in 1958, seventeen years after its last lynching
and only a year after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, was much different than it
had been at the cusp of World War II. A violent reaction to the new strain of black
activism was certain to bring swift federal intervention. To accomplish the same goal, that
of handicapping a potential electoral challenge from the majority population, local
officials tried a different tack. In Somerville, the fact that Joe Patrick and a handful of
others registered without incident set a precedent: officials could no longer say that black
citizens “did not” register to vote; in Brownsville, officials prevented any blacks from
registering by simply refusing to act in their offices as appointees. Reactions to the initial
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“threat” of black voters differed in each county; how the white “establishment” handled
the first black registrants determined the actions that could be taken later.
While Currie Boyd waited in Brownsville for something to result from his July
1958 complaint letter, he and a few others who wanted to vote began calling on Haywood
County Election Commission members for help or instructions for registering. Within a
month of Boyd’s first visit with county Election Commission chair Poston, Haywood
County voting registrar L. Malcolm Smith, registration clerk Virginia Farrow, and county
election commission member Leonard S. Smith all resigned their posts virtually at the
same time, each offering a different reason. As Boyd had found out, merely raising the
issue constituted a frontal assault on the structure of segregation. Those with power, most
of whom were county officials, began formulating a suitable response. Direct repression
was no longer an option, but stories of general success of “massive resistance” to school
integration in Virginia and elsewhere through the South filled local newspapers. Among
county officials, obstructive inaction was a well-understood and accepted response to
black activism. The law might enjoin specific actions but it could not coerce
participation.
The key practical obstruction for Boyd and other would-be registrants was
Farrow’s resignation as registration clerk. She resigned from her once-monthly duties for
the Election Commission position for “health reasons” (claiming to have an arthritic
spine), but curiously not from her full-time position in the county Employment Office,
where she worked daily. From the latter she simply took a leave of absence. She
eventually returned to work but not to her appointment with the Commission. Since
Poston was the only physician in Brownsville and thus likely her doctor, Farrow’s timely
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resignation—shortly after being asked to register the county’s first black citizen in a
generation—raises an un-provable suspicion about collusion. However, her decision fits a
broader pattern of individuals not wanting to be caught acting officially against the local
norms. Voting registrar Malcolm Smith and Dr. Poston were probably trying to undercut
the electoral process for their own ends of protecting minority control of the county. The
actions of Leonard Smith, Virginia Farrow, and later Election Commission appointees’
efforts to stay out of office, however, seem more likely to be individual attempts to avoid
being caught up in controversy. 15
The resignations left no one in the county with authority either to register voters
or to appoint a registrar, a fact that seems to have been lost on Currie Boyd and the small
group of emerging activists. Initially they pursued the quest for voting rights within the
rubric they knew: a black person who wanted something within the white world found a
white benefactor willing to permit, intercede, or negotiate in their behalf. It was
consistent within dependence/paternalism relationships to contact County Election
Commission members individually. Virginia Farrow, Dr. Poston, and Malcolm Smith
each had (or once had) recognized authority, even after explaining to Boyd’s group that
they now lacked statutory authority to act (which was true). But the pattern of
paternalism was replayed by other informants. White Dancyville landowner Katherine R.
Davis reported that two of her farm hands had approached her to get her agreement about
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their registering, and then approached a neighbor, Joe Moore, “because they knew Moore
and had confidence in him,” before she directed them to Poston’s office. 16
After his initial interview with Boyd in June or July 1958, commission chair Dr.
Poston kept a low profile. He avoided Boyd and the small group of similarly interested
citizens that collected around him. When he was cornered, Poston stalled, protesting that
nothing at all could be done about county voter registrations without a full commission.
James Estes and others thought differently. Currie Boyd was probably suspicious that
Poston had no intention of seeing the Haywood Election Commission back in
operation. 17 Before the end of the year Boyd made a personal trip to Nashville to see
what state officials would do about the election commission inaction in Haywood County.
There he met with Tennessee Secretary of State Joe Carr and other state administrators.
Each pled ignorance of the situation in Haywood and asserted that the state’s involvement
in elections was limited to ensuring that the county had a regularly appointed election
commission. Actual electoral proceedings were left to county officials. “The entire
problem was a local one,” Boyd stated later about the interview, “and that the State would
rather have such problems worked out by local authorities.” 18
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In the meantime, Estes’s involvement in Haywood County voter registration
question was distracted by a new development to the south. In September 1958, a few
months after Estes addressed the Mt. Zion congregation, the Fayette County sheriff made
a spectacular arrest. Sheriff David Myers and criminal-court clerk Thomas German
extradited fugitive Burton Dodson from East St. Louis, Illinois. The seventy-eight-yearold former sharecropper and part-time preacher had been in hiding from a capital murder
charge under an assumed name since 1940. For half a year after returning south, Dodson
was committed to state care for a pre-trial assessment of mental and emotional
competence. While their father was incarcerated and perhaps because the lawyer was
already linked to the county, Dodson’s adult sons prevailed on James Estes to take their
father’s sensational defense case pro bono. As a lawyer deeply committed to voting
rights, Estes probably saw the jury trial as an oblique opportunity to challenge the rigidly
stratified status quo.19
On the day that the trial convened in April 1959, Estes staged an entrance tableau
designed be conspicuous and perhaps to intimidate. Rotund and impeccably dressed in a
business suit, he pulled up on the Somerville courthouse square in a highly polished
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automobile. He was obviously not a sundried, poorly fed local sharecropper in field-worn
work clothes. Estes and a small entourage strode directly into the courthouse—not
through the basement side entrance that typically served blacks, but up the stairs, through
the main doors, and into the courtroom. As he doubtless anticipated, the entrance created
a stir and word spread through town quickly. One who noticed the spectacle was
sharecropper Harpman Jameson, in town for supplies, standing outside a store across the
street. With spring planting not yet begun and time on their hands, he brought brother-inlaw John McFerren to see what the black lawyer could do for Rev. Dodson.
Sharecroppers flocked to town for the rural spectacle. They were not disappointed. 20
Inside the courthouse Dodson’s trial was almost a pro forma performance; there
was no reasonable doubt that the jury would return anything but a guilty verdict, but the
case represented another significant break in social and legal norms for the small
community. Richard Couto later outlined two implications of Estes's trial tactics in the
Dodson case. First, Estes was probably the first black person in county history to enter
the county courtroom in a capacity other than defendant or janitor. The simple act of
striding purposefully through the doors and into the Somerville courthouse in April 1959
was an act of defiant bravado—a clear sign that place was being challenged. Second,
Estes refused to accept summary judgment and orchestrated a full jury trial for his client.
By ignoring intimidation and functioning competently among the rule-bound formalities
of the court, he made it difficult for Somerville to come up with or apply other
intimidation tactics that intensive news coverage would not report. His arguments were
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effective enough that the jury reduced the charge from a legally unsustainable first-degree
capital offense to a second degree conviction. 21 To see a black lawyer meet white power
head-on in its own courtroom on its own terms and to engineer a reduced sentence for the
nearly legendary figure of Burton Dodson, represented a paradigm shift. Square Mormon
remembered that “Before the trial it looked like the peoples in Fayette County was scared
that somethin would happen to em if they’d stand up, and I think they become convinced
through Estes’ actions that that wasn’t true.”22 The trial gave the rural black community a
lot to think and talk about.
To Couto’s list, two other points of significance about Estes’s action in the
Dodson trial should be added. Jury selection also provided Dodson’s lawyer an
opportunity to challenge the venire one by one in open court to take a stand about blacks
as registered voters. Since the law provided for a trial by one’s peers, and since juries
were selected from the pool of registered voters in the county, the question was directly
relevant to the trial, while at the same time forcing a public discussion of local social
discourse. Did they object to black citizens registering to vote? Surprising probably
everyone, “most” of the eighty or so prospective jurors (perhaps a journalistic
overestimate) replied that “they had no qualms whatever about Negro voters. They didn’t
care if Negroes voted or not.”23 A more nuanced and probably clearer view appeared in a
national black photo magazine.
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Time after time, Estes asked the white jury panelists this strategic question: “Are
you in favor of Negroes registering and voting.” Every time he asked the
question, the red faced veniremen would answer something like “Naw, I don’t
think Negroes should be allowed to vote.” Prospective jurors were being
disqualified. “But,” Attorney Estes says, “they finally caught on and pretty soon
everybody [to whom] I asked the voting question began answering ‘Yes.’ This
made the Negro spectators perk up their ears as they heard their bosses,
businessmen, and other white persons saying that they believed Negroes should
be permitted to vote.”24

Whether those being questioned on the stand responded sincerely, felt pressured by the
situation, or framed their answer as part of a tongue-in-cheek jest, the question asked in a
legal proceeding put a key issue about the limits of black civic participation within
Fayette County into the open. That Estes asked it at all allowed the idea of civic
participation to seep into the black community far more effectively than had his sermon
at Mr. Zion Baptist Church nine months earlier.
Finally, Estes’s very visible presence in Somerville allowed key local individuals
to form a connection to a competent figure from outside the community, one who held the
class stature and technical expertise previously enjoyed only by local whites. James Estes
was in a position to contribute ideas and functions that were simply unavailable to the
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rural black communities in either Haywood or Fayette counties. That link created a spark
almost immediately. Motivated by his questions to prospective jurors, at one court recess
during jury selection Jameson and McFerren, both military veterans, quietly approached
Estes and asked what qualified a man to serve on a jury. Estes replied that they simply
needed to be registered voters. 25 This was a revelation. Word got around.
Currie Boyd’s letter had alerted interested in the Justice Department’s Civil Rights
Division, but no action had yet been taken; it was not the only federal agency looking at
West Tennessee, either. Coincidentally, immediately after the Dodson trial in May 1959,
field investigators from the recently organized United States Commission on Civil Rights
stopped at the courthouse in Brownsville to look over Haywood County’s registration
lists. The Commission had been established as an independent fact-finding and
assessment agency by the Civil Rights Act of 1957. It had neither prosecutorial power nor
jurisdiction beyond compiling factual data and reporting on citizens’ access to public
services, practical participation in civic life, and assessing bias within government
programs. The Commission’s first report noted that the counties which generated a
complaint possessed common traits: they were rural counties in which agriculture
dominated the economy, with relatively large landholdings, little industry, high tenancy
rates, and low levels of education and income among tenants. Following the
investigators’ visit to Brownsville, the agency reported that Haywood County—one of
twenty-nine counties in eight Southern states from which a voting-related complaint was
received—had no registered black voters on its rolls. When investigators made a similar
request in Somerville, the small number of registered black voters (fewer than sixty out
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of a potential black voter population of over 6,000) provided a shallow foothold for
editorial grumbling in the Fayette Falcon about unmerited federal “harassment” about the
county voting lists. The local newspaper reported that the county voting records proved
blacks had not been prevented from registering, ignoring both the tokenism the small
figure implied and the intentional slowdown and obstructionism adopted by the registrar
to keep the number of registered blacks as low as possible. In Brownsville the StatesGraphic editor simply ignored investigators (and a year later, their report) with tightlipped determination and made no comment at all. 26
Currie Boyd and James Estes met around the time of the Dodson trial. The
Memphis attorney was becoming deeply involved as legal counsel to emerging groups of
committed individuals that were coalescing in both counties. Haywood’s group of
informally involved citizens and the small but growing number of similarly motivated
individuals in Fayette County still lacked the structure to provide a vehicle for
challenging the status quo. Drawing on his experience as a community organizer, Estes
proposed that the black citizens of each county organize themselves officially.
Organization provided an institutional platform for collective stability, coordination for
meaningful and effective action, an anchor for personal commitment to the cause, a voice
for communication, and a mechanism for recruitment and expansion that informal groups
simply lacked. In the last week of May 1959 Estes registered incorporation documents for
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the Haywood County Civic and Welfare League (HCCWL) with the Tennessee Secretary
of State's office.
Following the practice of the time, the incorporation certificate and other legal
documentation was sent from the state office in Nashville directly to the county clerk, to
be claimed there by a corporate representative. Boyd asked Stanton tenant farmer Omar
Carney if he would pick up the HCCWL incorporation documents at the Haywood
County courthouse the next time he was in town. He did. Leaving the building, Carney
was confronted by 89-year-old George W. Baggett, who blocked his path and demanded
“Where you going, boy?” Before Carney could answer, Baggett swung his cane or
walking stick into Carney's face, leaving a deep cut under one eye. The assault was
probably opportunistic rather than planned and may have been related to Caney’s
thoughtlessly walking out the main doors as a refusal to acknowledge place. The county
took no criminal action and Carney refused to press civil charges or name his attacker in
the press, fearing reprisal. 27 Perhaps because of this experience Estes did not file
incorporation for the Fayette County Civic and Welfare League (FCCWL), a point that
would contribute later to a fracture of the Fayette County organization.
Though his injuries were superficial, Carney sought medical help for his gashes
forty miles away in Memphis, probably for two reasons. First, medical care allowed Estes
to document the injury in a way that could not meaningfully happen in Stanton,
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Brownsville, Somerville, Covington, or any other rural community. Second, Carney knew
the white doctor in Stanton, who would want to know how the injury occurred.
Answering truthfully about the attack risked making the situation appear that he was both
out of place and accusing a white man. Evading the question or answering untruthfully
set him up as uncooperative or untruthful. The victim risked being perceived as a “bad
Negro” because of the incident; either way a high personal cost would be involved if he
were to get care locally. Even the choice to get medical help in Memphis exacted a
reputational price. Paternalism and dependency imposed a line between dominant and
subordinate parties that was negotiable only from one side. Blacks could not be perceived
as trying to relocate the boundary. Carney’s employer, Bond Morgan, later related a
paternal view of the situation. Morgan brushed aside the implication of an unprovoked
attack. To him, Carney’s chief offense was ingratitude; further, news reporting of the
incident caused Morgan personal embarrassment. As a returnee to the county, Morgan
implied that his longtime experience living and working outside Haywood County put
him beyond the sentiments that he tacitly agreed governed local race relations, but stated
that “if Carney was frightened, he . . . should have advised Mr. Morgan of his fright” and
“could have obtained local police protection.” Morgan failed to perceive the dependency
relationship he expected from his injured tenant, and either disregarded or utterly
misunderstood that local police and sheriff deputies actively enforced the social climate
of intimidation and dependence. However shortly afterward Carney quit Haywood
County and moved to Chicago. Carney feared reprisal for speaking against a white man,
even if justified by an unprovoked assault. Carney's landowner, Bond Morgan, saw the
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event in an entirely different light. He felt that publicity surrounding the caning reflected
poorly on himself as Carney’s employer. 28
Haywood election officials held to the practice of obstructing registrations by
asserting an inability to act in their office. For instance, when Currie Boyd approached
Poston a second time, he brought with him Charlie Ligon. Poston protested that without a
full election commission in place, new registrations could not be filed at all. His own
commission had expired the preceding April, but he said nothing about failing to return
his reappointment. He referred the group to Leonard S. Smith, who had resigned his
appointment following a job change, though he still lived in Haywood County and could
have served. The only other commission member, George F. Freeland, had died the
preceding year without a replacement. A meeting with any official or individual, whether
formal or informal, always referred them to some other individual in a ceaseless and
circular wild goose chase.
The systematic effort to solicit one or more influential white figures to intercede
illustrates an important point about expectations and relationships across race and
privilege. By approaching individual commission members and officials, Haywood
County citizens attempted to nudge a concession from the power structure by operating
within the county’s traditional dependency system: find someone willing to exercise
personal influence with other officials on behalf of a small number of would-be voters.
That attempt at securing an intercession followed the established pattern of paternalism/
dependence relationships, an arrangement which accorded effective control of social
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organization to the agency of individual private property holders. On one level officials
were correct: individually they had no authority to register voters.29 The implication of
those denials and referrals, however, was that they were also unwilling either to exercise
their personal influence, or to act with other whites in challenging the county's social
stratigraphy, an arrangement that precluded blacks from civic participation. Trusting in
the social strength of paternalism, Currie Boyd and those with him were looking
fruitlessly for someone who would intercede with the county political establishment on
their behalf; trusting in the strength of paternalism, whites invariably provided a credible
but superficial excuse why they could not act individually, unwilling to challenge the
status quo.
Actually, action addressing black voter registration efforts could be and was
taken, though it was not the positive intercession applicants hoped it would be. Despite
protesting to occasional small groups of black would-be registrants that nothing could be
done about the situation, Dr. Poston began quietly discussing the budding movement with
other power figures in the county. During one visit, Election Commission chair Poston
wrote down the names and addresses of those wishing to register and said he would see
what could be done. He was discretely followed to the courthouse by members of the
inquiring group, where he was found with Sheriff John S. “Tip” Hunter discussing the
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individuals on the list. 30 Hunter was notorious among Haywood’s black community for
his unapologetic racism and quick resort to violent enforcement tactics. He was the
officer who had detained Elbert Williams in 1941 on the night of Williams’ lynching. 31
Ideally the state government was above local paternalism, and Boyd’s visits to
Nashville had been attempts at seeing established law equitably applied. He trusted that
an exercise of state power would resolve the local impasse, without perceiving how
massive resistance could undercut established measures. The State Election Commission
reappointed Dr. Poston to the county body in November 1959, but the physician chose
not to return his oath to the state, a simple expedient that invalidated the appointment and
incidentally stalled the appointment of a country voting registrar, which in turn prevented
blacks from registering as voters. The state commission made two new appointments, but
neither completed the oath of office to qualify them. The Haywood County Election
Commission’s resignations and refusals to serve kept members of the county’s black
majority population from making the first step in overturning the established social and
county political order, individual sacrifices that accomplished a greater good of
stabilizing segregation and privilege. The state could do nothing without a recognized
election board and lacked any means to compel voluntary appointees to serve. No legal
mechanism was in place to handle a circumstance in which commission appointees
simply would not serve. It had not happened before. 32 A Memphis Press-Scimitar article
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captured the issues involved with the Haywood County Election Commission: if the
appointees “decide not to qualify for commission service, the state board likely faces
considerable difficulty in finding replacements for them. Reportedly, most white residents
of Haywood are reluctant to become involved in the controversial matter.” Since
elections are central to the function of the governance at all levels, failure to secure
elections was a serious matter, made doubly so as part of what appeared to be a broader
pattern of electoral discrimination between states.33
Inaction likewise invalidated a second round of appointments. The situation was
at an impasse. Haywood County was left with no legitimate means of registering voters
but also no means of conducting a valid election, either. The Brownsville City election
scheduled for 8 December 1959 was cancelled. After two more rounds of appointments,
finally in February 1960 the Republican member from Brownsville, Dr. W. D. Poston,
was joined by W. R. Gaters and R. W. Turner III, both Democrats and farmers near
Brownsville. The newly reconstituted Haywood County Election Commission quickly
appointed Clarence H. Berson as registrar. The county books “will probably be opened to
register voters about mid-April,” Poston declared, “as soon as they are straightened out.”
He declined to say what was wrong with them. 34
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It was not long before the white community became aware something was
happening, but how news travelled, how quickly it spread, and how widely things were
known is not possible to identify accurately. In both counties, blacks wanting to register
as voters began to experience direct pressure by the spring of 1960 not to become
involved. Those who were involved began finding that their anchors to daily life were
loosening. Tenancies were revoked, credit accounts were closed, and employment was
denied. According to later investigation testimony, most of this was applied personally,
one-on-one by landowners or employers. George W. Douglass recounted to investigators
a litany of hearsay accounts of charter members of the Haywood Civic and Welfare
League being evicted from their tenancies or suddenly denied service by businesses.
Former deputy sheriff Charlie Scott dismissed brothers Billy Martin Peterson, who
moved to Gary, Indiana, and James O. Peterson, who moved to Mansfield, Ohio, from
their tenant arrangements specifically because they were members of the HCCWL. Bill
Powell told Joe Sandlin he would have to withdraw from the HCCWL or lose his job.
Reprisals were more widespread than investigators were able to document. Many hands
flatly refused to cooperate with investigators. “Some of the victims were afraid to even
mention their situations for fear of bodily harm from the landlords,” Currie Boyd
reported.35 As far as a legal case went, the information from most of those willing to talk
to federal agents constituted only hearsay and not admissible evidence. Without direct
testimony, all investigators could do was compile interviews.
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Intervention
Though millions of new immigrants were acculturating to America, black
separateness was almost an article of national faith, even as the NAACP and other
organizations militated against it. By the time a moderate Republican, Dwight
Eisenhower, assumed the Chief Executive’s chair, civil rights was already a matter of
agitation nationally. Eisenhower accepted Franklin Roosevelt’s premise of “constitutional
moralism” and used Executive orders to repeal segregation in federal service. In his
second term the administration engineered passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
among the first national legislative actions to lean heavily on the idea of civic
participation as being limited by no other trait or qualification other than citizenship. This
new law provided a backdrop for the West Tennessee’s nascent conflict between similar
viewpoints about the same positions. Eisenhower’s steps to codify “constitutional
morality” virtually ensured that the federal agencies would act in these two Tennessee
counties at some point.36
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 created two agencies to measure and protect
citizens’ civic participation under an inclusive, liberal definition of rights. The United
States Civil Rights Commission (CRC) was established as a short-term “fact-finding
body,” a reporter and advisor which documented the degree of equity as governmental
programs were applied. The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
provided for enforcement of federal statute at a grass-roots level. Even before the CRC
met formally, Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver wrote chair John Hannah that “I hope
the Commission will concentrate on this subject [voting], and not wander afield where
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the result will do nothing but muddy the waters of progress.” 37 Senator Kefauver pointed
out that denying the right to vote was the least defensible position Southern conservatives
and proponents of segregation could assert either by legal statue or in the name of civic
morality. An early attorney noted that the lawyers charged with enforcing the Civil Rights
Acts were fired by a “philosophy grounded in hope” that saw federal government as the
protector of both collective and individual liberties—not merely of individuals belonging
to privileged elites, but all citizens. “This kind of hope is not the same as optimism,” he
remembered. “It is not a willingness to invest in an enterprise that is obviously heralded
for early success, but rather the ability to work hard for something because it makes
sense, not because it stands a chance to succeed.” 38 The CRC began its work by
corresponding with newly appointed state commissions, and in 1959 held its first meeting
in Nashville, Tennessee.
Currie Boyd’s July 1958 letter to the Justice Department from Stanton, Tennessee
was one of the earliest voting-rights complaints received by the new Civil Rights
Division. The Justice Department considered unsolicited complaints seriously, but given
the nature of Curry Boyd’s letter, the Brownsville postmark provided an important
cachet. Boyd’s letter to the Justice Department was routed immediately to Henry Putzel
Jr., acting head of the still-new Voting and Elections Section in the Civil Rights Division.
Putzel was familiar with details in Margaret Price’s report on black voting which had just
been published by the Southern Regional Council. Her report noted specifically that
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Negroes in Tennessee generally found no opposition to their franchise, save for three
counties in the western third of the state where they faced opposition to voting or risked
intimidation: Hardeman County, Fayette County, and Haywood County. Currie Boyd’s
letter, with its Brownsville postmark, was partial evidence supporting her assertion. 39
Local activism for the right to vote in Haywood and Fayette counties was sparked by
people on the ground, but the movement for inclusion was never exclusively independent
or entirely home-grown. If residents of either county had relied solely on their own assets
and worked to resolve the situation only with local officials it is unlikely that change in
voting practices would have occurred. Largely because individuals in both counties
secured a powerful ally that local elites could not dominate, the federal government
applied enough pressure to disrupt tradition and re-divide the jealously held local
privilege of participating in elections. The courts exposed the lack of a legal foundation
for the traditional denial of black voting. Price’s study, Boyd’s letter, and Powell’s
statement had put a corner of rural West Tennessee on the Civil Rights Division’s watchlist by the late fall of 1958. As mentioned earlier, the CRC dispatched investigators first
to Brownsville and then Somerville in May 1959.
Fayette’s County’s Democratic primary of 1959
Against the backdrop of recent registrations by black voters, seventeen members
of the Fayette County Democratic Executive Committee met in the county court house on
20 June 1959. They constituted the locus of political and economic power in the county.
Its members included the county’s largest landowner, Dr. John W. Morris, and the county
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clerk and master of records and county attorney, Joe N. Cocke. With the windows open
and a buzzing electric fan stirring the limpid air, the gathered men discussed the potential
involvement (and consequences) of black voters in the local party primary election, and
looked for an arrangement that would limit public participation to only the county’s
reliable (that is, white) electorate. In the end they adopted a resolution that was lifted
from boilerplate legal text of earlier election resolutions. Longstanding consensus left
responsibility for the exact contents of the document to the group’s real political center,
secretary Joe Cocke, backed by Sam Dunn and a few others. The resolution was similar
to those generated in other years, with the addition of a single important word. “Be it
further resolved,” read the second clause of the resolution,

that all known white Democrats who have duly registered as required by law and
who will pledge themselves to abide by the results of the said primary election
and the support the nominees thereof and who shall be allowed to vote in the
General Election in August, 1960, and no other shall be allowed to vote in said
primary election. 40

In making this slight change to the language of a routine authorizing resolution,
the FCDEC members were asserting their belief not only about the boundaries of a
political party, but also an assertion about the nature of society itself. The FCDEC
statement was a socially conservative stance. It claimed that political parties, and by
extension the public society that elected office represented, were comprised of
overlapping shared personal interests and views. Party participation and membership in
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public society was exclusive, and only those who were mutually accepted across the
boundary could participate by right of informal and mutually defined membership.
As the August 1 primary election neared, nearly 600 of Fayette County’s black
citizens had registered to vote. Another 300 had attempted to register and for various
reasons had been unable to do so. On the morning of the election, Joe N. Cocke, the
county clerk and FCDEC secretary, distributed a letter to district election judges and
officials with the ballot boxes. “This is a WHITE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY,” read the
opening line of the notice. “If any Negroes should ask to vote in your district, they are to
be informed that ‘this is a White Democratic Primary and not a General Election.’” 41 The
few black citizens who did present themselves at the polls, including John McFerren and
Harpman Jameson, were turned away on the authority of Cocke’s letter. Three days later,
Haywood County held its local Democratic primary and a county general election. No
black citizens voted because none had successfully registered.
Since no other party had an organized presence in the county and Democratic
Party candidates ran unopposed, party primary elections were effectively election to local
office. The same was true for Haywood County. There had not been a contested general
election in either county for a century. Jasper B. Shannon had observed that in the
conservative South, “The Democratic party has become a symbol of a way of life,
fundamentally undemocratic socially, politically, and economically. The Democratic
Party is an order into which one is born; it is a tradition which symbolizes a long-since
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outgrown past whose perpetuation is a part of a creed of loyalty to one’s forbears.” 42 In
1959 Estes was certain the FCDEC had handed him an actionable offense, but first,
following the chain of authority to protest what he felt was an indefensible step, Estes
immediately telephoned the state Democratic Party chairman, Jimmy Peeler of nearby
Covington. According to a subsequent news report, Peeler told Estes that the state party
exercised no control over local primary elections and refused to arrange a meeting
between Fayette County Democrats and the black citizens with their lawyer. Peeler
instead invoked the conservative line, “be patient and things will work out themselves”—
a vague promise of eventuality lacking any commitment to meaningful effort. 43 Estes
filed a complaint with the Justice Department immediately.
Locating a sympathetic ear in the local office of federal investigators was no less
difficult. The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice was still green and
woefully understaffed. Responsibility for enforcing federal civil law fell directly on the
U.S. Attorneys scattered across the country. Investigative support was delegated to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which approached civil rights with long-standing
institutional reluctance. In West Tennessee individual Special Agents demonstrated their
capacity as service-minded, conscientious public servants, but experience also proved
that just as many were unsympathetic or outright hostile to that facet of civil law.
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The Memphis FBI office dispatched Special Agent Franklin L. Johnson to
investigate the events in Somerville at Estes’s prompting. Johnson, it turned out, was a
native of Williston in Fayette County and quickly alienated those whom he interviewed.
The black news outlets pointed immediately to the conflict of interest and “inheritable
loyalties.” Johnson “became angry when Negroes asked him to show some identification.
The agent was more interested in finding out who employed the lawyer to file a
complaint against county officials than in discovering if they were being denied
registration privileges,” Estes complained in a letter to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. “His
interest is divided between his native community and his service for the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.” 44 Estes also gathered a group and drove from Somerville to U.S.
Attorney Rives Manker’s office in the Memphis Federal Building. 45 Realizing the gaffe,
the Bureau quickly replaced Johnson with another Special Agent and the investigation
proceeded.
Estes’s action and Manker’s transmittal landed in the hands of Henry Putzel Jr.,
chief of the Voting and Elections Section, with cosmically perfect timing. The Justice
Department was already pursuing US v. Alabama, et al., another circumstance in which it
appeared that resignations by election commissioners had effectively kept potential black
voters from registering. The thematic connection to the Alabama case gave the
circumstances in rural West Tennessee immediate attention at a national level. On 16
November 1959 US Attorney Rives A. Manker filed a lawsuit, alleging voting
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discrimination, in the Western Division of the Second Federal District Court for
Tennessee. US v. Fayette County Democratic Executive Committee was the first voting
rights suit filed under 42 USC 1971(a) and (b), the Civil Rights Act of 1957. 46
With the Fayette suit filed and following a year of fruitless effort trying to start
voter registrations in Haywood County, James Estes found half of his rural institutional
and community development efforts suddenly left out. He hurriedly compiled seven
affidavits relating the experiences faced by would-be voters in Brownsville, hoping the
testimony would be enough of a foundation on which to file a parallel suit addressing
denials in Haywood County. 47 On 2 December 1959 Estes submitted them to the U.S.
Attorney in Memphis. The attorney forwarded them the same day to Frank Holloman,
Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) office in town, and
sent transcribed duplicates to the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. The
Attorney requested a “preliminary investigation” into the Haywood situation from the
investigative arm of the Justice Department, but Ryan failed to either file a parallel suit or
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to join the cases. 48 In the courts, the division between the circumstances was clear and
proper. The lawsuit and Estes’s affidavits represented addressed the actions of separate
institutions without jurisdiction in either neighboring county, but two cases on the same
point filed at the same time would have demonstrated an important pattern in the South’s
social setting, and would potentially create a broader legal base and strengthen the reach
of the resulting judicial decision. Despite the precedence of Currie Boyd’s letter and
Estes’s best efforts, the filing of US v. FCDEC divided the two counties in the attention of
both local and national media; the federal case allowed the Fayette story and its
personalities to eclipse Haywood, a situation neither the courts nor the media rectified. 49
The lawsuit reflected a political view of democratic participation which had
immediate roots in the New Deal’s brand of liberalism. The view argued by the
Eisenhower Justice Department saw American civic society as inclusive. Contrary to the
position taken by the FCDEC, the view of federal officials was that participation in any
public setting could not be limited to a privileged, exclusive group of any sort.
Citizenship was citizenship.
The defendants’ attorneys filed their answer to the federal suit—the second half of
the arguments laid before the federal court—on 16 February 1960, after several
continuations. The defendants’ filing made the typical assertions that the federal court
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lacked jurisdiction in the case and that there were no stated claims requiring remedy.
Both were throwaway legal arguments included in response to a complaint of any sort.
The heart of the argument was the “fourth defense.” In this point the defendants’ attorney
argued that the Fayette County Democratic Executive Committee’s holding of a primary
election was not a public act and did not constitute an “election by the people” as defined
by the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (which was the terms on which the complaint was filed).
The group picked up a thread stated in an earlier court decision that “exclusion by
political party of negroes from participation in a primary election was private or party
action and not state action.” 50 The argument expanded upon the idea of public society as
an exclusive group implicit in the “white primary” resolution authorizing the primary
election the preceding June. The response from the FCDEC argued fundamentally that a
primary election “was openly and avowedly a balloting of a limited, designated group of
citizens”—a private organization—and that as such was specifically not an “election by
the people” protected by the Civil Rights Act. The FCDEC stood firmly on the view that
a racially defined primary was a collective invocation of First Amendment’s guarantee of
both peaceful assembly and individual free speech. They also asserted than an open
primary unjustly denied the Fifth Amendment’s right to individual due process “because
it has the effect of depriving the defendants, as members of the limited, designated group
. . . of liberty within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment . . . without due process of
law.” 51 By their arguments, the defendants argued a view of “public society” that was
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aimed directly at not only preserving, but legally defining the prerogatives of those atop
the county’s stratified status quo. 52
The arguments made by defense attorneys illustrate the conceptual nature of the
South’s segregation. Conservatives defined the public as a closed and bounded social
space having clear, color-defined boundaries. The bounds divided those who were
mutually allowed within the public circle from those existing outside it. In this view,
society consisted of mutual agreements between private individuals, rather than a general,
abstract right of participation. Public functions were therefore exclusive; participation in
public functions (like elections, or county office) should be limited to those with
acknowledged standing in society. White tradesmen, laborers, and tenants could qualify,
but black ones could not. Color was the marker, not the motivator, for segregation;
segregation was a privileged definition of society, based on criteria that not every U.S.
citizen could meet.
With the case in federal court, the jerky attempts by both sides to flank the
opposition and get the upper hand in the rights issue was transformed into the slow,
formal waltz of jurisprudence. Investigators had the latitude to begin looking more
closely at the circumstances. Agents tabulated Haywood County voter registration
records in mid December, which were open public records by state statute. Investigators’
canvass counted 6,140 registered voters, all of them enrolled prior to the county Election
Commission’s resignations more than a year earlier, but showed “no indication of any
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Negroes registered” despite the fact that race was a data point included on the printed
registration form. However, the county was not entirely discriminatory in the way the law
was applied—seventy-four dead people continued to hold valid voter registrations. 53
As the District Court in Memphis waited for the FCDEC to respond to the suit,
the Voting & Elections Section of the U.S. Department of Justice reviewed testimony
from the Brownsville investigations. The entire Civil Rights division was staffed by
slightly more than a dozen lawyers charged with both civil and criminal jurisdiction of
civil rights cases of all sorts across the country. Lacking the manpower for a vigorous
enforcement effort, their role was limited primarily to monitoring developments.
When Haywood County finally qualified an Election Commission in late
February 1960, the Civil Rights Division noticed. In mid March, J. Harold Flannery
returned two assessments of the Brownsville situation, citing specific instances of
intimidation that “The Bureau [FBI] did not pursue . . . but limited its investigation to
interviews of those who accompanied Boyd on his fruitless rounds.” Both reviews
concluded that investigations in both counties nevertheless revealed evidence of
intimidation and that coercion was probably documented well enough to merit action
under the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Section (b) read “No person, whether acting under
color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such
other person to vote.” Though the statute had not been tried on merit in a civil action,
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Flannery found precedent for action in case law grounded on a parallel criminal statute. 54
Flannery asserted that the Department needed to discover for certain whether intimidation
was preventing individuals from registering or voting. With US v. FCDEC still looking
like it was headed to court, Acting Assistant Attorney General Joseph M. F. Ryan Jr.
requested a deeper look at Haywood County’s voter registration practice, opening a
second round of local voting-rights investigations. 55
Though defense attorney Lucius Burch was able to stave off a courtroom
confrontation over merits for several months, US v. FCDEC could not be postponed
indefinitely. As time passed and the defense team consulted legal authorities and
precedents, it became increasingly clear that despite assertions of constitutionality, the
defendants had no solid legal grounds and few precedents on which to argue their case.
The U.S. Supreme Court had already rejected one manifestation of the conservative
Southern basis for defining society exclusively, having struck struck down racial
primaries more than a decade earlier. In fact, more than anything, FCDEC’s clear breach
of settled law in Tennessee provided the opening for federal legal action filed under the
rubric of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. In late February the government’s case was set for
trial in federal court on Wednesday, 27 April 1960. 56
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Another turn of the legal waltz came on 25 April, two days before a federal trial
on the complaint was scheduled. With no meaningful chance of a legal decision in their
favor, the defendants capitulated and agreed to a consent decree, a tactical legal retreat.
U.S. District Judge Marion Boyd issued the decree in US v. FCDEC. “Without trial or
adjudication of or finding any issue of fact or law” the FCDEC agreed to the terms of the
suit: that neither the organization nor its members would “prevent the exclusion, under
the state or local law, community custom, or political party practice, on account of race or
color, of duly registered voters . . . from effective participation in any election.” 57 On the
surface, the plaintiff “won,” though without a fight that would have established a
precedent. In practical terms, nothing happened. Conversely, settlement of the case by
consent was significant for the deeply conservative local Democratic Party officials. The
decree allowed the court to impose an order on a single action without ruling on an
argument, settling a point of law, or deciding the merits of the case—leaving the
defendants without an admission of wrongdoing or providing the plaintiff standing for
future legal action. The consent decree, which essentially allowed the defendants to
escape actual responsibility for the complaint, provided the narrowest possible remedy
for the situation and kept the federal court system from gaining a legal foothold over
local political activity or its mechanisms.
Joseph M. F. Ryan Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney General for the Civil Rights
Division, explained in a statement to the press that “the purpose of the consent judgment
is to prevent the exclusion, on account of race or color, of duly registered voters of
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Fayette County from effectively participating in all elections.” 58 Time would prove that
until practical changes were enacted and enforced, the agreement covered only theoretical
participation and not actual participation in elections. The consent decree was a binding
agreement established between the parties in the court, but it was not a judicial decision
about actual offenses. The terms of the consent decree in US v. FCDEC limited its reach
to “the individual defendants in the activities of any committee or group calling,
conducting, or supervising an election.” It specifically excepted the individual defendants
“in their private, business, or professional capacities”—an enormous loophole. The
FCDEC as a whole and as individuals were prohibited from “the exclusion under state or
local law, community custom, or political party practice, on account of race or color, of
duly registered voters of Fayette County from effective participation in any election.”
They were also enjoined from preventing participation as well. 59 Since the decree
covered only FCDEC members and not others of the white community, nor of any other
municipality, county, or state in the country, and while the decree resolved an issue
“without going to court,” it provided a comparatively cheap and easy victory. It also
robbed the victims specifically of a legal precedent and rule on the point of law: they
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gained nothing but an intangible and unenforceable promise that the local party leaders
would not openly prevent them from participating.
Despite its flaws as a legal resolution, the consent decree accomplished one
important point. In a historical sense, the consent decree invalidated a tradition central to
the way that Fayette County’s social identity and organization was defined. Despite status
as a time-honored tradition, color-based disenfranchisement could not measure up against
the broader ideals in an American definition of civic society. The defendants’ answer and
eventual consent was also the first grudging but tacit admission that civil society was not
an exclusive and self-sustaining club.
***
Under the terms of the US v. FCDEC consent decree, limiting civic participation
by using race as a bounding factor was invalidated, but the broader philosophical issue
went largely unnoticed by both sides of the complaint. The judgment imposed a civically
liberal interpretation of law and participation. This case represented an important step in
redefining local civic participation as a boundless, inclusive social contract limited only
by citizenship, rather than as a bounded or exclusive social contract of private agreements
among privileged equals. US v. FCDEC reflected the key premise of the civil rights
movement: that the nation’s civic “space” was governed by rights incident only to
citizenship, rather than by personal privilege or social convention. “Civil” rights existed
beyond—or at least beside—the terms of personal rights and locally acceptable social
standing. Specifically, civic participation was not limited to white citizens. U.S. citizens,
white or black, had a right to be involved in elections as voters on the same terms. Time
and circumstances would prove, however, that county officials might agree to black
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participation, but they did not surrender an unstated intent to dominate the local electoral
process and retain control of the public as effectively as they ever had.
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Chapter 3
Registration, Embargo:
The Strategy
The political life of an oppressed people depends directly on their full
understanding of the nature of power and their true situation in the power
arrangements. 1
Ordinary people who learn to believe in themselves are capable of
extraordinary acts, or better, of acts that seem extraordinary because we have
such an impoverished sense of the capabilities of ordinary people. 2
Early in the morning on the first Wednesday of almost every month through 1960,
black sharecroppers would filter into Somerville from the tenancies and farms. This was
not a normal day in town for the farm folk. They came neatly dressed, many in their
Sunday-best clothes. By the time the courthouse opened for the people's business, an
orderly line stretched decorously down the sidewalk. They were waiting for the voting
registrar’s office to open and were there to register. By the end of the day the line had
moved only slowly. Registration clerks worked methodically, slowly, painstakingly,
completing individual qualifications tests and registration forms with measured precision.
Though the office opened only once a month, the office might be closed part of a day to
relieve a clerk claiming fatigue. When the office closed promptly at 4:00 most of those
who had waited patiently through the day walked away quietly. They would be back
again on the next first Wednesday. If they did not have a turn then, it would be in June, or
September, or December, but their turn would come.
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92

Whereas events in 1959 had been a contest of ideas, as 1960 opened, those on the
ground were making strategic plans for an impending conflict. The black majority’s
strategy focused on voter registration. County officials and businessmen took their cue
from a line in the consent decree, which specifically excepted individual defendants “in
their private, business, or professional capacities.” If those areas were not covered by the
agreement, then private, business, and professional capacities would be convenient
platforms for curbing civic activity, a process which began quietly.
***
In the first week of February 1960, Fayette County High School custodians Mae
Emma Dowdy, Versie Perry, Georgia Douglass, Dora Lee Mass, and Bertie Springfield
were dismissed from employment at the white school. When the women asked principal
Jack R. Morgan for a reason, he responded that he’d “rather not go into that.” Shortly, a
number of tenant farmers were asked to “stay out of [the] hardware store” at which they
had traded for years. Black landowner Shepherd Towles was surprised when the Gulf Oil
dealer, with whom he had maintained open billing for fifteen years, cancelled his account
and removed the fuel-storage tank from his yard. Most unusually, a large number of black
farmers in the county, estimated at 1,500, reported being “cut-off of credit by white
merchants as reprisal for their attempt to register to vote.” Many reported comments
“about getting rid of us.” 3 An imposition of economic reprisal on politically active black
farmers and field hands had an opposite effect, galvanizing its targets to action.
3
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Figure 3.1

Head of the segregated voter registration lines, where Mrs. Hugh Starks
registers voters in the Fayette County court house, 2 March 1960. 4

On 2 March 1960 Fayette County Sheriff David Myers opened the courthouse
doors and queued the collected crowd into segregated lines. In a bare second-floor room
the registration clerk Mrs. Hugh Starks methodically completed cards at a table,
alternating applicants in the segregated lines. Reportedly Myers or a deputy attempted to
push the lines of neatly dressed sharecroppers and tenants outside. “If whites can stand
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here, we can too,” John McFerren told a deputy. “This is a taxpayers’ building and we
pay taxes.” The row of white men and women typically had eight to a dozen individuals
waiting their turn; the line of black registrants stretched from the second floor room down
two flights of stairs, through the basement hall, and to the side entrance which blacks
were permitted to use. Through long-standing practice, voter registration was held one
day in any month. Given the composition of the crowd, county officials had no incentive
to meet demand by opening additional days. Despite the crowd, Election Commission
secretary J. W. Freeland claimed that “no negroes had showed up to register last month”;
an unnamed spokesman for the black community disagreed, saying they had been unable
to locate the appointed place within the courthouse. 5 The mass response among black
citizens in March sent an unambiguous message to white officials that the handful of
earlier registrations had only hinted: they were facing a potential takeover of public
offices by those outside their version of the public.
James Estes’s community-organizing efforts, the Civic and Welfare Leagues, were
hardly off the ground and cannot be credited with the initial rights activity in the spring of
1960. The early success of the voter registration efforts rested on the black communities'
informal networks of personal relationships, which linked church congregations, farm
tenants, and patrons of small rural stores. Development of the Civic and Welfare Leagues
promised an effective training regimen for leaders in both counties, but only time and
commitment could make them into effective community organizations.
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Against the backdrop of the hundreds of blacks folks standing in line for
registration and nine months after their first visit, federal workers arrived at the
Somerville courthouse a second time to confirm local accountability over voter
registration. The county’s three-member election commission and the voter registrar
promptly resigned over “federal interference.” 6 As it had in Haywood, the resignation of
the election commission effectively nullified the judicial decree. No entity at any level
could bypass the county government to authorize or conduct the functions of the local
executive-branch registering voters or holding an election. Though they now held the
abstract right to vote, no black voters could be registered, no new black electorate could
challenge officeholders, and—theoretically, at least—the elective offices could be held by
incumbents pro tempore indefinitely. There was still no election commission when US v.
FCDEC was signed in late April. Far from settling the issue, the consent decree simply
shifted the nature of the conflict from attempts to enforce local tradition, to attempts to
dilute the threat by pushing the problems out of the county.
Embargo
The implication of massive voter registrations among black residents was not lost
on the white community of either county. The huge numbers of potential black voters
began looking like an electoral threat to the county’s established and rigidly defended
power structure. Black adults of voting age outnumbered whites in both counties by
almost three to one. If blacks were unfit for office under prevailing social definition, and
if the federal officials kicked the prop from under one traditional means of holding power
(denying black electoral participation), then officials, landowners, and businesses had to
6
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find another method of limiting the number of black voters in the county, and that
reduction had to happen in time for the upcoming elections in late summer and fall. If it
was untenable to have large numbers of black voters in the counties, then there had to be
fewer black voters. White businessman Hayden Williams later stated the problem
succinctly: “if they registered[,] in order to keep them from out-voting them, they was
just going to have to move them out of the county.” 7 The problem was precisely how to
do that without resorting to a type of coercion that got noticed. Federal attention meant
that large-scale violence or intimidation, another tradition, was no longer an option.
Well before voter registration began in earnest, key members of the Somerville
business community had settled on a means of applying pressure to both tenants and to
independent black farmers. For tenants the matter was easy. Dependency/paternalism
relationships were grounded in an unwritten principle: that a cropper who acted against
his employer’s wishes challenged his employers’ control over their property. At some
point, white leaders and landowners in both communities recognized that the
paternal/dependence relationship was the only factor that anchored black agricultural
laborers in either county. If that relationship ended, black families had no means of
remaining in place and would be forced to leave the area. By the time US v. FCDEC was
filed, landowners were becoming unwilling to retain tenants that were not abjectly
dependent and tractable. 8 Those who preferred to see place maintained were beginning to
see that targeted, apolitical pressure could push out black tenants who insisted on
challenging the terms of their socially subordinate place and asserting civic
7

Hayden Williams transcript, 166-72-1 section 14, DoJ records.
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Figure 3.2

“Euzel Wesley Kee’s tiny grocery store.” The sophistication of Kee’s
establishment illustrates both the level of infrastructure serving the rural
black community and why an embargo was so effective. 9

individualism. It looked simple. Landowners had usually extended run money to their
tenants, but nothing contractually obligated them to do so; if a tenant wanted to vote, then
he need not ask for run money; if his family could not stay without it, then they could
move on. There were fewer holds on independent farmers, but everyone shopped locally.
If they no longer had access to stores or assets, then they could not stay. Nothing beyond
credit obligated a bank to make a crop loan to a black landowner; if the bank knew who
had registered to vote, its staff could easily deny the application. Banding together to
impose an embargo on registered black voters was an utterly subjective, untraceable
solution, targeting those who provided the only risk to segregated place. If coordinated
9

Photo by L. F. Palmer, Jr. “Fayette County, Tennessee: Will They Dare Go to Polls?” Sepia 8,
no.8 (Aug 1960): 8–12.
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properly, without the thin threads of paternal support it would be nearly impossible for
poor new voters to sustain themselves. The white elite did not have to do anything,
merely not do anything.
Early in the process two things became clear: first, that to “move them out”
required a coordinated effort, not merely individual commitment, and coordination would
be a problem; second, not all members of the white community shared the same goals.
Fortunately, the network of informal personal relationships and acquaintances could also
coerce participation among moderates by including them in plans to enforce the norm,
making them guilty by association. This was not sporadic opportunism or limited to
individuals acting on their own interests; coordination at some level generated a single
goal and direction. As early as November 1959 HCCWL president George Graves
learned that Sheriff Hunter had secured a list of league members and “had made this list
available to the merchants in Brownsville and Haywood County.” Graves also noted that
rumors of a petition “circulated among Haywood County merchants and landlords . . .
agreeing to ask those charter members who were tenant on their respective pieces of
property to move and find residence elsewhere.” 10 Federal investigators collected enough
first-hand evidence from disparate statements to confirm that it was not merely rumor. 11
Coordination for an embargo also occurred across county lines. In early 1960 the
white population of Stanton, Currie Boyd’s home and the locus of black activism in
Haywood County, was quietly invited to series of private meetings. The exact motivation
for each meeting may have varied but the purposes were essentially the same. Citing a
10

George W. Douglass interview notes, 1959 Dec 21, 166-72-2 section 1, DoJ records.
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cf. Katherine Rawlins Davis interview report dated 1960 Apr 13, case 166-72-2 section 2, DoJ
records; Bond Morgan interview report dated 1960 May 10, 166-72-2 section 2, DoJ records.
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participant, a newspaper later reported that at least one session had been “called to
discuss what should be done with Negroes who had registered to vote.”12 Each of the
meetings was held in the symbolic bastions of white segregation: one of the public
schools. John H. “Preacher” Shelton from Somerville, a member of the Fayette County
Quarterly Court (county commission), urged the white landowners in Stanton and the
community’s few business operators that they “fire their Negro sharecroppers and
‘replace them with white tenants or white-faced cattle.” 13 In coming months Shelton’s
informal meetings would, in Fayette County, grow into a coalition which “joined together
for the self-preservation of the white man’s way of life.” by organizing and coordinating
the local embargo of black activists and registered voters, as well as whites who did not
fall in line with the coalition’s measure. 14
The embargo—or “squeeze” as it was most often called—was a targeted tactic
and never applied to the black populace generally. For the black community members
subject to the embargo, coping with the selectively applied embargo required ingenuity
and effort. In addition to denying local buying, businesses began systematically
pressuring suppliers beyond the county to strangle the few black-owned retailers who had
become politically active. Under a threat of losing most or all of the business in two
counties if they did not cooperate, wholesale suppliers from Memphis and Jackson began
picking up retail freezer chests, soda machines, and closing sales accounts for black
12

“Bares Plot To Punish Tennessee Voters | Told: Oust Negro Tenants” (UPI), Chicago Defender
(national ed.), 1960 Dec 21.
13

“Bares Plot To Punish Tennessee Voters | Told: Oust Negro Tenants” (UPI), Chicago Defender
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establishments. Rural store owner Tommy Rice managed to scrape by, barely, paying
cash and hauling a few supplies from a distance to his tiny store in the country when he
could get them. 15 Brownsville grocer Odell Sanders was visited by thirty wholesale
distributors a month, but all quit coming “within a two-week period under pressure from
the white landowners.” By the end of the first week only a bread salesman showed up.
“‘Does it hurt you to leave me bread?’ Sanders asked the salesman. ‘It’s killing me,’ he
replied.” So Sanders told the man to stop deliveries. 16 “I tried hauling the stuff myself for
awhile,” Sanders later related to an activist, “but I couldn’t sell in competitive prices with
the other stores. So in two weeks I had to go out of business.” With closure of his
grocery, the only black-owned retail establishment in Brownsville closed. 17 Landowners’
and businessmen's economic embargo of county sharecroppers evaporated what slim
margin of economic stability the black community possessed.
In April 1960, as the embargo began to take effect and desperate families began
moving off of tenancies, schoolteacher Robert McFerren folded up his small grocery
business at the “three-way” intersection south of Somerville. His older brother John, who
had been farming, jumped at the chance to quit day labor, buy out Robert, and operate the
store on his own. John’s wife Viola remembered years later that “it was our feeling that if
we open a store, that many of the items that people had to drive out of town to get could
be provided there on the local level.” That was one reason, but there was another as well.

15

Untitled manuscript beginning “On this my sixth visit . . .”, Hortenstein papers.
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“Press Tennessee Terror On Negro Voters | Whites Drive People Off Land Into Exile,” Chicago
Defender (national ed.), 1960 Dec 10; James Talley, “Fayette Invokes Economic Force,” Tennessean, 1960
May 8.
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Figure 3.3

John McFerren outside his filling station/store at Three Way, previously
owned by his brother Robert, June 1960. McFerren’s was likely the largest
commercial establishment owned by a member of the Fayette County
racial majority. 18

“He did it,” a friend recalled years later, “because he wanted to beat the white community
at their own game. If the white community was controlling black people through
economic means, then he wanted to liberate black people through economic means.” 19
Within a few months John McFerren’s store and its remarkable owner became the locus
of Fayette County’s civil rights movement.
Just as the US v. FCDEC consent decree was issued in late April 1960, federal
investigators returned to Poston’s office in Brownsville. Since an election commission
18
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had finally been appointed, the federal agents asked Poston for a summary of the county’s
voter registration plans. The doctor was not particularly pleased to see them. Despite
having a qualified and functioning county Election Commission, in fact “there is no date
set for voters registration in Haywood County.” The commission was “doing an
administrative reorganization of the registration setup,” checking voter rolls and changed
addresses against election district records to drop expired voters from the records. In
essence, the commission members were marking time—nothing had been done, but
would be “soon.” 20
While businesses clamped down on black activists and threatened uncomfortable
white moderates. Fayette County's lack of an election commission effectively nullified
the judicial order. The resignations in March 1960 set up a roadblock that did not have a
remedy. No entity at any level could bypass the county government to authorize or
conduct the work of the local executive-branch function and hold an election. Though
black citizens now held the abstract right to vote, none could be registered, consequently
no new black electorate could challenge officeholders, and—theoretically, at least—the
elective offices could be held by incumbents pro tempore indefinitely. The three positions
on the election commission might have gone unfilled forever—except that having no
election commission also carried an unintended consequence that hamstrung local
economic development efforts. Resignation of the election commissioners addressed the
immediate “threat” of federal interference and ended registrations of black voters, but
also left the county without a mechanism for approving a widely popular development
bond issue, which promised to provide over a hundred non-agricultural jobs for county
20

W. D. Poston interview summary, 1960 Apr 13, 166-72-2 section 2, DoJ records. This section of
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residents. Bids for construction of a building to house Somerville Manufacturing Co.,
which would be leased to Troxel Manufacturing Co., were opened in the first days of
May, but the general obligation bond financing construction could not be approved in the
required public referendum. What the court and abstract discussion of rights could not do,
expediency did, and a county election commission was qualified before the end of the
month. One of the appointees was Inez Davis, who had resigned in protest from the same
commission the previous March. 21 Far from settling the issue, the consent decree and
reconstituted election body simply shifted the nature of the conflict from an attempt to
enforce local tradition over civil rights, to attempts to dilute the threat by pushing the
problems out of the county.
Though an informal embargo had had some effect, individual enforcement was
ineffective. In April 1960 a group from the county's white business elite (it was probably
too informal to be an organized White Citizen’s Council) drew up a list of individuals
across the county to isolate, beginning with local black leaders in the challenge, white
supporters and sympathizers, and eventually most registered black voters—a blacklist.
Names were divided by civil district; “agitators” were singled out with an A marked
blackly beside their name. “Every one of the merchants had one of these lists,” Harpman
Jameson remembered. “If your name was on it he wasn’t supposed to sell you nothing.” 22
A copy of the blacklist was surreptitiously lifted from a Somerville business by a black
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housekeeper, rushed to Memphis where it was photographed, and returned to its place
before morning. Its existence became more difficult to deny after one sheet of the
blacklist appeared as an illustration in the pages of Ebony magazine. 23 Dr. John Morris,
the largest landholder in the county, read the situation differently, “There hasn’t been any
boycott. This is a matter of credit being withdrawn from undesirable risks at a time when
all credit must be tightened up.” On the other hand, Somerville Bank & Trust manager W.
B. Wilkerson unguardedly admitted to a white freelance reporter that “Both my girls [i.e.,
tellers] out there have copies of it. The men on that list, I won’t even talk to, unless they
already owe us money and are coming in to pay it off.” 24 Not only this, but contracts
were terminated and employment denied to those on the list. Shepherd Towles, a
landowning black farmer who had baled and sold hay for years and typically maintained
a waiting list, suddenly could find no buyers. 25 The embargo did not end business in
either county. It was applied primarily to the activists in both counties and those who
registered or attempted to register to vote, which represented only about a quarter of the
black adult citizens living in both counties by the end of 1962. Most black citizens
shopped as they usually did. There was no unified front in either county.
Along with the economic embargo, whites began applying exploiting and
sometimes creating circumstances to pressure individuals they considered “agitators.”
Black landowner Joe Patrick, who had been moved to action by Estes’s sermon two years
23
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earlier, suddenly discovered his credit was no good and businesses no longer interested in
his service. Then in July, Patrick was arrested on a Shelby County warrant and charged
with attempted murder on false testimony engineered by white farmers Ray Russell and
Parnell Reid. 26
Whites who did not fall in line with the embargo risked being included in its
terms. Katherine Rawlins Davis of Dancyville refused to sign the agreement presented
her by grower and gin operator Shelby Dixon. Within weeks she became an embargo
subject. Pressured by figures in Haywood County, the Virginia-Carolina Fertilizer
Company refused to deliver to her property even on a cash payment, and Brownsville
businessman Curtis Lowery was told by “some men . . . not to let Mrs. Davis have any
[field] soda and not to sell any soda to her.” The Bank of Brownsville refused to loan her
money and then likewise refused to release credit information to a bank in Bolivar,
Tennessee, when she applied there for a loan. Unlike black laborers, she had the standing
and property that allowed her to eventually secure loans in Memphis. 27
Of all the embargo measures enforced, one of the most difficult losses to cope
with was fuel. Food could be brought by small or large amounts and could be secured by
donation or purchase. Gasoline was a bulk product requiring specialized equipment for
storage and distribution and it was a key commodity to mobility and production. In April
1960, Somerville’s local Gulf and Amoco distributors removed the pumps and pulled
storage tanks from two retail businesses operated by John McFerren and Scott Franklin,
key figures in the FCCWL. The same week at least fifty-four fuel-storage tanks on black26
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owned farms were also removed. 28 Dozens more were left empty, and it quickly became
clear that the local embargo made it virtually impossible to secure bulk fuel even from
suppliers elsewhere in the region. McFerren eventually managed to pay for and install
new storage tanks and pumps of his own, but he could not find a supplier who would sell
him fuel. As one of the few places in the county black families could secure supplies, he
flung service queries to any business in the region which sold bulk gasoline. Everyone
turned him down. Desperate and increasingly suspicious, John McFerren understood only
that he could not buy fuel. From this point he began to assume that white businesses
across the region were colluding against black activists and against him personally.
The fuel situation was too large for local activists to address themselves, but
unlike the action of independently owned local stores, the fuel embargo involved
corporate franchises. The Tennessee situation benefitted directly from the advocacy of the
NAACP, which was tipped off to the embargo by an article in the Chicago Defender. John
M. Brooks of the NAACP’s voter registration staff quickly made a personal visit to
Fayette County to collect first-hand information on civic conditions facing the black
populace. At the end of his stay he forwarded nine affidavits documenting reprisals to the
organization’s Washington Bureau, who handed them directly to the Justice Department.
On 17 May 1960, three days after Brooks’ documents landed in Washington, an NAACP
wire asked four major corporations for explanations. 29
28
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Dr. James E. Levy, the NAACP state director in Ohio, saw the same Defender
news story and approached Gulf Oil directly on his own initiative. “Of necessity it is
imperative that I advise you,” he wrote, “that unless your policy is an open one applying
equally to all persons regardless of race, creed, religion, color and National origin I shall
be forced to return my card to your company and urge my constituents within Ohio and
throughout the nation to use selective buying power of oil products.” 30 As a corporation
whose largest concentration of retail distributors was in the Midwest, a potential fuel
boycott in Ohio and surrounding states could cripple the company. Levy’s letter and
others like it sent a shudder through a number of executive offices in the oil industry. Two
weeks later the NAACP made good on an economic threat of its own. On 8 July the
NAACP released a call to its local and state offices and youth chapters, urging its
350,000 members to “withhold our money from any national company [Amoco, Esso
Standard (now Exxon), Gulf, and Texaco, specifically] found to be cooperating . . . in a
flagrant defiance of law by those who are determined to prevent colored citizens from
voting.” 31 It certainly worked. The NAACP’s threat to call a national oil boycott sent
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reverberations through the industry and sparked action in corporate executive offices. 32
Within a week of the press release, polite answers from the highest levels of oil-industry
executives began arriving at the NAACP offices. Executives had clearly demanded and
gotten answers. 33
American Oil (Amoco) president James M. Patterson personally telephoned his
Somerville distributor, who flatly denied the existence of an embargo of blacks in his
service area. The Amoco distributor in Somerville was I. P. Yancey, the mayor of
Somerville and a central figure behind the embargo. His denial split a hair that those
outside the state were quick to see. “I do not believe that anyone has charged that
[Yancey] is refusing to sell to all Negroes. The charge is rather that he is refusing to sell
to those who attempt to register to vote.”34 Perhaps the most careful investigation and
response to the reported embargo was made by Gulf Oil. The Gulf distributor serving
Somerville and the surrounding area was Reuben Rhea Sr., another key figure driving the
economic embargo in Fayette County. After Rhea protested vigorously how innocent he
was of any wrongdoing, and when oil executives were certain the company itself was not
at fault, Gulf Oil executives invited a delegation from the NAACP to their New York City
corporate office. At the two-hour 20 July meeting the Gulf staff took careful pains to
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explain the same basic issue—their firm sold only through branded distributors and
McFerren did not operate a Gulf franchise. 35
Oil company explanations suggested that McFerren and the other rural stations
were simply out of touch with modern brand marketing. This was a matter of corporate
trademark policy which had nothing to do with the political situation in Fayette County.
From a corporate perspective it was a simple case; on the ground, circumstances were a
little different. Responding to corporate queries Rhea probably neglected to mention that
it was he who had pulled the pumps and tanks from McFerren in the first place, only after
the FCCWL was organized, and that Rhea had sold fuel to him and his brother before him
for years. Corporate offices had made no independent investigation or even confirmed
factual details, they had simply gotten their information from their local distributors, two
of whom had pulled the service equipment in the first place. It is difficult to interpret the
removal of service equipment from two black businesses at virtually the same time by
key Somerville businessmen as anything other than a coordinated action. In fact, there
was a collusion which the individual corporations could not identify independently.
On 4 August, the same day as the Memphis NAACP picketing, the Commercial
Appeal reported that the “vote registration agitator” John McFerren finally “admitted”
that he had bought fuel during the embargo. He had, but the reporter ignored the point
35
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that it had been smuggled to the station, evading interception, at the personal intervention
of a Memphis truck-depot manager and not an open sale. Viola McFerren later recounted
how an anonymous white man arranged to deliver fuel stocks to McFerren’s store.
Though she never knew for certain who the man was, it was likely Walter M. Chambers
Jr., manager of a bulk-delivery truck terminal in Memphis. Chambers later admitted that
he supplied McFerren and other small retail stations with fuel as a side business of his
family trucking firm. “This buying and selling operation was operated on a non-profit
basis and at the time without the knowledge of my father and brother,” he later told
federal investigators.36
Then in September 1960 the Chambers family partners sold their trucking
business to a Louisiana-based partnership and surrendered active participation in their
Memphis bulk-freight terminal. The sale affected the quiet fuel delivery arrangements
Chambers had handled on his own. “When the new management relieved me of my
position as Memphis branch manager then McFerren was left without anyone to sell him
gasoline or haul it for him.” Chambers unsuccessfully approached other trucking firms to
see if they would supply the Fayette County activist and finally hit on the idea of
applying for a distribution permit in his own name. “Under the Action Oil Co. name I was
able to find a small independent [fuel] broker that would sell me gasoline with the
knowledge that the product would be sold eventually to John McFerren.” “He [the
distributor] could not sell directly to John McFerren because of the economic pressure
that could be brought to bear on him.” The arrangement lasted only a month. Deputy
sheriff Ted Davis in Somerville—who also ran a service station and understood the fuel
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delivery business from the inside—laid in wait for the late-night delivery truck and
demanded the name of the fuel distributor from its driver.
Faced with a renewed embargo, the McFerrens drove into Memphis to appeal to
the fuel distributor directly and were rebuffed by a nervous manager. Chambers then
personally arranged a fuel load through David M. Weir, new manager of the Chambers
Trucking terminal. Two days later the delivery was cancelled. Weir told Chambers quietly
that “he would be fired if he hauled the load for me to McFerren against home office
orders.” Weir’s comment about the home office allowed Chambers to follow the lead to
its source. Chambers learned that the new Chambers Trucking joint-owner/operators,
Louisiana-based Hearin Tank Lines Inc. and Miller Transporters Ltd., had killed the
McFerren delivery, a process that originated yet again in Fayette County. Davis had
evidently traced the business connections himself, and the Somerville business
community was committed to crushing activists’ businesses in Fayette. “The wife of
Reuben Rhea,” Chambers explained to investigators, “is an heir of the estate that owns
the property that W. M. Chambers Truck Line, Inc. has rented for its Memphis terminal. It
would be a great economic burden and loss [to Hearin and Miller] if the estate should
decide not to renew the [terminal’s property] lease.” When asked directly about his
participation in the embargo by an Associated Press reporter, Rhea denied a boycott
existed but was unapologetic about taking up service tanks from black farmers. In his
mind a selective embargo was perfectly legitimate business. “When an individual causes
as much trouble as McFerren you can’t blame some for refusing to sell gas. A man is
justified to sell to whoever he wants.” 37
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Economic pressure not to register could also be subtle. In the fall of 1960, farmer
Square Mormon visited the Production Credit Association office in Somerville, the local
agency of the federal farm credit system, looking for a small loan to compensate for a
crop shortfall. Mormon’s account of the resulting loan “negotiation,” related years later,
illustrates the assumptions involved in place and paternalism. The local agent asked
Mormon if he was aware of what was going on.

He said, “People’s out tryin to raise trouble around here. Things been
going along all right. Ain’t you been going along all right?”
I said, “Well, I don’t know. I been still livin.”
He says, “What I’m tryin to say is you got a big family, Square. You
realize this and you gotta eat. And so when you come here you always got what
you asked for. Well now, you wouldn’t want your family out there starving would
you?”
I said, “No.”
He says, “Why I’m sayin is—you don’t get involved in this mess of stuff
goin around here, it may be possible. I gotta wait and see what you all is gonna
do.”
He said, “Don’t get involved in that and you can do like you been doing all
the time. Just do like you been doing.”
I said, “You mean like registerin or something?”

The agent agreed, comparing the situation of black citizens entering civic participation by
voting to a new driver who did not know the rules of safety for the highway; but rather
than following his analogy through to its logical conclusion (that learning and ability are
the result of experience), he instead set the matter bluntly: “I still ain’t trying to tell you
what to do. But I just told you you got a large family—I don’t forget that—and you need
a hundred dollars—don’t forget that. So these are things I’ll tell you about. When you
make up your mind, you come back.” 38 It was an exchange whose basic elements were

Weapon in Race War” (AP), Ada Evening News (Okla.), 1960 Jun 13.
38

Square Mormon, Our Portion of Hell, 48–49.
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repeated scores of times at the edges of fields, on street corners, and through automobile
windows across both counties.
Raising the ante
The consent decree in US v. FCDEC provided no legal precedent for a similar
situation or future legal action, but it was a clear and unambiguous precedent to county
officials in Brownsville that the tradition of white control could not be maintained openly.
In forcing FCDEC to acknowledge that its race-delimited control of local election
practices was unjust, white society began perceiving the federal government less as a
guarantor of the rights of private individuals against undesirable forces (such as the
public involvement of black citizens, according to local convention). Control of county
offices and the continued integrity of the segregated schools—public resources which had
been the exclusive venue of the white community—was in jeopardy of a takeover if
enough of the majority population was registered to vote.
The conservative power structure in Fayette County retained their long-held view
of civil democracy as an exclusive right between equals. The consent decree forced a
grudging agreement not to prevent participation in voter registration and county elections,
but it did not stipulate that they had to agree to participation. Massive resistance had tied
up voter registration in both counties but was not a permanent solution. It addressed the
symptoms—voters—rather than the problem: a traditionally privileged white population
that was an overwhelming minority. If whites were to stay atop the civil heap, then there
simply had to be fewer potential black voters in the county. With the traditional public
mechanism of disenfranchisement dismantled, members of the white community were
already relying on one extra-legal measure they could control and wield without
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question—property. Though it would not happen for another two to three years,
circumstances were setting up a clash of differences over civic v. private rights.
Conservatives were willing to accommodate visibly but privately remained
unwilling to surrender privilege. In both counties small groups of like-minded
individuals, all of whom controlled key local offices or businesses (and often both),
began planning to address the real problem: the white-to-black demographic ratio—in a
nutshell, there were “just too many niggers.” The proximate goal was to reduce the
number of black citizens in the county without losing the white population; the ultimate
goal was to retain the traditional dominance of county offices, landholding, and economic
power.
Mr. I. S. Carter later related to FBI investigators that in Brownsville “an
organization had been formed to take care of the problem,” and Fayette County reported a
similar group that had “joined together for the self-preservation of the white man’s way
of life.” Details about both groups and their activities are limited to hearsay and
inference. 39 Dr. Poston, who chafed about a second federal investigation of the Haywood
County Election Commission privately but not quietly, became a key figure behind the
effort to reduce the black majority in Haywood County. 40 Steered by a small group of
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Untitled summary outline, “Tennessee Eviction Cases,” David Kendall papers, Eisenhower
Library; I. S. Carter interview summary dated 1960 Apr 13, 166-72-2 section 2; Alva Carpenter, quoted by
George Bradley Cummings, 166-72-1 section 13, DoJ records.
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Poston alleged that Senator Estes Kefauver had commissioned the CRC and FBI investigations
to aggravate the racial situation in Brownsville. His ire represents the common practice of blaming political
action among a local black population on outside agitators. Despite a personal assertion from Kefauver that
he was not involved, Poston continued to dun the liberal Senator. Only when an internal investigation by
the Dept. of Justice turned up no evidence of contact from the Senator, his aides, or representatives did
Poston back down. cf. Joseph M.F. Ryan Jr. to John Calhoun, 1960 Apr 21. If Poston’s comments were
reported widely enough that the Justice Department got wind of them, then the comments probably
motivated the June 1960 fisticuffs at the courthouse in Brownsville, where a Kefauver aide was attacked
during a campaign stop. Alfred C. Anderson, “Deputy Slugs Civil Rights Prober—Estes Stops Fight,”
Memphis Press-Scimitar (morgue file 64752 fd.B), 1960 Jun 15; “Kefauver ‘Had Nothing To Do With
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prominent figures, the group used the HCCLW list and voter registration rolls to pressure
landowners to evict their laborers who had registered. Dancyville resident Katherine
Rawlins Davis was approached by Stanton gin operator Shelby Dixon, who brought her a
petition from local landowning neighbors to “turn off [her property] certain of Mrs.
DAVIS’ hands.” A similar “committee,” which included Brownsville Bank president F. R.
Chapman, pressured Curtis Lowery of the Purina Feed and Seed Company in Memphis
not to sell their products to the uncooperative Mrs. Davis. 41 Several individuals named
Shelby Dixon as “the main agitator,” along with the Willis brothers, and Taylor “Tip”
Hunter, the Haywood County sheriff. Major figures involved in Fayette included Dr. John
W. Morris, Reuben S. Rhea Sr., Somerville mayor I. P. Yancey, and county attorney
Preston Parks. Individual landowners and businessmen that have never been identified
were involved in both locales, but the informal curtain of silence around the loose groups
was effective. Much more significant were the numbers of white landowners who bowed
to pressure and cooperated, even reluctantly, rather than lose their personal stake in the
community. Those who were making it difficult to stay in the county for registered blacks
were the same figures behind the drives for local economic development. The push to
divest either county of its undesirable surplus labor cannot be meaningfully separated
from the drive to attract light industry and create local non-agricultural jobs. Society itself
was tied inextricably with the local labor market and the cotton economy; changes in the
latter would either affect or reflect changes in the former. Over decades the racial
Probe’,” Memphis Press-Scimitar (final edition; morgue file 64752 fd.B), 1960 Jun 15 (UPI); “Kefauver Is
Clear In Fistic Incident;” Reese Moses, “Tempers Flare In Brownsville,” Commercial Appeal (Memphis,
Tenn.), 1960 Jun 15; “Civil Rights Aide Hit In Tennessee” (UPI), “Deputy in Tenn. Slugs Agent of Rights
Board,” Washington Post, 1960 Jun 15.
41

Katherine Rawlins Davis interview summary, 1960 Apr 13, 166-72-2 section 2, DoJ records.
One of the two, Melvin Dotson, was an officer in the HCCWL.
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minority had carefully crafted and profited from the socioeconomic setting. While they
wished to retain the benefits of diversifying the economy, they did not want to bear the
cost incident to changing it.
In Brownsville, though Clarence Berson had been appointed as the Haywood
County voter registrar in February 1960, he did not begin registering voters until May. At
his direction, the States-Graphic published a schedule of thirteen three-hour blocks, one
in each of the civil districts around the county, most scheduled at rural stores. 42 His first
attempt at registering black sharecroppers in the countryside on 16 May 1960, away from
the possibly intimidating setting of the courthouse in Brownsville, was immediately
countered by none other than L. Malcolm Smith, Berson’s predecessor as voter registrar.
Though he had previously agreed to allow registration to happen at his establishment, a
Memphis newspaper, quoting HCCWL member James T. Bond, noted that Smith told
Berson, “This is a public store and it’s not going to happen here.” Another Memphis
newspaper reported a similar story: just as a group of about twenty black sharecroppers
arrived and the first two approached Berson, Smith stepped in and loudly informed the
registrar that “We’ve decided there’s just not going to be any registering here. This is a
place of business and we’ve had a lot of criticism about it.” 43 The would-be black
registrants angled quickly away and did not register to vote. Word travelled rapidly, and
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“Notice,” States-Graphic, 1960 May 6.
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“Bar Group Trying To Register,” Tri-State Defender, 1960 May 21; “8 Negroes On Haywood
Roll,” and James R. Reid, “Register? Nobody Shows,” Memphis Press-Scimitar (final edition), 1960 May
16; “Voting Book Slammed Shut In Tennessee,” Arkansas Gazette, 1960 May 17; “Tennessee Area Opens
Negro Vote List in Vain,” New York Times, 1960 May 17; “Haywood Negroes Register To Vote,”
Commercial Appeal (Memphis Tenn.), 1960 May 18 (clipping in 166-72-2 section 2, DoJ records).
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at two other rural locations scheduled the same day, no one else was willing to approach
the registrar. The net gain of voters to the county rolls for three days’ effort was nil. 44
Publicly, Smith and other officials, including Dr. Poston, seemed to be playing a
game of wits grounded in the language of the dependency status quo. Brownsville
Postmaster John W. Harwood confidentially told investigators that “the plan to hold
registration in the Civil Districts, rather than at the Courthouse as in the past, was
designed to thwart efforts by Negroes to register.” It was therefore likely that “their
landlords, and possibly others, could easily be present at the various local stores to
discourage Negro would-be applicants.” 45 Smith’s performance demonstrated how well
indirect intimidation worked. The former Haywood County registrar did not directly
prevent black citizens from registering to vote, but he staged a performance designed to
intimidate indirectly, with implications which they would clearly understand.
Sharecroppers were essentially powerless in daily interactions. They relied heavily on the
strength of personal relationships and obligations, informal knowledge of how others’
handled situations, and general patterns of expected behavior to provide clues about
whites’ intents and expectation. Needing the most from their dependent/paternal
relationship, black laborers thus held the least power, so they had to make the sacrifices
needed to maintain favor and avoid negative consequences. Traditionally blacks kept the
black-white social discourse in delicate subsistence equilibrium mostly by remaining “in
place”—by not demanding too much of one’s racial “betters” nor reaching beyond one’s
44

Another location the same day was J. O. Stephenson’s store, eleven miles north of Brownsville
on Highway 54. James R. Reid, “Haywood’s Registration--One Full Day--Nobody,” Memphis PressScimitar (morgue file 64752), 1960 May 17.
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Cited in J. Harold Flannery to Henry Putzel Jr., 1960 Jun 14, 166-72-2 section 3, DoJ records.
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station as a dependent laborer, and by expressing appropriate gratitude for what one was
given. Shades of dependence certainly existed, with black landowners being less subject
to direct pressure. This is not to imply that the black community was powerless,
unwilling, or unable to resist intimidation, only that daily life consisted of a series of
arrangements and expectations that could be exploited directly and indirectly by the white
community. As the exchange at Smith’s store shows, even the threat of an imbalance to
those personal relations was enough to curb black aspirations to civic participation. In
this case, Smith’s display of pique was intended to threaten the ever-delicate balance
between white land and business owners and their black labor force, rather than to apply
direct pressure on potential registrants.
Officials’ obstruction of voting rights exploited the dependency relationship
indirectly through two closely related methods. The first was a display of general social
noise. Smith’s visible and audible protest about unnamed and unspecified “complaints”
over using his store as a registration site carried the unstated but clearly understood
subtext that it was black registration being protested—registering black sharecroppers
was creating a problem for his customers, which made the problem the sharecroppers’
and left Smith and his customers as “victims.” The second method was invoking a
specific dependency implication. Smith stepped in to close down voter registration only
when the registrar was approached by two black citizens. Smith’s assertion about
unnamed complainants—white, by implication—was enough to let the score of black
citizens standing nearby know that someone, perhaps their landowners, had been
discomfited by registrations. It was fairly transparent that Smith did not want blacks
registering to vote, but the way he staged his protest implied that the sharecroppers had
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upset someone with whom their employers had a relationship. Malcolm Smith’s stunt not
only successfully kept a score of black residents at his store from registering, but his
display of social noise and invocation of dependency implications was enough, as
journalists unwittingly reported, that it successfully discouraged black sharecroppers
elsewhere in the county from even approaching the registrar at other locations.
Smith was not the only store owner to protest registrations, even though they had
previously agreed at the outset to host the sessions. In June, responding to protests by
more rural store owners, the Haywood County’s Election Commission again centralized
registrations at the county courthouse. Each civil district was allotted a day during the
week of registrations during which its residents could register to vote. Berson set up a
registration office in the grand jury room on the top floor of the courthouse, which was
no improvement. The jury room was often in use and small enough that registrants were
admitted singly. To avoid interrupting proceedings, one individual had to leave the
building before another from the district would be admitted.
Berson later told investigators that he had no idea who was controlling the crowd,
but Odell Sanders did. He and others provided details about the crowds standing quietly
around the lawn and registration arrangements. Sheriff Hunter positioned himself beside
the table with the registration clerk and placed chief deputy George Sullivan at the
courthouse’s exterior door to keep the line of registrants from crowding the halls.
“Deputy permitted persons to enter Courthouse one at a time,” Special Agent Francis
Finley reported. Hunter was later questioned specifically about how his deputy
“maintained order.” He informed investigators that he “could not advise when the Deputy
would know the proper time to allow someone to enter the Courthouse to register, but
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stated the Deputy would allow them to enter ‘when the time came.’ He would not explain
what was meant by ‘when the time came.’” By registrar Berson’s own record, over the
twenty-four business hours during which registrations were conducted (divided between
four six-hour days, 6–10 June 1960), he successfully registered thirty-four voters,
seventeen of which were white. “Sheriff denied knowing of any ‘slow down,’” Finlay
concluded. 46
Haywood County officials managed to maintain an effective brake on voter
registration even while investigators collected first-hand testimony about economic
reprisals. Justice Department lawyer J. Harold Flanagan summed up the Haywood
situation in a mid-June 1960 report to Departmental officials.

The white community has focused upon one of the League’s purposes—the
promotion of Negro voting. It seems that white employers, merchants, and
landowners have agreed, perhaps formally by executing a compact or petition, to
harass economically those Negroes whose names appear on the circulated list.
The employers and landlords discharge the named Negroes and the merchants
deny them credit. Also, there is some evidence which indicates that white persons
who refused to participate in the harassment of the Negroes have, themselves,
been subjected to economic pressure. 47

Stern measures have a rational purpose. In this case, the embargo was a carefully
constructed attempt to coerce compliance with social norms, attempts to force a decision
on the part of black laborers. They could choose not to register, accept dependence, and
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continue to receive paternal support, bringing them back into line outside the public
realm but within social and economic expectations assigned them; or, as the next stage of
the conflict unfolded, the could register and risk taking on the world without paternal
protection at all—elsewhere.
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Chapter 4
Eviction and the End of Paternalism:
The Tactics
“Why haven’t you moved?”
“Don’t have any place to go,” Puckett replied.
“You know where Tent City is don’t you? Well, it is just as much for you as
for the rest of them.” 1
“He told me that they would put me on the black list and squeeze me and I
wouldn’t be able to find any place to work. He told me that he would go up
there with me if I would go and get my name off the book and it would be
the same thing just like I hadn’t registered.” 2
On 12 May 1960, virtually the same day that Haywood County registered its first
voters in two years (and its first black voters since Reconstruction), the local postman
handed Billy Peterson a registered letter from his landlord. That was unusual. Business
between the two men was invariably handled face to face, even when the pair discussed
an annual tenant arrangement. Peterson had been part of a delegation which had met with
Dr. Poston about registering to vote in July 1959, had been among the group which
visited the State Election Commission with James Estes the same month, and was a
charter member of the newly organized Haywood County Civic and Welfare League
(HCCWL). Landowner/employer C. W. Scott had expressed his disapproval of Peterson’s
participation in July and again in September. In October 1959, Clifton Buchanan had
ended Peterson’s longstanding credit account at his store in Stanton without notice. In

1

Exchange between Fayette County General Sessions judge Paul A. Summers and A. V. Luck
tenant James Puckett, as reported in League Link 1, no. 3 (1961 Apr 22). Luck sued to evict Puckett in
Fayette County court; the latter had refused to vacate since Luck was named in the federal injunction.
2

J. W. Austin affidavit, 1960 Nov 20, “Tennessee Eviction Cases,” box 6, David W. Kendall
papers, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kans. Austin registered 1960 Jun 6 and was evicted by
Leroy Gillespie the following day.
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four lines Scott informed Peterson that his “lease agreement” was terminated
immediately, effective at the end of the crop year, and that he was required to vacate on or
before 31 December. Peterson’s father and brother in law, neither of whom had made any
move toward voting, remained in Scott’s employ. The letter to Peterson was an
uncommonly formal and redundant end to the matter. It was also rather pointless. By the
time Scott’s letter reached Peterson the latter had quit Scott’s farm, left Haywood County,
and was living and working in Gary, Indiana, where Scott’s eviction letter finally reached
him. 3
Following longstanding procedure, the Justice Department had requested the FBI
gather information on local voting rights from named officials and witnesses.
Scrupulously careful, the agents did so, but in the process they were otherwise blind to
notice, unable to act, or simply ignored what else was happening around Somerville and
Oakland, Brownsville and Stanton. While voter registrations moved forward, FBI
investigators collected testimony about the economic embargo, and Justice Department
officials worried over evidence, a different drama began unfolding. A week after Billy
Peterson’s letter was posted, Hiram Whitehurst sent Dudley Sanders a similar letter,
among of the first of dozens of similar letters dispatched to Haywood County tenants who
had registered to vote.4 Each letter was a variation of the same theme: your tenancy is
cancelled at the end of the season, get out (but not before your crop is harvested). The
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C. W. Scott to Billy Peterson, 1960 May 12, in US v. Beaty appendix L-1, “Tennessee Eviction
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actions might have been dismissed as merely routine changes in business arrangements,
except that there was one unifying statistic: no tenant who had declined to register was
given a registered eviction notice, and those who received these notices were almost
exclusively those who had registered to vote or attempted to register. In fact, each one
was an officer or member of the HCCWL. 5
The large numbers of prospective registrants which appeared at the Brownsville
courthouse to register in May 1960 directed landowners concern about a potential
challenge to the established civic and social order, but it was the chartering and
incorporation of the HCCWL the previous fall that had galvanized them to action. The
establishment of a black civic organization, one that was not tied to a local church or
school, meant that individual members of the elite were less likely to influence or control
the organization through the traditional network of personal obligations. Unlike churches
or schools, because the HCCWL itself was independent of white patronage, the only way
to apply direct pressure to the organization was to undercut its members individually.
Community leaders were scrupulously careful not to legitimize the HCCWL by attacking
it openly, but the evictions served the same purpose. Late spring and summer eviction
notices in Haywood County provided plenty of lead time for families to make other
arrangements before they were required to vacate in December. Some settled into another
tenancy elsewhere within the county. Others moved northward or west to Memphis. 6

5

Evidence sections L, A accompanying duplicate of US v. Beaty in “Tennessee Eviction Cases,”
David Kendall papers, Eisenhower Library. Despite the findings, Special Agent Leo E. Conroy dissuaded
the FBI from Haywood investigation. Putzel to file, 1960 May 20, 166-72-2 section 3, DoJ records. Given
the history of the situation it is tempting to wonder if these letters were an attempt to postdate and
legitimate pressure to leave the county that had begun much earlier.
6

Details of the outmigration have proven impossible to track since tenant agreements were only
oral and no records document changes in tenancy. Some croppers were evicted and did not leave the
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Although politically motivated, these evictions created no crisis; sharecroppers knew they
were the least powerful member of a tenancy arrangement. They at least had a timeline
for what was coming at the end of the 1960 crop season.
The Justice Department had watched and periodically investigated the situation in
West Tennessee for nearly two years without directly intervening. More than a month
after the primary elections in West Tennessee, the Justice Department finally believed it
had sufficient evidence on which to base a legal challenge in Haywood County. On 13
September 1960 Department lawyers filed documents in United States v. A. T. Beaty, et
al. The suit named twenty-seven landowners and one local bank, alleging a pattern of
intimidation and reprisal against black tenants and landowners who had registered to
vote. Those who believed the American public was exclusive were incensed. “The suit
infers that the Federal Government has the right and power to tell financial institutions
and private citizens to whom they shall lend and sell, whom they shall house and feed,
and whom they shall employ,” complained a Commercial Appeal editorial in Memphis. 7
A reader from Olive Branch, Mississippi, turned the case on its head and argued the
primacy of individual choices in relationships, which included economics. “Suppose I go
to a store to buy a shirt or pair of socks and then decide not to do so. Am I guilty of

counties for several years, others were not evicted but gave up sharecropping and left anyway. Where they
went and what they did once they arrived is a similar mystery, although we can assume many were drawn
to urban areas by relationships with extended family members who may have left Tennessee in the Great
Migration or during World War II. Grossman, Land of Hope, 67–114; Carole Marks, Farewell—We’re
Good and Gone: The Great Black Migration (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, c1989), 19–32. On
migration chains generally, Margaret Grieco, Keeping It in the Family: Social Networks and Employment
Chance (London: Tavistock, 1987).
7

“Whither Headed?” (editorial), Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.), 1960 Sep 15; reprinted in
“Federal Injunction Sought Against 27 White Persons And Two Banks In Haywood County,” StatesGraphic (Brownsville, Tenn.), 1960 Sep 16.
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Figure 4.1

Commercial Appeal editorial cartoon illustrating the conservative
perspective of US v. Beaty, et al., the Haywood County economic-reprisal
suit filed in September 1960. Actually only one bank was named; the other
twenty-six defendants were individuals. 8

discriminating against the store or sales person? Seems as though! Or if my banker
refused to lend me money, isn’t he guilty of discriminating against me?” 9 Both editorial
comments reflected the positions of those already comfortably inside an exclusive public;
the latter failed to address how right it would be if the store owner decided if the writer
could not come into the store to buy the shirt or socks in the first place. Wrapped up in

8

Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.), 1960 Sep 15. Used by permission.

9

“Discrimination in Haywood,” Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.), 1960 Sep 25; reprinted
in States Graphic (Brownsville, Tenn.), 1960 Oct 14.
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concern over a personal ability to act, those clinging to the idea of society as exclusive
dismissed others’ rights to participate under the same terms. As the case was laid out in
the lawsuit, lending was not the issue, but rather the exclusive privilege claimed by store
owners and bankers on personal grounds to decide to whom they would sell or lend,
rather than on qualifications related to the sale or loan.
The situation was different to the south in Fayette County. Families suffered under
the embargo, but as a whole, the black community coped or circumvented the measures
imposed on registrants and the pressure had not worked effectively enough to induce
civically active tenants to move away. Although evictions were a first-step action in
Haywood County, the experience of Fayette County suggests that evictions were the last
reasonable step trying to enforce the traditional standard, a forcible shove to those who
had not backed down. Around Somerville, Williston, Moscow, Rossville, and along
backcountry lanes, evictions began toward the end of the cotton harvest in late October
1960. They were to be gone by the New Year.
Evictions in Fayette County represented a patchwork of experiences. L. P.
Anderson went to Somerville on the one day open to voter registration, but the office
closed before the line moved far enough for him to register. Employer Gladys Youmans
found out and told Anderson “if I couldn’t be on the job all the time when he wanted me,
I ought to just move off the farm and never come back. He let me leave my wife and kids
there till I can find another place, but I can’t go back and see them.” Cropper Ruffers
Bostick was told by Arthur Luellen that “he could not afford to keep going halves” on the
cotton crop, but offered Bostick a two-bale rental agreement for the use of five acres,
virtually the same deal as his tenancy but without the implicit “furnish” obligation that
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would sustain the young family. Bostick and dozens of other families who turned down
similar offers, went elsewhere. Some were lucky and found new arrangements locally.
Jim Dye found a living arrangement with another black farmer, Joe Wales outside
Warren, after being evicted by Ed Sanders (one of the county voter registration clerks).
Most were not so lucky. Hardeman County native Emitt Williams reported that before he
registered to vote, landowner W. Preston Cox had “always told me I would clear good
money on my cotton this year, but since I registered, he said he hoped my crop would
bring enough so that I could break even.” Williams left Fayette County and found a
tenancy sixty miles east with a black farmer back in Hardeman County. Landowner Eddie
Owen told Isaac Smith simply that he planned to sow grass in the cotton fields Smith
worked, leaving the latter with no workable land. Bynum Leatherwood waited until the
crop was harvested and hauled to the gin before evicting six tenant families in the last
week of November. All had registered to vote during the previous August or September.
Ethel McNamee turned out Georgia Mae Turner, who had worked her land without
complaint for thirty-eight years while Sam Shelton, McNamee’s only other tenant,
registered and voted in the 1960 general election. He remained because of a longstanding
verbal agreement with the landowner who “has often told me that I could stay as long as I
live.” 10
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US v Atkeison, order to show cause, affidavits by Isaac Smith (p.61), Ruffers Bostick (62), Jim
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Williams statement, undated, case 166-72-1 file section 19, DoJ records. The Leatherwood tenants included
Trotter and his father-in-law Walker Mason, Wyatt Williams, Early B. Williams, and Clarence Williams,
who made up the first residents of Tent City. Georgia Mae Turner statements, undated, case 166-72-1 file
section 19, DoJ records. Turner had worked McNamee land for 38 years, Shelton 40 years. James Forman
recorded Turner’s account of her life, an edited transcript of which became a chapter in his autobiography,
“Georgia Mae Hard Times.” The section discussing her eviction is James Forman, The Making of Black
Revolutionaries, 122–125.
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Morgan Wright was an exception among tenants. For four decades he farmed land
belonging to the Piper family and heir Irene Mauldin of Corinth, Mississippi. Most
recently he had rented a hundred acres from Mauldin on a cash basis and worked seventy
acres of cotton, secure enough to sub-let tenancies to two black sharecroppers. Wright
owned his own tractor, plows, mules, cattle, and a hundred chickens. “When Mrs.
Mauldin took over the farm [in 1953] she told me I could stay there as long as I lived.
Each fall she would ask me what I was going to do the next year and I would tell her I
would like to stay.” Her paternalistic pledge was a lifeline most black families did not
enjoy and lessened his dependency somewhat. Wright had been among the first of
Fayette’s black citizens registered to vote, on 1 October 1958. He immediately found it
impossible to secure fuel in the county or a local gin that would process his seed cotton.
For two years he managed to truck his seed cotton to Shelby County for ginning. Mrs.
Mauldin said nothing to Wright until evictions began elsewhere in the county, then she
leased Wright’s land to Sam Dunn. Neither of Wright’s tenants or another Mauldin
sharecropper had registered; all three were permitted to stay where they were. 11
An accurate count of evictions was never made, but contemporary comments
estimated the figure between 300 and 700 tenant families in Fayette County alone, and
the total number of families displaced from both counties would certainly grow in the
coming years. 12
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Tent City
Unlike the six- and seven-month lead time landowners afforded tenants in
Haywood County, evictions in Fayette County were sudden and caused a good deal of
stress, as was intended. Part of the measure taken by landowners was to persuade farmers
beyond either county to advertise for workers, either genuinely or falsely. The opportune
appearance of these classified advertisements looked suspicious, maybe one more
measure to get them to move out of the county. Some offers did not ring truthful. “A man
came over here and said he wanted 10 tenant families for his farm over near Nashville,”
Tent City resident Georgia Mae Turner told Fred Travis of the New York Post. “He say he
got 80 acres of land. What's he going to do with 10 tenant families on a farm no bigger
than that.”13 Though some were able to make arrangements for new tenancies locally, the

a Group of Interested Individuals,” LeMoyne College, 1961 Jan 21, III:A280 Reprisals, Tennessee,
“Fayette County – General, Jan 1961”, NAACP records). Estes did not say, however, that all evictions were
voting related. Fellowship of Reconciliation member Margaret McCulloch of Brownsville chided Maurice
McCrackin for his casual use of high figures, calling them “sheer guesses as to the number of persons
notified to vacate—there figures have never yet been ascertained. Much less does anyone know that any are
non-registerant has received such a notice” (Margaret McCulloch to Mr. McCrackin, 1961 Feb 13, 19:3
McCrackin papers).
Though both counties lost black population heavily, the figure of 700 evicted families undoubtedly
reflects the high emotions surrounding the issue rather than an actual count. Though the number of evictees
undoubtedly increased in each county as time passed, in a brief for US v. Beaty et al. Justice Dept. attorney
John Doar stated “An analysis of the evidence indicates that more than three hundred persons comprising
approximately 48 [Haywood County] families are about to be evicted from their homes” (italics mine;
“Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,”
p.4, US v. Beaty, Kendall papers). In October the same year Virgie Hortenstein reported that “of the 60
families in Haywood County who have been given eviction notices, many refused to turn in their names to
the Department of Justice, for fear of reprisal” (“Brownsville Journal,” [Nov 1961], Hortenstein papers).
The lower number squares with the limited number of voter registrations in Haywood County. It may be the
300-families figure (rather than 300 people) was a popular misunderstanding, but Hortenstein repeated it in
December 1961 (“Christmas Vacation Work Camp,” n.d. [1961 Nov], Hortenstein papers). In early 1963
she reported that “this winter between 200 and 300 Negro sharecropper families may been put off the land,
according to Odell Sanders” (“Fayette County Work Camp, Spring Vacation–March 23 to April 14, 1963,”
Hortenstein papers). Evictions credited to mechanization, changing tenure arrangements, and other causes
could have driven the figure in both counties to 700 families, but there is no hard proof of the fact. A larger
number is consistent with the 500-families-annually figure reported to be a Fayette Citizens’ Council target
(Hayden Williams interview transcript, 1961 Feb 2, p.10–11, case 166-72-1 section 14, DoJ records).
13

Fred Travis, “There Is No Joy In The City Of Tents,” New York Post, 1961 Jan 3.
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vast majority of evictees gave up farming. Those who could not find new employment
but could move in with extended family in the county or elsewhere were the lucky ones.
The late-season evictions left some families without recourse and made the FCCWL
scramble for ways to help. On Sunday, 4 December, James Estes pulled into Somerville
where he picked up John McFerren and Scott Franklin. Four days later, after brief stops
in Washington, D.C., where the trio made an unsuccessful last-ditch effort to get federal
intervention, and then in New York, they arrived in northern Illinois. “I thank you. We
need this,” McFerren told a crowd in Chicago as he locked the door of a truck loaded
with donated food. “And I want you to know without the support of the people in
Chicago and in the East I don’t know what we would have done this last few months.” 14
The Justice Department’s filing of additional injunctive actions, US v. Archbell in
mid November and US v. Barcroft two weeks later, each a request for temporary
injunctions barring evictions in one of the counties, came close to the evictees’ dates to
vacate and left them in a quandary. Should they go elsewhere, or stay and hope the court
would work things out? They did not have long to decide. 15 In early December 1960,
John and Viola McFerren were quietly contacted by a white member of the community
who disagreed with what was happening in the county and wanted to help mitigate the
evictions. In the second week of December, this individual acquired several large wall
tents from an army surplus store in Memphis and had them delivered with the explicit
agreement that the origin of the tents remain secret. 16 With such large numbers being
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Emergency Relief Committee news releases, 1960 Dec 5, 12, 395:7 UPFAW records.
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The lawsuits are discussed in chapter 5.

16

For five decades the McFerrens have maintained that trust. Viola has identified the individual in
a group of records that will not be released until their death so that the individual’s generous act will not be
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evicted, a few tents could be temporary accommodations for a small number at best,
intended to allow families time to make more permanent arrangements, a last-ditch effort
both to house people and to stave off wholesale outmigration. The first tents were pitched
in a fallow pasture belonging to Shepherd Towles, a black landowner who lived several
miles south and west of the county seat along the Somerville-Macon road.
As the sun was setting on 14 December 1960, Early and Mary Williams moved
their four children and a handful of worn belongings—three beds, a worn piece of
linoleum, a small table and four chairs, and a single trunk of clothes—into a 14  l6-foot
canvas Army tent. Their new home had been hurriedly pitched that afternoon along the
county road which ran beside a fallow field about four miles south and west of
Somerville, Tennessee. The thermometer registered fifteen degrees. As a mocking wind
worried the loose canvas through the night, they fed hastily gathered sticks into a small
woodstove, desperately trying to keep from freezing. The tent was not appreciably more
substantial than the tenant shack on Bynum Leatherwood’s land they had just vacated,
and it lacked a floor. The stove warmed the air, but also the frozen ground. By morning
the family was standing in icy, oozing mud inside their new home. They tiled flattened
cardboard boxes over the ground to serve as an ersatz floor, and then a worn carpet. The
thaw merely seeped through and pooled beneath their feet. Over the next few days,

lost to history. There are, however, historical complications. A letter carbon, dated the previous September
and signed “JAD” (likely SCEF president James A. Dombrowski) refers to five tents just sent to McFerren
(JAD to Mr. and Mrs. McFerren, 1960 Sep 14, 33:6 Braden papers). The first tents were pitched
Wednesday, 1960 Dec 14. A week later a labor union press release noted that “Five tents are up. Six more
are to be put up this week” (“For immediate release from the Emergency Relief Committee for Fayette and
Haywood Counties,” [1960] Dec 21, 395:7 UPFAW records). But the NAACP bought five tents for
$502.13 in December 1960 (“Memorandum to NAACP branches, Youth Councils, college chapters and
state conferences,” 1961 Jan 3, III:A280 fd.5, NAACP records), which means that the privately purchased
tents must have ended up at the second site on the Gertrude Beasley farm, which was near Moscow.
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Early's father, his brother, and two brothers-in-law with their families all took up what
was hopefully a brief residence in nearby tents as well. By the end of the week, six
families with nineteen children between them—all of them recently dismissed employees
of Leatherwood—were crowded in a handful of additional canvas accommodations. By
the turn of the 1961 New Year there were sixteen adults and forty-three children living in
Tent City. 17
From that cold December night in 1960 through the late summer of 1963, three
small, scattered clutches of Army-surplus tents housed a succession of evictee families
and captivated public attention as “Tent City”—the baker's-dozen tents on land outside
Somerville belonging to Shepherd Towles, another six or eight on the Gertrude Beasley
farm near Moscow, and three more on land belonging to Dan Nixon in southern
Haywood County. They were temporary but critical shelters. The only residents were
black sharecropping families, a few dozen of the several hundred households across
Haywood and Fayette counties hastily evicted from their tenancies, some of which they
had held for decades. For a brief time the tents of “Freedom Village,” as activists named
their clutch of tents, became icons of the struggle—not only for civil rights, but also for
economic viability of blacks families in the rural South, symptomatic of the challenge
that “equality” faced in society. 18
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“Report on a visit to Fayette and Haywood Counties, Tennessee,” 22:14 McCrackin papers;
Simeon Booker, “We Ain’t Scared and We Ain’t Beggin,” Jet 19, no. 10 (1960 Dec 29): 12–16.
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Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins, 1961 Jan 23, “Fayette County – General, Jan 1961,” III:A280,
NAACP records; Paul Vanderwood, “A Second Tent City Rising in Fayette,” Memphis Press-Scimitar
(morgue file 64752 fd.B), 1961 Jan 27.
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Figure 4.2

Tent City (Towles site) from the southeast, ca. March 1960. 19

Life was cramped and cold, but not appreciably less comfortable than the mostly
ramshackle croppers’ cabins they had occupied a short time before. Amenities in the Tent
City camp were Spartan at best. Potable water for eight to twelve families was available
only by hauling it in buckets from the Towles family’s own domestic well across the
county road. Demand on the well was high enough to drain it and Towles was forced to
pay for a second, deeper well to be drilled. Sanitation was limited to a single pit
outhouse, which served as the only facility for the entire camp. It filled quickly and was

19

From the cover image of Tent City—Home of the Brave (Chicago: Industrial Union Dept., AFLCIO, [1961]). The sky is white in the image because, as is common with many printed photos, the
background was scrubbed out of the image when the printing plate was made; the full image, much
reduced, appeared on p.3.
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moved several times. Lacking electricity, the tents’ heat and cooking was limited to
wood-burning stoves, and light came from kerosene lamps brought by the residents.
Initially the Army-surplus tents lacked floors. Fundraising efforts for the tent residents
sprang to life across the country. 20 In mid-January 1961 the Ann Arbor, Michigan, chapter
of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) sent a $377 donation that helped floor the
tents with 1  4 lumber nailed across 2  4 supports laid directly on the ground, an
amount matched by the Quaker-led Peacemakers group out of Cincinnati, Ohio. 21
The tent community was a stopgap measure at best and was never adequate to the
task of housing the dozens of families evicted from tenancies. Since the small number
tents could never house the number of evicted families, and convinced that blacks were
content within their systemic dependence and secure within their own sphere of white
paternalism, county officials regarded the tent encampment as a publicity stunt rather
than a last-ditch relief effort. The ersatz encampment was, to their minds, therefore
undoubtedly the work of agitators. Little or no help was forthcoming from county
officials, and the county actively attempted to curb donations of federal surplus food to
the camp residents. “It is probably true,” Agriculture Department investigator James W.
Hutchens Jr. conceded with carefully measured understatement as he looked into the
administration of the federal surplus food program in Fayette County, “that there might
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“Mahalia Jackson Sings Here Wednesday Night,” Memphis World, 1960 Dec 21; “Plan Huge
Carol Sing For Tennessee Vote Victims,” Jet 19, no. 9 (1960 Dec 22): 4; “M. Jackson To Sing At Ellis,” TriState Defender, 1960 Dec 24–30. Memphis’s black civic leaders organized a benefit Christmas dinner and
concert for Tent City residents, featuring gospel singer Mahalia Jackson. Weather stalled Jackson in
Chicago, and the performance was relayed by telephone, the capstone to a hastily arranged and badly
coordinated affair. “Mahalia, In Chicago, Thrills Memphians By Phone,” Jet 19, no. 11 (1961 Jan 5): 4;
Simeon Booker to James Estes, undated (photocopy), OFCCWL records.
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Forman, Black Revolutionaries, 126–130; Meier and Rudd, CORE, 122–123; Operation
Freedom circular letter dated 1961 Jan 26, 22:14 McCrackin papers.

136

be a hesitancy among white leaders in the county to seek aid for the Negroes.” Because
enough donated food from private contributors was arriving to stave off a genuine
emergency, Agriculture Department officials concluded that federal surplus commodities
were unnecessary. 22
Two weeks after the first tents were pitched, late on the night of 28 December, the
occupants of a car driving past without headlights fired into the camp and sped off. One
of the bullets grazed the arm of Early B. Williams as he lay in bed, narrowing missing the
head of his sleeping daughter. Sheriff Clarence Pattat arrived at Tent City shortly after the
midnight shooting. After a cursory look around the tent, the sheriff suggested
disingenuously that the Williams and other families move out of the area to avoid further
opportunities for intimidation. 23 During his years as the chief law enforcement officer in
the county, Pattat promptly reported to and pled for help from federal investigators as
incidents unfolded, but he seemed to accomplish little constructive investigation on his
own and never filed an arrest unless accompanied by a federal official. Two days after the
shooting a second car sped past and fired wildly at the tents. Guards around the camp
returned fire with shotguns, which did no damage. This time the car was identified and
the perpetrators were apprehended. Raymond Parks, Rhett Powers, and J. Perry Pulliam
Jr. admitted to the sheriff they were staging a copycat prank and claimed they were firing
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“No Emergency In ‘Tent City’,” Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.), 1961 Jan 5; “U.S. Won’t
Give Food,” New York Times, 1961 Jan 5; “Negroes Tent City Decried As Stunt” (UPI), New York Times,
1960 Dec 29; “Whites Irked by Negroes’ Tent City” (UPI), Washington Post, 1960 Dec 29; “Tent City:
Home For Oppressed Or Propaganda Showcase for Negroes?” Nashville Banner, 1961 Jan 2; Anonymous
interview with Leigh Ann Duck, 2008 Oct 7.
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blanks. The trio was dismissed with a stern warning about good behavior. 24 Coupled to
the lawsuits, the shooting instantly made Tent City and the Fayette County embargo into
national news and put new pressure on local law enforcement in ways that the complaints
of black farmers could never apply. 25
The shootings, even though one was tacitly resolved, left nerves in Tent City as
chapped and raw as the January mornings. While the tents were guarded, there were more
immediate matters to resolve. The huge amount of donated material created something of
an administrative crisis for the FCCWL which was, of necessity, the only black-led local
organization currently capable of assessing and addressing needs across the entire county.
The embargo had bitten deeply into the community, but there was no escaping that black
families normally existed on the verge of starvation. “It will be something of a problem to
get accurate figures on the number of people who are dependent on outside aid,” wrote
one activist. “While there has been an organization set up in each county, it is general
rather than specific in nature. Any specific question sends the district president scurrying
to his secretary. The secretary has figures but no totals; names but no ages.” 26 In short,
the Civic and Welfare Leagues had been created merely for organization and
communication, not distribution. No one in either group had much practice orchestrating
(or documenting) such an activity. The learning curve was very steep and missteps were
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inevitable. Partly based on personal knowledge of who was in what circumstances,
supplemented by the experience and advice of CORE field organizer Richard Haley, and
Chicago CORE visitors P. Sterling Stuckey and James Forman, both the HCCWL and
FCCWL and volunteers divided case lots and bulk goods into smaller bundles for
distribution to individual families. Outside Somerville, donated goods of all sorts filled a
storage shed beside John McFerren’s store and filling station.
Though there were a few reasonably secure landowners among them, abject
poverty was the common condition among rural black residents of West Tennessee. As
word spread that food and clothing was being disseminated in Somerville, desperate
families from other West Tennessee counties began showing up quietly in line hoping to
share in the relief opportunity. Witnesses soon claimed 400 to 500 people were showing
up at McFerren’s store on distribution days. During the twice-weekly aid distributions in
the second half of 1960, weeks before the tent settlement was established, “Those
receiving aid were asked to ‘donate’ to the Welfare League,” Shepherd Towles explained.
When the Memphis Press-Scimitar ran a story asserting that McFerren had “sold”
donations, FCCWL president Scott Franklin was quoted as saying that “If [McFerren]
was raising money for the Welfare League, I don’t know anything about it.” Response
beyond Somerville was immediate. W. C. Patton of the New York NAACP branch wrote
McFerren and Allen Yancy that he wanted it to be “crystal clear that there can be
absolutely no fees whatsoever collected by your local group, or any individual for the
things which the N.A.A.C.P. may provide for distressed families there” and later assured
donors in its branches that goods were not being sold. 27 Stuckey clarified to the press that
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the money had been taken not as a payment, but as a donation to cover expenses. Using
Fayette voter registration cards to prove that the holder was a county resident did not
work, at least not well, since many adults living under the embargo might have only
attempted to register. Eventually the registration cards were accepted as identification. It
was an imperfect solution, but some sort of control was necessary. “‘We are not using the
assistance as a means to get negroes registered, although we do encourage negroes to
register,’ McFerren said. ‘But we are using the cards as a means of identification, because
negroes from Mississippi, Shelby County, Lauderdale County and other places are
sneaking in here for food and clothing.’” Endemic rural poverty was not limited to two
majority-black counties in West Tennessee. 28
Crates of commodities and mounds of clothing created challenges, but nothing
was quite as problematic or as needed as cash donations. A shirt or dress or jacket was
either too large or too small for someone and could be distributed accordingly; the money
came with no size or instructions and there were not only different needs, but also
different approaches to distributing it and ways of describing “fair.” To whom did money
go, and under what circumstances? Was it for current Fayette County residents, or did it
include those who had been evicted but left the county? Would evictees who had found
new tenancies get less than those in the tents? How would the sum be divided? By need?

1960;” Gloster B. Current to L. P. Jackson [Covington, Va. NAACP], 1961 Feb 6, “Fayette County -General, 1961, Feb 1963,” III:A280, NAACP records.
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Paul Vanderwood, “Aid Bundles Sold By Negroes In Fayette County,” Memphis Press-Scimitar
(morgue file 64752 fd.C), 1961 Jan 17; Paul Vanderwood, “Spokesman Admits Funds Solicited in Fayette,”
Memphis Press-Scimitar, 1961 Jan 19; James Gunter, “Charges Tied On McFerren; Somerville Successor
Named,” Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.; final edition), 1961 Jan 28. The assertion that the donations
constituted a sale was made by sisters, Fayette resident Thelma Parker and Ruth Carson of New York City.
The story reflected the negative spin which characterized the news coverage by local media outlets. Paul
Vanderwood, “Registration Cards Closely Tied To Handouts in Fayette County,” Memphis Press-Scimitar
(morgue file 80137 fd.B), 1961 Jan 30.
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By equal amount? How frequently? The details of disbursement could be worked out
provided the central point could be resolved: was the donated money strictly intended for
relief of individual families, or could it be used to cover expenses incurred on everyone’s
behalf? Compelling arguments could be made for both views, but they were mutually
exclusive. The FCCWL was beginning to create an organization that needed office
supplies and discretionary money, but funding administration at any level kept
desperately needed money out of the pockets of poor folks somewhere.
Disagreement over the distribution priorities and practices sowed the seeds of
division. Within a week of the shootings Franklin accused McFerren and James Forman
of “disrupting our meetings and have never given an accounting of the food and clothing
received and distributed.” By the end of January 1961, it was clear that an internal crisis
was brewing. The emerging activists in the FCCWL had, as Forman later observed in his
autobiography, gone as far as they could on their own. To learn administrative
organization and routine, “the older people had extraordinary spirit but they needed and
deserved the technical help of dedicated young people.” 29 Sterling Stuckey of the ERC
returned to Chicago; James Forman remained in Somerville as accusations began flying
in all directions.
For James Estes, who had carried the legal work for both counties for nearly two
years, mostly at personal expense, donated relief money seemed to provide the first
reasonable opportunity to be paid even partially for his services. His request to be
allowed expenses on at least part of his effort in their behalf widened the divide between
the groups. Simeon Booker of Johnson Publishing wrote John McFerren suggesting Estes
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Forman, Black Revolutionaries, 132.
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was not to be trusted. James Forman, deeply suspicious of black middle-class
indifference to the trials of the poor who faced reprisal without a cushion, also believed
Estes was exploiting Fayette for his own enrichment. Having a different strategic vision
and tactical priorities, Forman perhaps failed to recognize the personal sacrifices Estes
had made pursuing Fayette and Haywood’s interests over his Memphis law practice. It is
unlikely that either Booker or Forman knew of expenditures Estes had made over the
preceding two years. Warren Bonner was on hand for an argument between John
McFerren and Estes in a crowd at the former’s store, where June Dowdy finally called for
an impromptu “show of hands from those present to indicate whether the individuals
agreed with McFerren or Estes.” Scott Franklin charged that Forman had threatened to
withdraw ERC support if the FCCWL did not break with the NAACP and fire Estes, a
member of its Memphis branch. He asserted that Estes divided the Fayette leadership and
encouraged only the side that supported him. 30
By mid February 1961 there were open ruptures. The FCCWL leadership was
effectively divided into opposing camps around Scott Franklin and James Estes on one
side, and John McFerren and his supporters on the other. Possibly because of his mistrust
of James Estes, the Franklin camp initially pushed Forman toward McFerren. 31 The
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divisions among Fayette activists were becoming too deep to repair. Franklin’s faction
consistently insisted that the donation books be opened for inspection; McFerren just as
consistently refused. The final tear came over incorporation. Probably because of Omar
Carney’s incident as the HCCWL was chartered two years earlier, Estes had never filed
the incorporation papers for the Fayette County group. Now incorporation provided a
way to steal a march on McFerren’s rival faction and resolve the leadership issue,
possibly a calculated but unwise move to resolve the divisive argument about donation
distributions. In the third week of January, Estes filed incorporation for the Fayette
County Civic and Welfare League Inc. with the state. Three days later, McFerren retained
Nashville lawyer R. B. J. Campbelle Jr. to file incorporation for the Original Fayette
County Civic and Welfare League Inc. 32 Far from resolving the issue, the competing
incorporations made the split in the recognized Fayette County leadership irresolvable. 33
Division of the FCCWL leadership threw distribution into confusion. Estes sued in
General Sessions Court for control of donated goods and other assets, particularly the

fd.B), 1961 Feb 14; “Tent City Spokesman Fired,” Nashville Banner, 1961 Feb 14. cf. Lasley and Charles
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143

frozen bank account of donated funds deposited at the Tri-State Bank in Memphis. 34 By
the first week of March the OFCCWL was establishing a new office. 35
Freedom Farm
In the aftermath of the embargos and evictions it was becoming clear to the black
community in both counties that without the protection of paternalism, generations of
dependency left agricultural families at an almost irrecoverable economic disadvantage.
A low percentage of land ownership among the majority population created the
exploitable economic weak spot in both counties. As evictions began, the small number
of vacant tenancies under landowners willing to buck the embargo was quickly filled. If
evictees were to remain in either county, the percentage of black-owned agricultural
property had to increase. To do that required not only white landowners willing to sell
acreage to their former laborers, but also a huge infusion of ready cash or secure credit to
buy it. Most evicted families moved to work opportunities elsewhere in West Tennessee
or left agriculture entirely for urban wage labor further abroad, but a few faltering steps
were made toward solidifying black land ownership. The largest came shortly after Tent
City began claiming news headlines.
In March 1961 Dr. Joseph H. Jackson of the National Baptist Convention
proposed to circumvent the problem of landowner evictions with an internal resettlement
and economic development plan. Convention-affiliated churches would pool donations to
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buy property. The Convention would hold trust ownership of the land, construct homes,
and lease the property to evictees for agricultural production. Profits from the self-styled
“Freedom Farms” would be reinvested in improvements and to acquire additional
property. “As soon as one farmer is able to purchase his own farm, another moves in on
the church-owned property.” 36 Jackson regarded the plan as a new self-help model for the
South’s poor black farmers. “We are moving from protest to production,” he announced
proudly. The Convention soon completed purchase of its first property, a 404-acre farm
straddling the western corners of both Haywood and Fayette counties, and later two other
rural parcels totaling another 400 acres in Haywood County.
Within two weeks of the purchase, Earl Anderson’s family of eight moved from
their Tent City accommodation to the new Freedom Farm. Two more families followed
the next week, but purchasing the farm created as many problems as it solved. In moving
the Andersons from Tent City to the property, two families of white sharecroppers who
had a tenant’s verbal agreement to work the land for Fuller, were displaced. J. A.
Williams Sr. and Jr. jointly sued the church for breach of contract. Fayette County judge
Paul R. Summers ruled that the seller and Convention had completed the sale in good
faith but that the Williams’ verbal tenant lease was valid and enforceable. After a lengthy
discussion, the parties agreed to allow the Convention and the Andersons to take
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immediate possession of the property and to compensate the Williams $2,500 for their
standing crops, a judgment divided between the seller and buyer. 37
Freedom Farm produced crops over several seasons, but did not succeed in the
larger sense. Jackson’s attempt at building a self-sustaining institution was conceived as a
plan to build a solid economic foundation for rural agriculture. It failed for two reasons.
First, in the face of drastic economic and technological change in farming, Jackson
assumed that former sharecroppers could maintain agricultural smallholdings. They could
not. The status quo could not be maintained in a rapidly modernizing world. Traditional
hand-cultivated small-plot field labor (6–18 acres) could not compete with chemicals and
mechanized production on fields ten or twenty times that size. Jackson recreated an
obsolete economy of scale. A second factor was cultural: sharecroppers who were used to
the flexible interpersonal negotiations involved in dependency/paternalism found it
difficult to function within a dispassionate, inflexible accounting system bound by
contract terms, fixed figures, and the calendar. The personal fealties and informal
arrangements that characterized tenancy may have been arbitrary and fundamentally
unfair, but they were also somewhat negotiable. Despite his best thinking and intentions,
the urbane Dr. Jackson misunderstood the people who lived and worked in this differently
sophisticated world. The impartial arrangements of a modern credit system lacked the
flexibility in the sort of repayment terms and schedules that had long been negotiated
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face-to-face as necessary under dependency/paternalism. The result was that Jackson’s
Freedom Farm, inspired by a desire to help rural evictees and based on modern
accounting practices, essentially created a new dependency with divisions and markers
determined by class and income rather than race.
The residents of Fayette County’s two Tent City sites froze through the winter of
1960–1961, waded through spring mud, and baked in the summer heat. As the settlement
approached its first anniversary the ersatz community housed a succession of evicted
families, most of whom remained a few weeks or months before moving to more
permanent accommodations or out of the county entirely. By August 1961 the tent
population declined from 163 to 96.38 A year after its founding, Arkansas NAACP
director L. C. Bates reported on a visit to Tent City: three families remained in tents at the
Moscow site, ten occupied the Somerville tents; of the Moscow families, one worked
with a landowner, one was doing day work, and one was working in Memphis; of the
Somerville families, two found new places to work, and eight had yet made no plans.
Shepherd Towles had “asked all to move with the exception of four families” but would
not force them out. Available firewood on the property was running out. 39 By the end of
1962, Tent City’s always-small population was declining. By the turn of 1963, Tent City
had effectively served its purpose. In February the population was down to two families,
both of which were preparing to move to more stable accommodations. 40 Jack McKart
reported that two of the small clutch of tents on the Dan Nixon property in Haywood
38
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County—a third tent site—were shipped south to meet similar housing needs around
Cleveland, Mississippi. 41
In retrospect, the tent accommodations helped a small number of families with
immediate needs and no available options, but were an ineffective measure to remedy
widespread evictions. Two dozen tents could never house the scores and perhaps
hundreds of families displaced by change and callousness. Tent City was no stunt, but it
was a better symbol of the resilience and sacrifice of the black community than a means
of addressing economic and political repression.
***
After the founding of Tent City, pressure on sharecroppers asserting their civic
individualism by registering to vote did not lessened, but the tactics of landowners began
changing. Evictions and the tents provided a ready-made media opportunity that
portrayed the white community in a harsh light. Landowners finally recognized that
evictions provided unwanted attention. To kick the props out from under a voter they
need do nothing at all, and the counties settled into a quiet siege. Rather than evict
politically active farm tenants, landowners allowed their former black laborers to remain
in the tenant shacks, but they were given neither land to work nor extended the credit,
cash, goods, or services that had been the only “income” paternalism once provided.
White landowners surrendered paternalism when it no longer suited their needs, leaving
black families standing with the empty hands of poverty that paternalism had
systematically created. In spring 1963 the unofficial unemployment figure among the
working population in Haywood County was estimated at 30%. Many families were
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sustained from day to day by donations and federal food surpluses, but generally lacking
any asset other than their labor, the question was one only of how long former tenants
could remain idle without giving in and moving on. The exodus from rural West
Tennessee farms and tenancies continued to bleed black agricultural families unchecked
for years.
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Chapter 5
Federal Investigation and Court Action:
The Law
Democracy is an assertion of the right of the individual to live and to be treated
justly as against any attempt on the part of any combination of individuals to
make laws which will overburden him. 1
It is the duty of the liberal to protect and to extend the basic democratic freedoms
. . . But fundamentally, liberalism is an attitude. The chief characteristics of that
attitude are human sympathy, a receptivity to change, and a scientific willingness
to follow reason rather than faith or any fixed ideas. 2
While those on the ground struggled for stability and sustenance, far from the
small communities in Haywood and Fayette counties, there was a fight being carried on
in their behalf as well. It was far less dramatic than the embargo and the tents, but it was
more influential. In Memphis and in Washington, D. C., federal officials in the U.S.
Department of Justice looked for openings to act decisively, but legally decisive action
carried requirements of evidence and was bounded by legal protocol and statute. Federal
officers had watched, prodded, and documented in both communities for nearly two years
as registrations began in Haywood County in May 1960. As they travelled county roads,
interviewing landowners and officials, federal investigators remained tangled in the
curtain of silence drawn by those who were enacting the intimidation. In reviewing
Harold Flannery’s assessment of the Haywood County situation in June 1960, Voting &
Elections section chief Henry Putzel admitted that “though the assumption is likely
correct that the intimidation was primarily related to the Negroes’ voting efforts it would
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certainly be advisable to obtain clearer legal proof to that effect.”3 Anecdotal evidence
was overwhelming but remained circumstantial: the Department lacked clear, admissible
proof of intimidation or economic reprisal that could be linked directly to voter
registrations. Through the summer of 1960 investigators recognized that evictions were
happening, but they could not tie it to voting except by correlation. With field
mechanization increasing rapidly and the need for field labor lessening, there were too
many other potential causes for evictions to risk relying on a correlational statistic in
court.4
In the first week of August 1960, both counties held their primary elections, the
first in living memory at which an appreciable number of black citizens cast a ballot. “For
the first time since Reconstruction days,” each county held an election that in principle
included its entire population. Approximately 600 black voters were registered in Fayette
County and 255 in Haywood County. About half of each (roughly a tenth of the total
turnout) voted.5 An NBC film crew shot background footage for its evening news
programs and was afforded a chilly reception in Somerville despite the summer heat.
Even in the civil ritual of an election, local practice reinforced paternal/
dependence relationships, for two major reasons. First, a closed confederation, the deeply
socially conservative Democratic Party, maintained an unchallenged grip over the
electoral mechanisms in each county. In neither county did party politics exist at the
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county level, and the county functioned at a level at which the party was the local “state.”
After US v. FCDEC, local Democratic leaders in Fayette County successfully resegregated access to county power by imposing a $150 fee per candidate to bear the cost
of mounting the primary election. In Haywood County the fee was set at $250.6 That
much discretionary cash was far out of reach of virtually all black citizens, which made it
impossible to stand for public office in the only election that mattered. So long as the
black majority population remained poor, being enfranchised was irrelevant. In this way
the political liability of a “white primary” was avoided, but in practical terms the same
end was accomplished. The power structure crafted a situation where participation was
effectively based on economic class instead, which still eliminated competition. Blacks
could have established a Republican Party in the county and countered the local
Democratic junta, but setting up an outright opposition organization would have been a
tactical disaster, especially since various forms of intimidation left the black majority
with a minority of actual voters in the county. The black populace worked hard merely to
be included in the existing power structure because they saw that it worked—it just did
not work for them at the moment.
Second, the same coterie retained control over specifying polling places, virtually
all of which were appointed for private property. In rural areas, these were small country
stores typically belonging to FCDEC members or County Court magistrates—members
of the interest group. Using someone’s store or gin as a polling place had been standard
practice for a century. Historically, holding elections in these locations provided the local

6

Charles Haynie, letter dated [1963] Jun 13, in “Letters from Tennessee: Background of a Civil Rights
Movement,” Trojan Horse (Cornell Univ.) 4, no. 1 (1963 Sep): 7.

152

Figure 5.1

The intimidating informality of polling practices in rural Fayette County,
November 1960. Five election-district officials can be seen: at the right,
the two men sitting on the sales counter are likely the election judges; the
right shoulder for the man at the square table partly visible in the left
corner is likely that of the precinct clerk, who would register and issue
ballots; the assistant clerk, talking to the woman, checked names against
voter registration rolls (open in front of him); the man behind her leans
back against a second counter and has his elbow on the ballot box. In the
glare behind the woman two figures can be seen completing ballots on the
store’s sales counter. Only the presence of the poll book and ballot box
distinguishes an election from a typical business day. 7

member of the elite with direct control of the election in his district and underscored that
those who came to vote did so with his approval. After 1960 the longstanding practice
took on added meaning as a direct form of paternalism. Admittedly, the rural stores that
dotted the backroads were about the only “public” spaces available for polling stations,
but a store belonged to someone, even when it was assigned temporary status as a polling
station. Access to every enclosed space in the county—even a sharecropper’s tenant
7

From Don Rutledge, “All Quiet in Fayette County,” Sepia 9, no. 2 (1961 Feb): 24–27. Not until 1968
when the county bought voting machines did its voters have a private means of casting ballots (Fayette
Falcon, 1968 Apr 4).

153

cabin—was subject to layers of culture (expectations, relationships, and “that’s just the
way it is”). Segregation dictated that blacks had to be admitted to white spaces (like
stores) because they were private property, and blacks were automatically precluded from
the mutually defined spheres of public life. Admission of a black citizen to a private
space or asset of any sort obligated them in some degree to whoever granted access. Only
in Somerville and Brownsville, where voting was conducted at the courthouse, was the
poll location tacitly “accessible” to its black citizens by virtue of residence. Even the
privileged nature of this “public” public space was protected by layers of paternalism and
dependence. For instance, the single “colored entrance” on the west side of the building
in Somerville had stairs leading only down to the basement before coming up to the main
floor. Culturally neutral space—a truly public civic space, accessible to any citizen on no
other term than their citizenship—simply did not exist in either county.
Action—finally
The Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division had remained on the sidelines of
both investigation and legal action—due partly to the challenge of establishing a new
office with a skeleton staff and large accountability, and partly it was because the
outgoing Eisenhower administration’s Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, W.
William White, and Attorney General William P. Rogers were reluctant to pursue noncriminal investigations; partly it was because of Bureau director J. Edgar Hoover’s
distaste for civil cases, ensuring that Justice Department received only exactly what
information its attorneys requested; partly because local U.S. Attorneys in states with the
greatest problems were reluctant or refused outright to file cases on behalf of black
voters; but mostly because the role and strategy of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S.
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Department of Justice to remedy civil rights issues was still evolving. 8An important step
in the process, taken in 1960, was the direct involvement of Department attorneys in
individual cases. FBI agents were still delegated the task of compiling precise
documentary evidence, but Justice Department attorneys (still no more than a score and
with responsibility for the entire United States) began visiting areas so they would know
specifically what to request from the Bureau. “Theoretically, support from the FBI[’s
5,600 agents] should have increased the Division's capability,” one of the early attorneys
later observed.

However, before the Division could make use of the Bureau, the Division first
had to learn how to carry out the assignment. Division lawyers had to master
everything that goes into understanding the realities of a distant and unknown
territory: the back roads; the operations of county registrar's offices; the states'
registration laws; 100 years of history; the identity of the local leaders; the way
the court's family in each judicial district functioned—the clerk, the judge's
secretary, the marshals, the U.S. Attorney, the court reporter—you name it. 9

Since state and local governments had created and then ignored the circumstances
protested in civil rights actions, to address the scale of potential cases at the federal level
required both a system and an expansion of hands capable of handling the work. There
were not enough attorneys, everyone was still learning, the courts in the respective states
were generally unsympathetic to civil rights, and little case law existed on which to build
8
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an argument. Work as an attorney in the Civil Rights Division involved shuttling
constantly between the offices in Washington and the field, studying situations in
hundreds of counties looking for actionable evidence. Decades later one attorney
recalled, “On a Friday afternoon I would see a row of suitcases and briefcases lined up in
the first floor corridor of the Department of Justice, alongside the offices of the Division
lawyers. Whenever lawyers went south to investigate, they departed Washington on
Friday night to return on the third Sunday following. This meant sixteen straight days in
the field,” 10 stopping in several locations to check the status of often differing situations.
Since voter registrations had begun, haltingly at least, between March and May
1960 the Acting Assistant Attorney General decided that the Justice Department lacked
enough direct evidence to take West Tennessee voter intimidation cases to court.
Investigators pulled out of both counties after the voter registration dates in June, but
fortunately for the new voters in Tennessee, the Department’s legal team remained in
occasional contact with the emerging leaders within the counties themselves. Shortly
thereafter the Department hired a smart attorney from Wisconsin who would have a
profound effect not only on the situation in West Tennessee, but on the entire American
civil rights movement itself.
John Doar graduated from Princeton University in 1944 and took a law degree
from Boalt Hall in at the University of California in 1949. In the spring of 1960 he was
lured from private practice in Wisconsin to a staff position in the Civil Rights Division.
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 had provided the federal government a mandate to protect
citizens’ rights to participate in their own governance. What the Civil Rights Division
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aimed to do was litigate the abstract concept into concrete reality. One of attorney John
Doar’s early field assignments was to get a direct view of the situation in and around
Brownsville, Tennessee. After the September filing of US v. Beaty, for a week between
21 and 28 October 1960, and then over another two days a few weeks later, Doar visited
Brownsville and Stanton to determine if the situation provided sufficient hard evidence
for further federal legal intervention. Doar returned to Washington with a collection of
evidence that the FBI’s Special Agents—focused on finding direct intimidation prior to
registration—had failed to acquire. His findings changed the direction of the case. While
earlier investigations concentrated on unprovable measures taken to prevent voter
registration among blacks, Doar documented what had happened because blacks had
registered, which did provide the government with a case. His evidence included twentyeight written eviction notices, photographs, a map showing the distribution of evictions
across the county, and first-hand testimony from evictees. In his affidavit supporting the
motion for a temporary injunction to prevent landlords from enforcing their eviction
orders (an order which would take effect immediately upon being signed judicially), Doar
pointed to clear circumstantial evidence of collusion among at least fourteen white
Haywood County landowners. The twenty-eight eviction letters included as exhibits were
dated between 12 May 1960 and September 1960, which meant none was dated prior to
the first black voters registered in the first week of May. Twenty-two of them dated
within the three weeks of 18 Jun–9 July 1960, a statistical cluster that does not suggest a
genuinely random or spontaneous process of attrition. More importantly, of the fifty-two
affiants who supplied testimony documenting their experience of being pressured, all but
one had registered to vote. The last, Earnest Turner, had agreed not to register upon direct
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instructions from landlord Edmund Taylor. Thirty-seven of the fifty-two had already been
evicted from their tenancies. Doar returned to Washington and on the last day of
November submitted the actionable petitions and exhibits ready for filing in federal
district court. 11
Filings for additional detail chewed up the calendar in October and November.
Defendant depositions in US v. Beaty were scheduled to be held in the Brownsville Post
Office. When depositions began, those named in the suit uniformly refused to answer any
question at all, invoking the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, but also
denying the government any information about tenure arrangements, business, or
relationships. 12
Against this backdrop of a new legal conflict, the first general election in which
blacks of either county cast their ballots was the national election of November 1960.
Many new registrants were successfully pressured to stay away from the polls. Turnout
saw an unsubstantiated number of approximately 1,200 black citizens cast a ballot in
Fayette County. 13 The figure represented only about a third of the registered white
electorate, but was large enough to underscore the possible forthcoming threat to white-
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Figure 5.2

Second District, Western Tennessee, western district federal judges
Marion S. Boyd (left) and successor Roland McRae at Boyd’s retirement
in 1966. 14

minority control of the county. No figure has been found for Haywood County. Three
days before the election, though it may be coincident with investigations, the Fayette
County Election Commission opened its first permanent office in the courthouse
basement. The local newspaper announced voter registration applications would be
accepted on all weekdays, with the residents of several districts assigned a single
weekday in rotation, rather than a single day for general registrations. 15
On 18 November 1960, Doar filed an amended complaint to Beaty in Second
District federal court. US v Archbell et al. named seventy Haywood County landowners,
five of whom lived outside the county, which brought the total number of individual and
corporate defendants to eighty-one. On 1 December he filed US v Barcroft et al., a
separate suit which named ten Fayette County landowners. The judge of the District court
14
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assigned to the case immediately joined the Haywood cases into a single action. The
following day Doar filed for a temporary restraining order to prevent the defendants from
enforcing evictions on their registered tenants. 16 A week later he was in Fayette County,
where he collected additional seventy affidavits for a similar suit in covering reprisals in
Fayette County. On 14 December 1960, the same day that the first tents were staked in
Shepherd Towles’ icy field, the Justice Department filed a separate suit in the Second
District federal court, US v. Atkeison et al., against eighty-one landowners and one bank
in Fayette; Barcroft was joined to this. Both suits sought an injunction against
landowners and businesses owners for economic reprisals against black citizens who had
registered to vote.
Two and a half weeks after Doar drafted and assembled the petitions and
documentation and less than a week after the ersatz founding of Tent City, on 19
December 1960 Civil Rights Division attorney David L. Norman visited the White House
to present the Justice Department’s findings and discuss the situation in Haywood and
Fayette counties with executive staffer David W. Kendall, Special Assistant to the
President. Norman was a divisional legal strategist and according to John Doar “a large
amount of the credit for the development of the government's strategy in enforcing the
Civil Rights Act of 1957 belongs to Norman.” 17 Kendall was the gatekeeper to the Oval
Office for justice issues and had effective control over what legal matters reached
Eisenhower directly. In a long discussion reviewing the situation and exploring possible
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directions forward, Norman laid out the evidence and later that day provided Kendall
with a thick duplicated sheaf of legal motions for the suits in both counties. Norman’s
presentation illustrated that any path through the courts would drag the federal power of
the Justice Department squarely into the local situation. For an administration that had
endured the ugly conflict in Little Rock, Arkansas, such a case coming just before leaving
office was distasteful. 18
The judge sitting in the Second District for the Western District of Tennessee was
Marion S. Boyd. Boyd was a Franklin Roosevelt appointee known for his quick
disposition of cases brought to his court, and for a fierce attention to detail and precedent
in legal filings. 19 In handling these two cases Boyd assumed a narrow interpretive
position that revolved around the key issue for landowners, who wished to protect the
social power that their control of resources gave them. For local conservatives, the issue
in the voting rights issue was the control of individual property in the form of tenant labor
on their land; for the government the issue was individuals using private property as a
goad to deny others the participatory rights of citizenship. Boyd sidestepped the case’s
central argument, agreeing that it was clear some landowners had intimidated their
tenants, but noted that “All the Civil Rights Act [of 1957] does is to protect the rights of
citizens to register and vote.” “This court has no right under the act, or any law, to enjoin
the eviction of these families or enjoin the altering of any lease agreement on these
farms.” Doar was aware that the South’s agricultural economy, Haywood County in
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particular, was in flux and countered the argument of landowner control of property and
summarized the issue for the court that “We have nothing against mechanizing farms. We
say that if you mechanize next year, O.K. But if you hire, don’t hire according to whether
or not a person is registered to vote.” 20 The same principle held for the Bank of
Brownsville, Doar argued; the lawsuit was not about its lending policy, but rather an
individual who used the institution to enforce a personal standard. A week after the first
tent pegs were driven into the Towles’ field, the federal district judge denied both
preliminary injunctions on a key Constitutional issue in the case. His ruling came down
on the side of local conservatives, deciding that the government’s petition to bar evictions
interfered with landowners’ use and control of what they owned. A Memphis PressScimitar writer pegged the issue squarely when an article observed that the district judge
“had ruled that the 1957 Civil Rights law did not give him the right to interfere with
contract and property.” 21
Boyd’s ruling addressed the issue that the county’s conservative white elite
wanted to emphasize and entirely ignored the government’s central argument. For
conservatives, the case came down to the rights of individual property holders: they
should not be required to support or employ labor they did not want to retain. One
editorial put it this way:
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So here we find a federal court raising the issue that a man who has been in a
sharecropping agreement with another man in the past must continue that
sharecropping agreement indefinitely—perhaps forever—because at some time or
other [the landowner] expressed the view that he wouldn’t have Negro voters as
his partners in crop production. 22

A Birmingham News editorial opined on the matter succinctly: “Are individuals to be
deprived through federal action of the privilege—whatever the motivation—of
terminating leases, firing employees for what they consider sufficient cause?” 23 An
anonymous letter to the U.S. Attorney General put the matter more bluntly: “Just how in
the Hell do you think a farmer in Fayette County, Tenn. can operate a farm successfully
when he is forced by a United States Federal Court to employ persons whom he does not
want?” 24 Explicitly, landowners wanted a decision that validated a property owner’s
longstanding domination of employment terms; implicitly, they wanted a decision that
enforced the existing and rigidly stratified socioeconomic order. Defense lawyers allowed
the court to assume much by virtue of the language used in their filings and briefs. It
worked.
In his ruling Boyd overlooked or ignored the conflicting nature between a tort
definition of “contract” and the sort of informal agreements that were the sole tender in
the plantation-style societies east of Memphis. By longstanding convention—not by
judicial or legislative decision nor typically committed to written form—planter/tenant
arrangements existed almost solely as verbal and informal agreements between the two
parties. Such an agreement involved a set of implicit reciprocal obligations, but rarely an
22
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actual document. These “agreements” were more permission to remain rather than a
lease, contract, or partnership. Boyd also overlooked that the individual-rights argument
of property owners invoked the primacy of their individual rights over the individual
civic rights in theory enjoyed by their tenants. Conversely, the government’s case was
built on a politically liberal idea that the private rights of one citizen could not infringe
upon the exercise of another citizen’s civil (public) rights. Citizenship conferred an
inalienable right of civic participation that was not subject to the interest, will, or power
of more privileged fellow citizens. The exercise and protection of civil liberties within the
public or civic sphere was a colorblind proposition. The Justice Department was acting to
protect a fundamental right and responsibility of citizenship that no one’s color,
economic standing, or social “place” could disqualify.
The Justice Department appealed the District Court’s ruling to the appellate court
immediately and because of the pending eviction date, asked for an expedited hearing.
On 28 December the three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Cincinnati, Ohio, reviewed the case with Justice Department attorneys D. Robert Owen
and J. Harold Flannery presenting the government’s argument. Outside LeGrange,
Tennessee, desperate for help powerful enough to halt evictions as the weather
deteriorated, rural store owner and FCCWL president Scott Franklin dispatched a
pleading telegram to President Eisenhower on 30 December 1960, certainly unaware that
the White House staff had been quietly watching the situation for nearly a month already.
After Boyd’s ruling was filed, Special Counsel to the President David W. Kendall
discussed the matter with President Eisenhower later the same week, an exchange that
added details to the television and print news reports Eisenhower had already seen. In a
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private staff meeting on the same day the Sixth Circuit heard the appeal, the President
commented for the record that reading about how “economic reprisals against Negroes in
Tennessee has infuriated him.” Referring to the pending cases Eisenhower also observed
that legal remedies would be at best an imperfect solution. 25
Two days after hearing the appeal, on 30 December the three-justice Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals sitting in Cincinnati overturned Boyd’s denial of the temporary
injunction. Late the same afternoon attorneys Owen and Flannery telephoned Viola
McFerren and Harpman Jameson from Cincinnati with news about the appellate court’s
issuance of the mandamus and temporary restraining order, which halted standing
evictions and curbed further evictions by those named in the filing. Beaty concerned only
Haywood County landowners, but “We told them,” Owen wrote in a note for the case
file, “that the Negroes in Fayette County who have been told to move because they
registered should stay in their places pending further order of the Court.” 26 The hurried
establishment of Tent City in mid-December 1960 seems to be the activation of the
backup plan, a measure to provide some evicted families means to remain in the county
long enough to see if the courts would rule in their favor over the evictions: the tents
were a response to the suits, not the suits to the tents. Owens’s advice anchored the tent
community in place for another year. That night there was a second drive-by shooting at
Tent City. On the day after the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed evictions and
remanded the case to the Memphis court, David Kendall of the White House staff tabled
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“Tennessee Eviction Cases” file, David W. Kendall records 1953–1961, box 6, Dwight D. Eisenhower
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further executive-branch involvement. A few days later copies of two confidential
assessments of the food situation were added to Kendall’s file, the last action the
Eisenhower administration would take in the Tennessee case. The matter was left to the
incoming Democratic administration after John F. Kennedy’s inauguration on 21 January
1961. 27 The mandamus returned the case to Judge Boyd in the Second District, who
issued the temporary injunctions on 5 January 1961, which allowed evicted croppers to
remain on their tenancies until the cases were decided, and put both cases onto the court’s
docket for trial on the merits. 28
Three months later, in the closing days of March, Boyd’s court denied the
government’s order on Beaty, an action that effectively handed landowners absolute
control over their tenants actions, even in civic participation. Doar appealed. On 6 April
1961 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the ruling, ordering Judge Boyd to
hear and rule upon the eviction cases, holding that 42 USC 1971(b) did apply: the
Haywood County landowners could not evict nor in good faith fail to deal with their
black tenants because they had registered to vote. 29 The decision was entered for US v.
Atkeison as well. 30 Boyd scheduled the cases for trial, and the investigations began in
earnest. The cases dragged on in Boyd’s Second District court for another year and a half,
through a litany of depositions, filings, subpoenas, and responses. 31 Neither went to trial.
A final judgment in Beaty—another consent decree—was entered 2 May 1962 and for
27
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Atkeison in late July. By this point economic reprisals and evictions in both counties were
continuing unabated, just without mentioning anything about voting. Landowners had
figured out the positive implications of their traditional paternalism: without real
contracts they owed their tenants no real obligations. The decrees in Atkeison and in
Beaty were essentially irrelevant.
In looking back at the cases from the present, the key point of relevance was the
Sixth Circuit’s ruling a year and a half earlier. The judicial panel’s ruling indicated that
the appeals court expected the district court to hold Fayette and Haywood county civic
orders to a legal standard other than its own custom and sentiment. Conservative
landowners felt that their informal agreements extended over more than the fieldwork and
crops of their labor force. In their eyes, enough cause had been shown merely by
involvement in an activity (building a civic identity by voter registration) that potentially
threatened to compromise their control over the community and its privileges. When the
appellate court ruled that dismissals/evictions had to be “for cause,” the court meant
“cause” in the contractual sense of failed obligation: laborers had not worked as agreed,
or had misappropriated goods or assets, or had not delivered on their narrowly defined
part of the agreement. So far as documentation exists, no landowner in either county
complained that their laborers had failed to produce crops as expected. That point
challenged more than just voting rights; it aimed at a premise deep in heart of the cottoncropping tradition.
Because tenancy agreements existed informally and were traditionally at-will
agreements that could be severed by either party at any time. It was a longstanding
practice to settle and “renew” the agreements on an annual basis after the crop had been
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harvested (usually late October to early December). Leaving aside debt bondage, which
consistently tipped the relationship in favor of employers, landowners felt they were
within their rights not to keep laborers who had displeased them and they no longer
wished to retain. The courts’ insistence that landowners could not dismiss labor at will
over voting implied that planters would have to continue their obligations, and that other
field hands could not be brought in. The decision looked suspiciously like the courts were
ruling not on blacks’ rights of civic involvement but on the private obligations of
property owners. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this point explicitly in its
decision overruling Judge Boyd’s decision. The panel unanimously observed that their
decision should not be viewed as “a present determination by this court that the Civil
Rights Act [of 1957] may constitutionally be employed to require private citizens to
continue or enter into contractual relations in respect to their property.” 32 By accepting a
consent ruling on the narrow issue of the complaint, individual landowners only agreed
not to slough off workers as a reprisal for political activity, but they could divest them for
any other reason or for no reason at all. “Thus the landlord can evict, and has been doing
it, for the ‘customary’ reasons, as long as it does not appear to interfere with voting
rights.” 33 Left unaddressed by the suits and the courts was the validity and terms of the
traditional verbal agreements that imposed the paternal/dependent relationship and the
enforceable obligations of either party. The courts could never address the fundamental
social and economic inequities which had been crafted over generations by convenience,
by need, by opportunity—by tradition. In Fayette and Haywood counties, the desire for
32

Quoted in “Injunction in Haywood Rights Case,” Memphis Press-Scimitar (morgue file 64752 fd.B),
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social stability and to minimize actual costs had kept the plantation system in place for a
generation longer than most of the rest of the nation.
Before the decrees were issued, in April 1962, Justice Department lead attorney J.
Harold Flannery travelled to Tennessee and spoke at meetings in both counties,
explaining the resolution of the cases and what the consent decree meant. He tried to put
the agreement terms in a positive light, though news of the consent decree did not sit well
with the local folks. “For two years I have been telling the people to report their injustices
that are done to them,” an angry John McFerren was quoted as saying. “We report
everything to the Justice Department, believing that justice will come. Now no one has
been convicted of anything.” Flannery responded by being up front about the matter.
“Mr. Flannery explained that this was not a criminal case but a civil rights one. Although
many of these were criminal offenses, . . . they did not dare to bring the case in a criminal
court. It has been almost impossible for Negroes to win a case in a criminal court because
it requires a jury which is always white.” Yes, the case had been disappointing
compromise, but it was at least on record. “It will depend now on the enforcement.” 34
No one in West Tennessee was fooled—the landowners had dodged a legal
penalty and yet surrendered or lost nothing. A few black citizens felt vindicated and
expected that they could at last secure fair treatment from the banks and their landowners.
They would eventually understand that there was a difference between prohibiting
discrimination and practicing involvement. Courts and the law could address the former
but could not impose the latter. Yes, a key premise of segregation had been exposed and
discredited: private individuals could not exercise arbitrary control over others who were

34

Untitled manuscript beginning “On this my sixth visit . . .” [ca.1962 Aug–1963], Hortenstein papers.
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trying to participate in the civic sphere. By extension, those who claimed to service “the
local community” could not pick and choose who would constitute “the public”—there
were not black dollars and white dollars. Banks and businesses quickly retreated to less
arbitrary measures of disqualifying black borrowers: insisting on loan requirements that
poor black families could not meet, such as selectively requiring collateral. In essence,
nothing changed. Activist Virgie Hortenstein wrote Odell Sanders in Brownsville,
reporting what Cincinnati lawyer Morse Johnson concluded about the effect Boyd’s
injunction would have on local banks: the ruling would disallow lenders from refusing
bank loans as a penalty for registering to vote, but it would not generate loans for them. 35
The Justice Department maintained interest in the West Tennessee situation from
a distance after the US v. Beaty and US v. Atkeison decrees. As voting rights activists
began working in both counties in 1963 and 1964, federal officials repeatedly turned
down pleas to head off intimidation. John Doar wrote dozens of letters to concerned
citizens across the country, including one to California Senator Clair Engle, that
summarized the limits of federal intervention in situations such as West Tennessee and
elsewhere throughout the South: “The Attorney General’s statutory authority to take
action respecting violations of civil rights is limited, except where the right to vote is
involved, to the enforcement of federal criminal statutes.”36 As rights activists would
discover, federal officials could not provide protection from intimidation and reprisals,
only act when violence occurred. The consent agreements signed in April 1961 and filed
after the final judgments in 1962 resolved the legal issue that had sparked federal
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intervention. Thereafter, landowners continued to exercise a free hand but were more
careful. Many abandoned evictions for a far more effective tactic. “Negroes are told they
may continue to live in the shacks. Nothing is said about voter registration. The landlord
simply says he is mechanizing his farm,” observed one rights group.37 “Families who are
not evicted outright are being told that they may remain on the land. But they are also
told that there is no work for them. Without work how can they stay?” 38 Obviously they
could not—that was the point. Cut off from marginal support meted to them under
paternalism, former sharecroppers might secure occasional day labor, but the loss of
access to farmland left them without livelihood or the paternal protection on which they
had relied, sometimes for decades. The Department investigated continuing economic
reprisals, but never found enough direct evidence for further action under existing
statutes. The Voting Rights section closed its Haywood-Fayette file in 1964. 39
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Chapter 6
Individual Efforts and Indirect Action:
The Activists (part 1)1
I have encountered discrimination and bigotry, but I have never stopped fighting
for the basic principles of our democracy, which I feel are right. 2
Since the beginning of this present day struggle for the “unalienable” right to
exercise the elective franchise, many of us have witnessed situations that we
never before even dreamed of. 3
Though never measured or quantified, Americans have long been credited with a
cultural sense of fair play. Indignities and failures are acceptable if the playing field is
level between players. When it is not, the sense of cultural "rightness" is offended and
often moves citizens to action. This is perhaps the best way to characterize the story
behind external support for the local Fayette and Haywood county activists. This conflict
happened at a time before it would have been called a humanitarian crisis. The situation
faced by Fayette and Haywood sharecroppers, particularly the Tent City residents,
resulted in an outpouring of contributions from concerned private citizens and
organizations. With the country in the midst of the civil rights era, political support in the
form of federal investigation and judicial review was forthcoming as well, but it was
outside aid that counterbalanced the lopsided distribution of wealth and political
opportunity held in the determined grip of Haywood's and Fayette's racial minority.

1

This and the following chapter are an extensive revision and expansion of a previously published
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2
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External assistance—money, commodities, expertise, and moral support—provided a
safety net to the black communities struggling not only for rights, but for survival.
The Haywood-Fayette story has typically been told as local civil rights efforts. In
the context of the larger drive for inclusive civil rights, perhaps they were. Truthfully, in
rural West Tennessee most of the organizing activity was carried out by small groups of
individually committed, fiercely determined local people. With a few situational
exceptions, nationally recognized civil rights organizations seem conspicuously absent in
both county-wide movements, and none of the personalities with national stature
budgeted time, attention, or substantive assistance to the people in these two counties. Yet
the memory of grass-roots action has been a bit too convenient. Focusing too closely on
local efforts and activists obscures the close ties and substantial support contributed by
outside groups and individuals, both black and white. Had Fayette County and Haywood
County residents turned down outside help and attempted to “go it alone” in their fight,
economic and political reprisal certainly would have dispersed the activists and left little
story to tell. That did not happen. Instead, support from beyond these two counties
sharpens the picture of precisely why the voting rights actions succeeded. External aid to
the West Tennessee actions took three important forms that could not be secured or
generated locally: mass media coverage, contributions in the form of cash or goods, and
the individual involvement of committed activists. The web of material and moral
assistance for Haywood and Fayette activists was critical.
Galvanized by the embargo and evictions
The first voting rights case filed under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 had drawn the
media’s interest, providing an occasional column in print media—chiefly newspapers—
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for months. Judicial reviews of rights legislation were of national significance and
interest. News of US v. FCDEC appeared even in distant newspaper markets. The case
probably would have garnered more press attention, except that the media was focused on
Nashville as the state capitol was convulsed by the sit-ins. It was another month before
the first news articles about the economic embargo appeared in national news outlets. The
Memphis World published the first account of economic reprisal. Two weeks later the
unfolding Tennessee drama was picked up as a Scott News Service story, a black-press
news syndicate near the first of May. 4 Within days the story made the jump to the white
mainstream press, and by summer West Tennessee’s economic embargoes were drawing
sporadic attention in the national press, while black newspapers across the country ran
weekly or daily stories about the economic repression. While the embargo was a daily
weight for those on the ground, through the summer and fall the only real interest in the
media was in clucking their tongues over the injustice, and whether black Tennesseans in
these two counties would actually vote in upcoming elections. 5
News reporting became the vehicle for not only current news about the actions,
but a brake on open white reprisal, and the catalyst for national aid and assistance.

4
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Reportage in the Chicago Defender, the Atlanta Daily World, Pittsburgh Courier,
Baltimore AfroAmerican, Norfolk Journal and Guide (Va.), and Memphis's two black
newspapers, the Memphis World and Tri-state Defender, acted as advocates for
Tennesseans within the national community in a way that no amount of personal
relationships could match. The hometown activists in Tennessee eventually learned the
value of a well-crafted press release, but in 1960 news reporting was an invaluable asset
they could not command themselves.
The tent encampment and shootings generated press attention in ways that
economic reprisals alone never could, but it was the Sixth Circuit Court decision that
galvanized interest nationally. Blazing in newspaper headlines and simmering in columns
across the country, the founding of Tent City and legal battle in the Second District and
Sixth Circuit courts provided a compelling image that attracted external support for the
broader civil rights struggles in Haywood and Fayette counties. Within a few weeks
representatives from dozens of organizations would descend on West Tennessee to find
facts, make assessments, and offer assistance. Several papers committed reporters to onlocation coverage. The resulting attention paid to Fayette eclipsed similar developments
in Haywood County to the north and shaped the public face of the struggle in West
Tennessee. Thereafter the national media attention essentially ignored Stanton and
Brownsville to concentrate on Tent City and Somerville. The regional press always
included both counties in their coverage, as would be expected, but with Tent City,
Fayette now had a story and a news “destination.” The Los Angeles Mirror dispatched
Memphis native George Reasons to cover the story. For a year, Trezzvant W. Anderson
cycled through the two counties, filing dozens of stories for the Pittsburgh Courier. Its
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eight regional editions covered the entire South and East, from Maine to Texas to
Minnesota, and the paper had a circulation that was probably larger than the better-known
Chicago Defender. Western Kentucky native Ted Poston of the New York Post arrived
and filed a detailed, six-part illustrated story for his newspaper. Wire service reporters,
including the Associated Press, United Press International, and Scripps-Howard News
Service, ran stories from on-site reporters regularly, and black news services such as the
Scott Newspaper Syndicate and Associated Negro Press covered the events as they
unfolded. Even NBC returned to shoot stock footage. 6
Even with new coverage, before the first tents were pitched in Shepherd Towles’
field beside Rural Route 8108, the events in Haywood and Fayette counties were strictly
local matters, newsworthy certainly, but still local. No one in Chicago or New York could
do much about the denial of voting rights in Tennessee. On the other hand they could do
something about families without homes living in tents, short of food, and ill clothed. The
establishment of Tent City effectively nationalized the Fayette and Haywood stories and
opened a period of liberal activism. 7
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Aid contributions
For those suffering under the embargo, its crushing bite illustrated two points very
clearly. First, white paternalism was the only economic asset sustaining the black
community as a whole in either county; as the core of white activists had already realized,
those cut off from paternalism had absolutely no other assets sufficient to maintain
stability. Second, despite establishment of the Civic and Welfare Leagues, neither
community organization nor “leadership” actually fed hungry people. If civil
participation was to be secured in either Tennessee county, they needed help in proportion
to the need, which was unavailable locally. Given the dire poverty among the black
majorities of both counties, help would have to come from outside sources, and it would
have to be in folks’ hands before newly registered voters were forced to move their
families elsewhere simply to subsist. 8
News of the embargo circulating in Memphis’s black press sparked support in the
urban populations. The national NAACP leadership was already hammering on the oil
companies, but encouraged chapters’ direct contributions. The chapter in Memphis was
asked to coordinate donations. 9 Jesse Turner accompanied a truckload of food and
clothing to Somerville on 5 July 1960, and a week later Special Field Secretary W. C.
Patton arrived to direct distribution of other NAACP-collected contributions. 10 The
8
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situation in these two counties, however, was no less pressing than similarly displaced
sharecroppers in Alabama or South Carolina. The fulcrum that eventually pried
Tennessee’s evictions out of the back pages of news outlets across the county was the
sharply peaked roofs of three canvas tents.
Within days of the extended Williams’ family moving into “Tent City,” Nashville
residents Nelson Fuson, Leo Lillard, and Metz Rawlins had collected food, some
clothing, and a few household goods from friends. In a borrowed truck the trio drove to
the Towles farm and unloaded their contributions. News reports also stirred Missouri
trucker James Puryear. Within days, his truck pulled into Somerville piled with goods
gathered on his own from friends and personal acquaintances. Though Fayette and
Haywood’s story had occasionally been in state and national news for months, as soon as
the Tent City story broke, help was offered by private individuals across the state as well,
usually by committing goods or small cash donations. “We want you to know that there
are white Southerners who share your feelings about this matter and who would like to be
able to share in its solution,” wrote one supporter as she enclosed a personal check to
help cover someone's living expenses. 11 Before long, however, both the scope of the
actual need and the number of contributors grew dramatically.
Thoughtful individuals like Puryear were the vanguard of a steady stream of
assistance that picked up as word of evictions and the founding of Tent City made
national news. Within two weeks of the Williams family's move, the muddy field became
a destination for well-intentioned investigators and potential supporters. By Christmas,
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just as Tent City was collecting its displaced residents, another truck-sized contribution
came from the United Packinghouse, Food, and Allied Workers Union, a predominantly
black union, and a delegation and relief goods from the Mennonite Central Committee
out of Pennsylvania. Based on the plan modeled by the Chicago CORE membership,
other CORE chapters established “Emergency Relief Committees for Fayette and
Haywood Counties” to funnel contributions to Tennessee from California, Michigan,
New York, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and elsewhere. 12 At New Years, a three-member
group from The Peacemakers, a radical nonviolent ministerial group based in Cincinnati,
visited. Their brief contact generated long-ranging consequences. Another CORE chapter
in Los Angeles supported evicted Haywood citizens. Other groups came quickly to see
what they could do as well. 13 In March, Russell R. Lasley of the United Packinghouse,
Food, and Allied Workers made a site visit, bringing with him union writer Eugene A.
Kelley. Kelley produced an illustrated account of the ongoing conflict as Tent City—
Home of the Brave, which was published by the AFL-CIO and distributed nationally. 14
The two shootings at Tent City galvanized support in urban black areas across the
country. In particular, groups in Chicago and southwestern Ohio mobilized or reinvigorated their support. Though the Chicago ERC continued sending assistance, new
help came in January and February with an organization named the “Kenwood-Hyde
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Figure 6.1

Canvassing for relief donations by young members of the Kenwood-Hyde
Park Committee to Aid Fayette County, January 1961. 15

Park Committee to Aid Fayette County.” This group of mostly women and children from
the neighborhood around the University of Chicago collected and presented over $2,300
in cash to a Fayette County delegation that had come north to accept it; additional money
was contributed by a student group at the University of Chicago, by the St. Thomas
Parochial School, and by the South Shore School of Jewish Studies. 16
With Tent City capturing headlines, relief goods pouring in by the truckload, and
cash sitting in accounts waiting for dispersal, national organizations were becoming
frustrated with unnecessary duplication of effort and tried to persuade the Haywood and
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Fayette groups to work together to coordinate relief efforts. In the second week of
January the NAACP hosted a meeting of the American Friends Service Committee
(Quakers), National Sharecropper Fund, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and
National Committee for Rural Schools. John McFerren was specifically invited but
refused to attend, refusing even travel expenses. Held in New York on 11 January, it
became clear that no meaningful organization could happen without involving the local
activists, who had not attended. A second, more inclusive meeting was scheduled for
Memphis. 17
The stated purpose of the second meeting was to figure out how to coordinate
constantly changing needs in Tennessee and the diverse assistance being offered across
the country. The HCCWL reluctantly established a committee to coordinate with the
Fayette group, but leadership of the latter was fracturing. Neither was particularly keen
about working with the other anyway. Given John McFerren’s willful absence from the
11 January meeting, NAACP executive secretary Roy Wilkins was enlisted to apply
constructive pressure on him specifically, as McFerren’s streak of independence
threatened to hamstring the effort he was working to strengthen. “Your absence will be
subject to misinterpretation and may add to the confusion which already exists due to
internal dissension,” Wilkins’s telegram read. “Your presence will help those concerned
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with settling this issue to work out practicable long range solutions.” 18 In advance of the
second meeting, Gloster Current issued a three-week assignment to Phillip H. Savage to
get to Tennessee, work with the activists in both counties, and bring them to the table. 19
There were related problems, including the NAACP’s insistence on dominating or
steering projects that were ostensibly cooperative efforts, which was alienating potential
allies, including the SCEF, which had not been invited to the Memphis meeting. “It gets
sort of tiresome fighting with these NAACP people to get included in things they do,”
Ann Braden grumbled in a letter. The Peacemakers had not been invited either. 20
Everyone knew that large economic forces were tugging farm families toward city
jobs, even without the evictions. The goal for this second meeting, as stated by the
NAACP, was to “explore long-range solutions” for aiding those who stayed in the county
(“re-habilitation”) and those who could not (“re-location”). The NAACP’s twin visionand experience-borne solutions immediately collided against the deeply grounded
interests of the local groups, who were interested in carving out positions of respect and
participation within their own communities. Their firmness was grounded on the simple
assumption that civic participation could be gained without leaving Haywood County or
Fayette County; at least, leaving would mean the white landowners had won.
By the time the second coordination meeting convened at LeMoyne College, the
FCCWL leadership had split. Attorney James F. Estes arrived with a delegation of six
Tent City residents from the Scott Franklin faction (FCCWL); John McFerren brought his
18
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own delegation of five others (which would soon become the OFCCWL). Both sides
were admitted and participated in the meeting. 21 The chair opened by asking if the group
of activists could agree on a joint committee and would accept the advice and assistance
of trained relief personnel. McFerren immediately said that “he would not agree for an
outsider to come in and tell them what to do.” Softening the proposal’s language a bit,
someone suggested an advisory committee, whereupon Fayette County’s Allen Yancy
insisted that it involve equal numbers of local and “outside people.” Hastening to reassure
the rural participants of their importance to the group, Memphis lawyer Benjamin Hooks
unwittingly weakened the proposal further, noting that the group would have “advisory
status only,” effectively ending the national groups’ hope for a strong, coordinated effort.
James Estes put a final nail in the coffin of coordinated effort by assuring that the
committee “would only advise to insure national confidence.” 22 Despite frank discussion
and commitments from every one, the meeting ended without clear goals or agreements,
and without making substantive progress toward organization, cooperation, or assistance.
Resolve had dissolved and been watered down to ineffectiveness.
Reporting the event to NAACP chairman Roy Wilkins a few days later, Gloster
Current noted that “Although McFerren did not close the door to cooperation, in view of
his dominant leadership in the Fayette County situation, it would appear that he is
lukewarm on the idea of creating any organization through which the two counties can
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jointly distribute aid and work together. The absence of [HCCWL’s Currie] Boyd from
the meeting adds up to the same thing—an unwillingness to cooperate even with the idea
of cooperating.” The direct outcome of the meeting was that interest in Tennessee’s rural
conflict weakened dramatically among leaders of key national civil rights organizations.
This meeting marked an effective end to direct NAACP involvement and support in the
Tennessee situation, through the Memphis chapter remained engaged and the national
organization occasionally probed for openings in Haywood County. Lacking a reliable
local mechanism for distributing aid equitably, in 1963 the national office finally
reallocated nearly $25,000 in funds donated specifically for relief in West Tennessee. 23
The sentiment of the key local leaders to oppose direct cooperation with national
groups was fateful and long-ranging in several ways. First, it meant that both counties
would function primarily toward achieving local goals, on local priorities, and toward
local improvement. “Neither wants to see anything created,” Current continued, “which
would adversely affect their present independence of operation and open up to closer
examination what is going on in terms of distribution, etc.”24 The local activists wished to
fight their own battles on their own terms. Maurice McCrackin of Operation Freedom
23
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was less charitable: “The NAACP wanted to exploit the situation to raise national funds.
In order to keep a local chapter out the members of the [OFCCWL] are the officers and
members of the local chapter of the NAACP. John [McFerren] said this was the only way
they could keep others from messing up what they were trying to do.” 25 McFerren’s
suspicion and his fear of becoming a tool for someone else’s machine was enough to
make him wary of any cooperation that did not focus directly on local needs. By
dismissing coordination and cooperation of national organizations, the Haywood and
Fayette activists asserted their independence and fundamental equality with supportive
urban sympathizers and national organizations. Leaders of both groups thus ensured that
their causes would not become momentary cause célèbres, burning issues one day and
forgotten the next. They were working for general betterment of people around
Somerville and Brownsville, Tennessee, not for black citizens generally nor for mere
notoriety. But maintaining local control came at a price; the inability to substantively
influence actions or activists in Tennessee was pushing the Haywood/Fayette conflict off
the radar for national groups and lessening the economic and social pressure they could
apply to those driving the embargo in either county.
For the local activists, cooperation involved not only material benefits but also the
threat of being overrun by other priorities. The large influence a group could wield was
not worth the large risks. Remaining local conflicts, without direct involvement from
national rights groups, meant that they risked being ignored altogether. On the other hand,
by January 1961, as much as the press at Tent City was bothersome to residents, it was
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also clear that the notoriety limited what the white establishment could do in reprisal. Part
of the reason white landowners and businesses had long been able to deny civic
participation and economic stability to black citizens was because little accountability for
those denials existed beyond individual power and county boundaries. News reporting
provided a new measure of public accountability. In this case, a familiarity with tactical
needs trumped the familiarity with strategic effort. The on-site effectiveness of national
organizations such as CORE, SNCC, NAACP— in terms of leadership, assets, or
influence—was propelled or mired or redirected by the influence of local activists. Local
options were limited, but significant enough to shape the landscape of effective,
cooperative activism.
Activist organizations
Some individuals came to the scene in West Tennessee, wanting to stay long
enough to “do something” personally. Among the first was probably Bob Plese, a New
Mexico State University student. He came around the 1961 New Year and stayed long
enough to be caught up in the early relief efforts and to help coordinate the broadening
voter registration effort during the early spring of 1961. 26 A few months later two college
students arrived from Cleveland, Ohio. They had been thumbing around the country and
were attracted by the unfolding drama in Tennessee. Charles Butts was white and his
close friend Gilbert Moses was black. The two of them drove a family car from the shores
of Lake Erie to southern Tennessee simply to see what they could do to help within either
county. Butts proved invaluable as an assistant to Richard Haley, who had set up a
workspace in a corner or backroom of Odell Sanders’ grocery on South Washington
26

Plese guided Richard Haley from McFerren’s store at Three Way down the road to Freedom
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Avenue in Brownsville, which had reopened as the Haywood County Supermarket. In the
coming months this odd couple was followed by scores of other visitors, some the idly
curious wanting to see the spectacle of poverty, others representing organizations
galvanized into action by the thought of U.S. citizens being evicted for political
participation. 27
Rather than weaving a detailed narrative involving all the activist groups or
individuals involved, three organizations merit individual attention: Operation Freedom;
the Fayette Haywood Work Camps; and the “Cornell-Tomkins County Committee for
Free and Fair Elections in Fayette County, Tennessee,” known informally as the “Fayette
County Project Volunteers,” a drive for voter education and mobilization before the 1964
election that is easier to cite as simply the “Cornell-Tompkins effort.”28
Operation Freedom
Operation Freedom had its origins in the righteous indignation of a three-member
delegation from The Peacemakers, a radical Cincinnati-based group of ministerial peace
activists. They had visited Tent City, Somerville, Stanton, and Brownsville on 2–4
January 1961. 29 Maurice McCrackin, Wallace Nelson, and Ross Anderson were all
experienced activists and recognized both the desperation and the threads of support that
kept evicted families in place. The NAACP effectively withdrew from West Tennessee
relief efforts after the failed Memphis coordination meeting in mid January 1961. By then
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it was evident that concerned groups across the country were needlessly compounding
their efforts, providing too many of some contributions while not enough of others. Local
folks in Stanton and Somerville were wallowing in unneeded clothing donations, no
longer starving (though certainly malnourished), and still desperately poor. By February
1961 it was clear that better coordination among relief organizations would reduce
duplicate efforts and to maximize the effectiveness of public appeals for donations.
Informal discussions between various officers and participants in a wide variety of
organizations in the upper Midwest resulted in a coordination meeting scheduled for
Dayton, Ohio. To this meeting came representatives of the Ohio Council of Churches, the
Southern Conference Educational Fund, Columbus and Cincinnati CORE chapters, the
national CORE organization, the Peacemakers, the Socialist Party, the National
Sharecroppers Fund, and several ad hoc local groups such as Dayton, Ohio's “Freedom
Village Fund.” Insisting on controlling contributions made by its members, and ironically
refusing to cooperate—just as its leaders had chastised John McFerren only days
earlier—the NAACP did not send a representative. All who did attend agreed to support a
new coordinating organization that would deal directly with needs in Fayette and
Haywood counties. The result was the formation of the “Operation Freedom Fund.”
“Operation Freedom was formed,” a circular letter later stated, “to provide emergency
help so that people who are expressing their freedom by voting might remain in the
counties.” 30
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Besides the initial task of coordinating donations from the contributing
organizations, the group formulated a plan to address one of the key problems in a postpaternal poor society: the need for stabilizing capital assets. James Estes had advocated a
credit union as early as January 1960, but it is unlikely that enough assets could be
pooled from the community to create a viable institution. On 1 February 1961, Haywood
County sharecropper Lee Harden Estes painstakingly wrote out a query to McCrackin.
“Have received Some information, concerning you and your work, & with other
understanding. If a man needed somom mone foa years time [i.e., “some money for a
year’s time”] you could help out,” perhaps the earliest appeal for financial help. 31 Estes’s
letter underscored a point that the three-member committee had noticed: since each
county's Civic and Welfare League was already functioning and distributed aid
commodities fairly effectively, commodities alone would not sustain farm families who
owed debts to banks and landowners, or needed money for implements, seed, or general
subsistence “run money.” At a board meeting Maurice McCrackin, speaking of the
evicted families of Fayette County, emphasized that “if they [the locals] were willing to
risk their safety or their security or in some instances their lives, we of Operation
Freedom should be willing to risk our money.” 32 Out of the early organizational meetings
came a plan for Operation Freedom to establish a quarter-million-dollar circulating fund
to function as an underwriting agency for Fayette and Haywood's black farm families
who had suffered reprisals for their civic individualism, or to deflect arbitrary
31
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foreclosures by local lenders and lending institutions. To coordinate this process the
national CORE office, which had re-acquired the leadership of founder James Farmer
barely a week earlier, volunteered to post one of its seven field organizers temporarily in
west Tennessee. Richard Haley was dispatched from Chicago to Brownsville for a stint
that lasted between February and May, 1961. 33
After his site visit became a formal assignment, Haley’s energy went into creating
a workable mechanism to distribute the small loans that Operation Freedom planned to
make to both counties’ residents. Operation Freedom became an informal financial
institution “organized to act quickly and without red tape to supply money in emergency
situations” in a population that had few assets outside dependency relationships. 34 The
total figure of about $120,000 actually realized was far less than hoped for, but the
significance of the money to the county movements cannot be overstated. About 2,300
donors from across the country contributed to the fund in sums as little as a dollar. A few
large donations were returned because the donors wanted to attach stipulations to the
gifts. 35 Creating a circulating fund guaranteed that aid would be disseminated as loans
rather than outright gifts or aid payments. Operation Freedom was set up as a circulating
33
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fund, though the organization’s leaders knew they could never raise enough money to
improve the general living conditions of abject poverty. All it could do was address dire
emergencies faced by those most committed to the cause, who most risked economic
coercion or reprisal. “I cannot put into words the frustration, the depression, the defeat
that arises from looking into hopeful faces or discouraged faces, to tell them there is not
sufficient money to take care of them at that time,” wrote Richard Haley. “And it’s just as
depressing to realize that, at the most, we’re doing a temporary job that has little bearing
on the permanent problem: low income, low hope, low expectation, low achievement,
low self-opinion.” 36
The three-member Peacemaker delegation began soliciting donations immediately
after their visit in early January 1961, a task transferred to Operation Freedom at its
founding. Organizer Richard Haley began compiling and funneling to Cincinnati a
monthly average of about forty-five requests, which varied between $150 and $300. 37 By
the end of the month and barely two weeks after it organized, the first donations were
dispensed as loans in amounts as small as fifty dollars and as much as fifteen hundred.
Completing a loan request form, even a mimeographed one, and committing to a fixed
repayment schedule was a new and impersonal formality to many rural people, whose
only previous lending experience had been to ask for springtime “run money” from the
landlord and to expect the sum to be garnished from the year’s income at harvest. The
money staved off opportunistic bank foreclosures, bought equipment, and provided
subsistence loans to desperate families. The money allowed many families to remain in
36
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the county and not migrate to other states; this desperately needed cash infusion was
probably the single most significant external factor in the success and the function of
grassroots organizations.
Operation Freedom tried to curb foreclosures with emergency loans to those who
commanded at least a few assets, but evictions still stripped working families from the
land. Evicting sharecroppers cut families loose from dependence but also from
paternalism, their one mooring to either county, a fact landowners were betting on to
reduce black populations. Controlling land represented stability. It was a natural step for
activists to attempt to tie at least a few farm families to a new anchor. Operation Freedom
executive council commissioned a three-member local committee to quietly locate and
explore making a large-acreage purchase in Haywood County but immediately ran into
trouble. “We seemed on the verge of the purchase of a 300 acre site [in the spring] when
it became known that Operation Freedom was financing the purchase. All negotiations
were halted amid dire threats of what would happen to those giving assistance to
Operation Freedom in the farm purchase. At this time a farm purchase does not seem
feasible.” 38 Real estate-based institution building on the scale needed proved too large a
problem for a relief group to handle.
Even without the land, Operation Freedom funneled tens of thousands of dollars
into west Tennessee that otherwise never would have come, but making the first group of
loans was much different than collecting on them to keep the fund going. 39 “A sizeable
38
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amount of [loaned] money we will never get back,” McCrackin confided to friends Wally
and Juanita Nelson, speaking of repayments in terms of once-annual rural incomes. “The
banks and landlords would be at the gin to get their money back even if the families go
without food and clothing the rest of the year.” Though the group intended never to
foreclose on such loans, “Someone should go back in the fall when the cotton is being
sold, to do everything possible to see that all is repaid which can be repaid.” 40 Board
member Virgie Hortenstein eventually took up the responsibility. She made several visits
to each county to encourage individuals to repay their loans. Despite fears, Tennessee’s
sharecroppers were generally scrupulous about repayment and the default rate was much
less than expected. Of particular interest is an observation Hortenstein made in 1962 that
“Fayette County be given consideration [for future loans] in view of the fact that their
money was mostly repaid.” 41
While Operation Freedom experienced success as a support organization, other
concerned people felt more strongly about direct engagement on the ground. A year and a
half after Tent City was pitched, the first activist work group arrived. These were four
Swiss and French members of the International Voluntary Service (IVS), the Chicagobased US branch of Service Civil International, the international Quaker service
organization. Their week-long visit coincided with the late-summer election of 1962.
These young people were so exotically foreign that they were essentially left alone by
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local white detractors on the sheriff’s orders. Their presence underscored that the events
around Brownsville and Somerville were of interest across the world; thus, negative
reaction potentially could spark international attention. 42 Both counties had been visited
by curious supporters and activists for a year, but the “workcamp” was a new experience
that initially upset the social sense of “place.” Wyoming native Barry Davis, who
organized and led the team, noted that as the quartet arrived “the people didn’t even look
directly at us.”

At first the men were very guarded with us . . ., replied “Sir” to us, wouldn’t laugh
at jokes, gave only noncommittal replies. By the end, the men would laugh with
us (especially if we made jokes on ourselves), would discuss with us, and express
opinions and decisions, and we had to fight off the hospitality for fear we would
be given food that they needed. 43

Initially Operation Freedom signed on as a co-sponsor for the IVS service project, but in
the late summer of 1962 potential liabilities of the “workcamp” approach sparked a
debate about goals and methods among the directors. Over its first year the Operation
Freedom board of directors made three decisions that shaped the future of the
organization, changing it from an ad hoc response effort to a genuine non-governmental
relief organization. The first was an early decision not to loan money for homes or house
construction, since better-established public programs were in place to meet that specific
need. Operation Freedom would instead remain a lender of last resort and would “give
42
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priority to cases of greatest need where people are unable to get loans from other
sources.” 44
A second decision was longer and more painful. The group’s participation in
financial activism and success with microlending was unique among U.S. social welfare
groups. At a board meeting in early September 1962, Carl Braden of the Southern
Conference Educational Fund proposed that Operation Freedom expand its scope
southward to include the larger but demographically similar Mississippi Delta. The two
Tennessee counties were the northernmost point of the Delta region, which was
experiencing the same sort of civic awakening and economic repression. The proposal
was widely discussed among board members and some, notably vice president Virgie
Hortenstein, disagreed vigorously with the proposal. Despite objections from Hortenstein
and a few other trustees, the majority voted for the change on the premise that “no other
group is set up to give economic aid on an emergency basis in times of crisis.” 45 Within
the month Operation Freedom extended its first loans to families in the Mississippi Delta.
As a result, loans to Fayette or Haywood County residents declined sharply by 1964,
though the group made occasional grants to Tennesseans thereafter. The last record of a
loan to a Tennessee resident was in August 1967. 46 Economic reprisal against black
voting was so widespread across the South that it was probably inevitable that Operation
Freedom would change its mission to meet the challenge. The circumstances in Haywood
44
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and Fayette counties were far from resolved, but Operation Freedom was drawn toward
the gravity of similar situations in other states.
Operation Freedom directors made their third major decision in the same meeting.
“After considerable discussion” they resolved to withdraw from organizational
sponsorship of direct-action aid projects, “but not excluding Operating Freedom
encouragement of other group experienced in such camps from conducting them in
Fayette and Haywood Counties, Tennessee.” 47 If the group was to operate with a broader
scope, the directors did not want to be tied to a specific locale, but certainly encouraged
others willing to make the effort (among which were at least two of its own voting board
members). Operation Freedom’s decision to separate itself from direct-action work
groups heralded its own broadening interest and opened a window for another
organization to fill that void.
Operation Freedom was evolving from an aid organization into a financial relief
agency, a support organization rather than an activist one. No amount of political activism
could remedy the need for financial credit. By 1962, when its board acted to broaden its
scope, federal court action had provided protection from overt evictions (on paper at
least) and the immediate crisis of Tent City represented had dissipated. It began making
loans to Mississippians in October 1962; by the early months of 1964 Operation Freedom
had effectively ended its broad support for activists within West Tennessee to focus on
Mississippi. By 1965 it expanded its reach into select areas of Alabama as well. Its
mission had changed. No longer tied programmatically to a single locale, Operation
Freedom became “an emergency operation, set up to aid people while their tears are still
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wet and their minds and hearts are still seething with anxiety. It is the Red Cross of the
civil rights movement, going immediately to the scene where the tornado of racial
turbulence has unleashed its fury.” 48 The organization’s leadership was certainly not blind
to the realities facing those in West Tennessee, but it determined to do what they could for
others just as hard-pressed. Its 1964 newsletter stated:

Although everyone supposed three years ago that Operation Freedom would be
only a temporary effort—Operation Freedom was mainly designed to meet the
crisis facing candidates for ‘tent city’ in Haywood and Fayette Counties—
Operation Freedom found it not only had to continue, but also had to expand. The
reasons are twofold: 1) Action for civil rights, particularly voter registration, has
increased; 2) The civil rights organizations do not have any arrangement in their
own groups for giving aid. 49

Doing the greatest good for the largest number was an admirable goal, but it was not the
only admirable goal.
As a relief organization Operation Freedom stood apart from the voter registration
effort which had fueled its aid in 1960. Privately, however, its officers remained
concerned. “It will be tragic if all the sacrifice and suffering goes down the drain because
the registration effort fails. You will remember that the reports are that they are keeping
the Negro registration down to a point where it will be no threat to the reelection of the
sheriff,” treasurer Maurice McCrackin wrote to vice chairman Virgie Hortenstein in late
1961. 50 The August 1961 primary election in Fayette County—the first primary in which
blacks could cast a ballot—saw L. T. Redfearn defeated a second time in the Democratic
contest for sheriff against the “establishment” incumbent, Clarence E. Pattat. Those who
48

Clarence Jordan, “Helping the South,” Operation Freedom newsletter, 1966 Feb.
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“Newsletter: Operation Freedom Enters Fourth Year,” 1964 Jan 18, 22:22 McCrackin papers.
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Mac [McCrackin] to Virgie [Hortenstein, 1961] Nov 2, Hortenstein papers.
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observed the election were certain it involved massive voter fraud by election officials,
but no one at the state or federal level was listening. 51
Fayette Haywood Work Camps
As Operation Freedom directors set aside direction action tactics and sponsorship
in late 1962, several of the members objected vigorously and ultimately decided to
organize separately as a different form of aid organization. In the IVS experience
Operation Freedom vice chairman Virgie Hortenstein perceived the value of white and
black people working together as a means of building good will across the racial divide.
She disagreed vigorously with the Operation Freedom board’s decision to end workcamp
sponsorships. Hortenstein’s chief concern was that unmet practical needs remained
plentiful in Tennessee. She also feared that an expanded program for Operation Freedom
would lose the personal contact that fostered trust across the color line and bound
otherwise dissimilar people to each other. Based on her correspondence with Barry Davis,
the U.S. organizer for the Fayette County IVS project, Hortenstein decided to found a
separate group, the Fayette Haywood Work Camps Inc. (FHWC), based on the model
IVS employed: bring small groups to a location to work for a short time beside local
people in service projects and activities like building a house, pouring a driveway,
repairing a roof. The payoff was in good-will and community development earned
through service. FHWC, which remained active and engaged in both counties until 1985,
became the longest running and most deeply involved outside organization.
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Barry P. Davis, “International Voluntary Service Sends International Work Team for a One Week
Workcamp Among the Negro Community of West Tennessee,” dated 1962 Aug 12, Hortenstein papers;
Untitled manuscript beginning “On this my sixth visit . . .” [ca.1962 Aug–1963], Hortenstein papers.;
“History Being Made,” League Link 1, no. 26 (1961 Oct 14).
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Figure 6.2

Virgie Hortenstein, Operation Freedom vice-chairman and Fayette
Haywood Work Camps executive, in Haywood County, ca. 1966. 52

The organizational force and driving figure behind the FHWC, Virgie Hortenstein,
was a doggedly determined white housewife from Cincinnati, Ohio. A Quaker herself,
Hortenstein had been a stay-at-home peace activist for nearly a decade. She had become
politically active during Maurice McCrackin’s hearing and expulsion before the
Cincinnati presbytery in 1959–1960. Her attention was redirected to Tennessee after his
visit to Tent City in the Peacemakers delegation at the turn of 1961, and she visited
several times herself the same year. The unconscionable treatment of U.S. citizens in
Haywood and Fayette Counties galvanized her into personal action. She became involved
52

Virgie Hortenstein papers, Wilmington College, Wilmington, Ohio.
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with Operation Freedom at its inception and remained actively involved until the group
disbanded. She was a major figure in that organization’s relief activities in Tennessee and
hosted visiting delegations from both counties in her home as early as 1961. “The
experience of knowing these people has been so strong,” she wrote in the family’s 1961
Christmas letter,” that I have been busy the greater part of the year finding ways to help
them, giving talks to raise money, writing, traveling about and especially to Tennessee.” 53
Hortenstein’s interest in the poor families of west Tennessee became a passion and a
cause to which she devoted most of the rest of her life.
Fayette Haywood Work Camps Inc. began simply enough. Hortenstein organized
the first independent service project over the 1962 Thanksgiving break, adopting the IVS
model of a “workcamp” service effort, a self-sustaining short visit organized to
accomplish a specific task. “Our immediate purposes are,” she wrote in an undated 1963
work-project call:

1. To work with local people in a project of their choosing for the betterment of
their community.
2. To raise money for materials for construction.
3. To publicize the facts of the [Tennessee social and economic] situation from
firsthand experience.
In an area where “justice,” as we interpret it, does not exist, responsible citizens
can help by exposing these conditions. The local people who are responsible
sometimes “wake up” when they see themselves as others see them. 54
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The group of ten male and female college students lived in Tent City during their stay and
helped pour the concrete footings and set the first blocks for the OFFCWL community
center down the road from John McFerren’s store, south of Somerville. The weather
turned too cold to set block for another project at Christmas break, so a different group of
workcampers helped renovate an abandoned house for June Dowdy’s family and chopped
firewood to be sold for the Community Center building fund.
The small, independently organized five-day to two-week sessions ran several
times a year between 1962 and the mid 1970s, and FHWC remained engaged in
community institutional development in both counties until Hortenstein's passing in 1985.
FHWC brought middle-class white students from all over the country to live with and
work beside black families in both Tennessee counties. Their service in the two counties
accomplished nothing that local people could not do themselves, but their effect among
the black population was tremendous. As unskilled labor (even by rural standards), their
help picking peas, building small outbuildings, and participating in work projects often
provided more entertainment than practical help. Especially in the early years, these
college students were often the first openly supportive white people that many blacks in
either county ever met. 55
Workcampers brought with them their own food to lessen the burden on the host
families, who could not always feed themselves. They typically collected donated funds
for the materials or supplies they used in a workcamp well before they arrived. Volunteers
also paid $10.50 weekly to cover their living expenses in Tennessee, only part of which
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Charlie Butts interview transcript #15, p. 2-6, OFCCWL records; “September [1962] Newsletter
from Operation Freedom,” McCrackin papers; Robert Hamburger interview, 2003 Feb 23, WLJT studio
tape, Univ. of Tennessee at Martin.
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offset administrative expenditures. 56 Virgie Hortenstein insisted, however, that the “two
main things” about the workcamps were first, that there was a specific task to be
accomplished, in whole or in part, and that second, “there are some local people to work
with us. Fellowship together is very important. We don’t want to just come down and
work in our own group and eat in our own group but to be with the local people as much
as possible.” Accomplishing discrete tasks was not the major goal of the projects;
workcamp service provided an opportunity to get outside one’s own existence. “One of
the main reasons for our wanting to come is to get more people acquainted with the
situation there and the people so they will feel involved enough to go back home and help
with the movement.” 57
The first few workcamps had trouble accommodating to Southern habits and
expectations, and the influx of strange if supportive white people was not uniformly
welcomed. Jeff Broadbent, a member of one of the earliest workcamps, helped lay the
first courses of block for the OFCCWL community center walls. “Next morning we had
breakfast at the Goodins, charter members of Tent City. After much hesitancy, we finally
persuaded Mrs. Goodin and one of her boys to eat with us.” “She had eaten with some
white workcampers during the summer, but she was still pretty uncertain about the whole
thing. Many of the colored people evinced this attitude.” 58 For Linda Lynes the challenge
was mastering how to address her host and hostess and helping them understand how she
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expected to be addressed. “We quickly settled into the custom of calling adults by their
first name prefixed with Mr. or Mrs. (pronounced “Miz”.) We insisted that they drop the
Miss for us, because of our age, but this was hard to establish, because they had never
addressed a white man without the formality of Mr.-Mrs.-Miss.” 59 Lynes chopped a
Haywood County cotton field ten hours a day for nearly two weeks.
FHWC developed an active board of directors, but as its executive, Hortenstein
effectively ran the organization, generating publicity, handling correspondence and
finances, writing its newsletter, planning with local contacts, organizing and staffing
projects, and personally visiting Tennessee several times a year. Most importantly she
became the chief fundraiser for the organization. She developed and maintained an
extensive mailing list of former workcamp participants, donors, and sympathetic
sponsors. And the donations letters poured in: from Yonkers, Brooklyn, Gettysburg,
Cincinnati, Los Angeles, Seattle, Nashville, Atlanta, Philadelphia, but also Hot Springs,
Arkansas; Carmel, California; Westpoint, Mississippi; Norristown, Pennsylvania;
Saginaw, Michigan; Salem, Virginia; Yellow Springs and Hiram, Ohio; Racine,
Wisconsin. It was an unusual day if the Ohio housewife activist did not pull four or five
envelopes from the mailbox. They came from women sending a few dollars of
housekeeping money, Baptist congregations taking a stand for freedom, Quaker meetings
supporting the work of peace. Most were small sums. Three dollars was common, ten
was more common, but one elderly man enclosed thirty-five cents and a prayer, unable to
afford more. A few donors could be more generous. Two deeded automobiles to the
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group. An investor transferred 30 shares of stock with a cash value of around $1,100 and
no strings attached. 60 Virgie herself seems to never have drawn a salary.
Despite an attempt by officials in both counties to keep a lid on news about
continuing evictions, Operation Freedom and FHWC publicity began attracting interest in
the nation’s network of social activists. The situation in both counties grew increasingly
tense as SNCC sent a four-man team from Albany, Georgia. They were met by Dave
Brown, “a young man who quit his school teaching job” and came to southwest
Tennessee on his own to so something constructive. They became added ingredients in
the increasingly unstable mix of activism and repression. 61
Not all activists were short-term volunteers. In March 1962, Quaker dairyman Art
Emery visited Memphis to join a protest at a meeting of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission being held in Germantown, east of the city. The visit introduced him to the
social conflict in the counties to the east and the need for agricultural development in the
black communities unrelated to cotton.62 After consulting with his wife, Carolyn, the
Emerys moved their family from Iowa to Tennessee, preparing to put themselves on the
front lines of justice and development. He initially planned to buy a farm. When that fell
through Emery bought a D6 bulldozer with Operation Freedom’s assistance, hired James
Smith as his driver, and went into business as Emery Soil Service, expanding cropland by
clearing field edges and woodlands. 63 His work for landowners of both races was initially
60
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a constructive step. Though he did not wear his loyalties on his sleeve it was inevitable
that farmers wanted to visit about where “his people” hailed from, who he was, what he
thought, and just why he was at work in Tennessee. Emery’s answer was direct when
confronted. As a result, commissions from white landowners began dropping off as news
of his loyalties became known.
It was not among just the white community that Emery’s views complicated
business. His reception among the local activists illustrates how divided even the
committed folks were. Sara Lemmons finally took Emery aside and “gave [him] some
good advice . . . about measuring my words these days. John McFerren feels that I should
have nothing to do with Somerville & Fayette County white business. Shep Towles & LT
Redfearn differ with John and feel that we should make all the constructive contacts
possible & always be ready to negotiate on the basis of fair play.” Emery was caught
between conflicting advice. He was beginning to realize that the Fayette County situation
was not just a friendly disagreement between neighbors, but a life and death struggle. “I
am saying less and less as I meet more and more Mid-Southerners,” Emery concluded.
“This integration issue is awfully explosive.” 64 Emery finally gave up the bulldozer
business but was instrumental in several cooperative ventures. His first success was a
thirty-member truck-garden cooperative, the short-lived West Tennessee Organic
Vegetable Producers Cooperative. 65 This venture survived for several years but struggled
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Figure 6.3

Haywood Handicrafters workshop, ca.1962. 66

to locate reliable outlets for its produce. More successful was his effort to spark a
regional fuel cooperative. 67
Another venture in cooperative development was the Haywood Handicrafters
League. This business startup was the brainchild of Eric Weinberger, a peace activist and
social justice advocate.68 The concern operated out of a small building at 307 W. Margin
Street in Brownsville and employed seventy to seventy-five women to hand-stitch leather
handbags, purses, and wallets, which were marketed and delivered by mail. Their $200
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share of profits represented a third or more of what a sharecropping family might make in
a year. 69 The number of mail orders leaving the county raised concerns among those
pushing the economic boycott. Leather supplies were hijacked and contacts were made to
suppliers to pressure them not to provide materials. More than the supply-chain problems,
the successful effort brought Weinberger attention in Brownsville as a local problem that
required a solution. Had Weinberger operated the Handicrafters solely as a business
venture he might have escaped notice, but he saw it as part of the broader social justice
movement in Haywood County. And that was a problem.
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Chapter 7
Direct Action and Direct Response:
The Activists (part 2)1
Our elections are held according to state laws. Reliable, elderly men and women
doing the holding and counting of ballots. These people do an excellent job, there
is never a question of dishonesty or miscarriage of justice. 2
If not [us] . . . who? If not now . . . when? 3
Until the summer of 1963 supportive activism in both counties had been limited
to indirect action, cooperative work, and efforts at individual training. County officials
and landowners had not appreciated “outside interference,” but other than eviction for
registering to vote, local activists experienced only a low level of opportunistic
harassment. The response changed as activists’ tactics changed.
Though badly divided by personal agendas and undercut by informers for those in
power, the HCCWL began showing signs of renewed cohesion by 1963. In June, an
FHWC workcamp conducted a round of voter registration in Haywood County. As usual,
some of the black families were threatened for housing the workcampers and many of the
workcampers were stopped by police and fined heavily for minor or imaginary traffic
violations. The camp closed, but the registration effort continued without the white
activists and a renewed interest in voter registration spread to Fayette County the
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following month. 4 Harassment of local activists picked up as the white community saw a
renewed challenge to the established order. A new development compounded the conflict:
direct-action protest in the form of marches and sit-ins at local businesses conducted
independently by young people. For activists from beyond Tennessee, the development of
an independent will to resist the status quo was a relief. “This will to resist is more
common among the younger people than the oldsters,” wrote one visiting activist, “but
still not too common.” 5 By now the rights efforts had been active for five years and
nothing much had changed. The struggles were attracting a new, younger and less tolerant
group, often the high school-aged sons and daughters of those registered to vote.
Disappointed with the lack of substantive progress, this newly politicized younger
generation of local activists was not content with indirect action and workcamps. They
adopted direct-action tactics that raised the stakes in the bid for maintain stability over
change. Direct action marred the glassy surface of whites’ affirming belief that
segregation’s hard-edged strata was acceptable to both sides.
In mid June 1963 an impromptu group of thirty-eight high school-aged marchers
walked from the Williston area toward the courthouse in downtown Somerville—the first
protest staged in the open within either county. As they drew even with Somerville
Elementary School and Armstrong’s clinic, a quarter-mile south of downtown, Sheriff
Pattat stood in the road. An activist from New York made a series of on-the-spot
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Rights Movement,” Trojan Horse (Cornell Univ.) 4, no. 1 (1963 Sep): 19.
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recordings this summer, 6 one of which captured one story of these young protestors only
minutes or hours after the confrontation occurred.

First female voice: We stood there—well they stopped us, we kept on singing
and then he said ‘Be quiet.’ Some kept on singing, and some stopped and then
finally all of them stopped. And then he said, ‘what are you all doing down here?’
Well, I answered to him ‘we are marching for our freedom.’ And then he asked,
[aside] what is it—
Second female voice [Fannie Vinson]: Do we have a permit for the march? So
we said no.
First female voice: And so he said ‘whyn’t you just turn around and break it up
now and go, ask your leader. All you’re doing like march without a permit.’ We
were not going to turn around, we not going to ask anyone, ‘we’re our own
leaders,’ just like that.
Male voice [Charlie Haynie]: Who said that?
First female voice: And I asked him was this law Constitutional, and he did have
anything to say.
Second female voice [Fannie]: No!
First female voice: A boy in the group asked him who made the law? He said the
citizens of Fayette County, and, then he didn’t have anything to say. Well then he
pulled out this little scrappy piece of paper, wrinkled, partly torn, and read it—the
chief. And then he said—Pattat said—why don’t you turn around and disperse
yourself, you don’t have any reasons marching down here. And then one boy said,
we have rights to go into any drugstores, any place in Somerville to be served as
to whites. And so this boy also said—[muddled words] he [Pattat] said, we not
[stumbles over words] this new law has been made: it say neither whites, nor
Negroes, can march. And so, the boy say, ‘well why should the white people
march? 7

This new willingness to confront authority with uncomfortably direct questions was
deeply unsettling in a community which expected deference and mutually accepted place.
Direct action got attention. The march was followed by a series of sit-ins, integration
attempts, and group meetings all of which resulted in harsh repression by a mob of whites
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hastily deputized for legitimacy. The courthouse quickly accommodated with
demonstrators and desegregated its drinking fountains and entrances, but direct action
made even some activists uncomfortable. “I am still worried about the demonstrations,
philosophically rather than practically,” wrote workcamp volunteer Pete Russell of the
University of Illinois. “I admire the courage of the young people in Fayette and
Haywood—a courage I do not have. But serious, very serious, problems and
responsibilities arise, when one encouraged young people to defy a state and a county law
which you feel is unjust.”8 By the first of August, confrontations between law
enforcement and demonstrators escalated dramatically. Police began breaking up
demonstrations with tear gas and fire hoses, and the Somerville mayor and alderman
hastily passed a curfew ordinance as marches swelled in numbers. Several successive
days of marching resulted in over fifty arrests and brought national news interest to the
county for the first time since Tent City. 9
By then, Fayette and Haywood struggles were attracting attention among the
national rights community as well. The situation in both counties grew increasingly tense.
Some of the intimidation imposed by Fayette’s white community members can only
adequately be described as terrorism. Tommy Lee Woods was walking home at night and
was ambushed by a group of white men, who stripped him nude and left him beside the
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road. In another incident near Macon, a group of white youths attacked a school bus of
black children, breaking out the windows. 10 No charges were ever brought against the
members of either group, though the participants were widely known. Several times
during the summer cars driven by blacks were shot at, and more than one returned home
with bullet holes in door panels or windows. 11 Since the police and sheriff did nothing,
few of the incidents were reported. Miraculously no one was ever injured or killed.
Within communities that had long survived by escaping notice, the confrontations
and reprisals that followed direct action complicated the Civic and Welfare Leagues’
ceaseless quest for membership. Success within the county was linked to the ability to act
in large numbers with the strength of common goals. In both counties, the Civic and
Welfare Leagues were hard pressed to maintain coherence, even among their leadership.
Sustaining membership—especially participatory membership—was difficult for local
activists, particularly among the elements of the population that could have contributed
most to the effort but also stood to lose the most by participating. Later that summer the
Rev. June Dowdy noted that place compromised unity in the black community.

One of our great problems is that so few of our professional Negroes have taken
part in our efforts toward first class citizenship. There is hardly any other minister
in the movement [and] out of 160 [black county] school teachers, not over a
dozen have registered to vote. So our movement must be carried on by the poorer
and the less educated. 12
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Activists behind the Greensboro and Nashville sit-in movements had been strengthened
by support from the black middle class: academics, churchmen, and legal professionals.
In these urban areas, institutions maintained a measure of independence from white
patrons and power. Conversely, the tiny black “middle class” of educators and ministers
in rural West Tennessee, which had been the core of the Brownsville NAACP chapter in
1940, had become wary about their socially exposed and dependent positions after the
violent repression in June. They depended heavily or entirely on white patronage for their
tenuous positions. Teachers, who had no more than personal verbal agreements with the
county superintendent as a basis for employment, had the most to lose and least to gain
from confronting inequities imposed by county officials. Ministers often preached in
churches built on donated land, dependent on the good graces of whatever family had
allowed them to build there. So long as they accommodated the expectations of the white
community, their position—a slightly better standard of living and margin of
respectability—was safe. Neither black community was populated solely by activists; the
voting right efforts in both generated their own type of conservative moderates.
As emotions drew increasingly tighter in 1963, John McFerren was served with a
paternity suit from Emma Jean Frazier. He and everyone that knew him were certain that
it was a pressure ploy, especially when after the trial Sheriff Pattat quietly asked
McFerren “Why don’t you compromise, and end the sit-ins?” 13 To answer reprisals by
business owners against those staging sit-ins, black citizens instituted boycotts of court-
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square stores that carved a deep gouge in the black patronage of Somerville businesses.
Since blacks constituted 69% of the Fayette County population in the 1960 census, the
boycott represented a substantial loss of income. Tensions continued to mount and
confrontations increased in number and severity. 14 Cars tried to run Art Emery off the
road several times. He evaded them and escaped but once a pursuer ran off the road—and
Emery was charged and fined exorbitantly for “leaving the scene of an accident.” He
served jail time rather than pay the fine. 15
In Haywood County, the stakes were raised once again in July 1963, when the
local NAACP chapter called for desegregation of the Brownsville bus station after a
biracial committee failed to agree on any measure of accommodation. 16 Inaction was not
surprising; an editorial in the local paper included them as “controversial news regarding
race relations.” On 3 August Weinberger and a dozen others walked two blocks to the
courthouse in Brownsville, carrying signs in Haywood County’s first civil rights march. A
week later the States-Graphic reported the incident: “The Negroes were driven from the
business district by police and Weinberger was arrested.” 17 A little more detail was
provided by other media outlets. The handful of demonstrators was met by Sheriff
Hunter, deputy Buddy Sullivan with his police dog straining on a short-leash, and a
collection of around fifty more hastily deputized men armed with clubs and guns.
14
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Ironically, the Brownsville Police Department had appointed its first two black officers
two weeks earlier. 18
As the marchers crossed the street to the courthouse lawn, deputies waded into the
group, yanking signs out of their hands. Sullivan set the dog on twenty-year-old Edna
Mae Jones, who was bitten repeatedly in the stomach, and then on Weinberger, who was
knocked to the ground. One of the men hosed Weinberger with a bottle of tear gas at
close range and the concentrated liquid soaked into his clothes. He was bound by a
“wristbreaker” arm clamp, dragged to the jail two blocks further, and dumped into a cell
by a pair of deputies. His back blistered horribly from chemical burns. A local physician
who glanced in at him suggested he coat them with petroleum jelly, but the custody
officers refused him medication. While Weinberger was in the cell, Hunter beat and
jabbed him at least once with an electric cattle prod.
CORE notified the Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, who asked the
FBI to investigate. Two Special Agents from Memphis interviewed Weinberger in his cell
on 5 August, the day of his arraignment, and collected physical evidence of the attack, but
no action materialized. Weinberger was charged with assault and battery, disorderly
conduct, and two other unnamed felonies. Each charge carried a one-year jail sentence. A
trial date was set and Weinberger was released for medical treatment, spending four days
in Memphis at the city’s segregated Gaston Hospital before returning home to
Connecticut. The county sent him no notice about his trial arrangements but in October
Weinberger returned, going directly to the courthouse and then the county jail on his own
18
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volition. Not wanting a conviction which could be appealed, county officials quietly
delivered an ultimatum: he could serve the four sentences—sequentially—on what were
patently false charges, or agree to leave the county for good. Segregationists in
Brownsville claimed a victory, since protest marches ended and Weinberger decided to
leave the county. But the public library finally began admitting black patrons, and soon
after, the city bus station was no longer segregated. 19
Weinberger’s arrest came during a hardening of attitudes among the white
officials in response to renewed voter registration and a tactical shift among the black
activists they faced. In fact, the summer 1963 was a season of tense confrontations
between officials and local black citizens of both counties. Court actions had resolved
nothing. Biracial committees proved only tools to deflect or stymie real change. The
children of local land- and business owners, with their small-town world changing around
them fast enough that even they could not keep up, were becoming increasingly vocal in
opposing activists, particularly those who were white. “Some of these people are young,”
wrote activist Jack McKart, harboring a liberal hope that understanding and forthright
engagement would resolve distrust and insecure bullying.

They have no jobs; they drive around all day in new cars harassing people who try
hard not to hate them. They had bottles in their hands at the bus stop, but they
aren’t even to the point yet where they throw them at you. They are all talk. If you
could confront each one of them individually, they would each back down. Maybe
their violence will never break out if we keep on meeting them face to face and do
not return their abuse. 20
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Tent City had seen only isolated incidents nearly three years earlier, but now
confrontation became a common occurrence. Direct action increased the intensity of
social discourse, illustrating for the white community the deep dissatisfaction with place
and the casual assumptions of segregation that defined it.
One incident illustrating the tension over the shifting sense of place is the
encounter between father and son farm owners Sterling and Thomas Dunn and their
dairyman Will Todd Jr. As a dairyman, Todd worked a sixteen-hour day which began at
3:30am for fifty dollars a week. Late in September 1963 the younger Dunn arranged to
exhibit cattle at the Mid-South Fair in Shelby County, and Todd agreed to do additional
work while he was gone in return for two days off of work. Todd later told a Memphis
newspaper:

“On Sunday morning [30 September], after we had finished milking the cows, I
asked Thomas if I could take my two days and he said, ‘No,’” Todd said, “but I
took off anyhow. I did not milk the cows on Sunday night. 21 This morning Mr.
Dunn came over to the house, and I could hear him cursing before I had a chance
to get to the door. After talking a few minutes, he said, ‘Come on over to the barn
and talk to me and Tom.’ When we got over there he asked me if I were going to
milk the cows and I answered, ‘Yes sir, when I get my two days off.’” Todd said
that Dunn replied that he was not ready to give him his two days, and when
[Todd] insisted that he would have to have them before returning to work, Dunn
said, “I guess you are the boss then.” “I said, ‘No sir, I am not the boss of your
place, but I am the boss of myself.’ ”

Todd’s reply challenged Dunn’s integrity as an employer, but more importantly, it
questioned his obligation as a paternalist, particularly as Todd “had been tricked before
and had not been paid or given time off for extra hours.” Two months earlier Dunn had
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cut Todd’s wages nearly in half after the laborer had independently bought his family a
used car. Todd had been looking for other work since then, another challenge to Dunn’s
management.

“Mr. Dunn then said, ‘You are one of those smart niggers,’ and hit me upside the
head with a pistol that he always carried in his car. He hit me with such force that
the pistol slipped out of his hand. We started tussling over it, and his son said,
‘Daddy don’t let him get the pistol. He [Todd] might shoot someone!’” Todd says
that the younger Dunn ran to the car and got a shotgun, and for fear that he might
hit his father with a blast, began hitting [Todd] over the head until he broke the
stock. Then he continued beating him until the barrel was bent.

Dazed by the blows, Todd was quickly bested. Sterling Dunn recovered the pistol and
stood upright, pointing it at Todd’s head as Todd’s wife screamed at him not to shoot her
husband. After a few tense seconds, Dunn pocketed the pistol, climbed in his vehicle, and
he and his son drove away. The Todds fled to Memphis with their family, him needing
medical attention and both fearing the possibility of a lynch mob; the Dunns drove into
Somerville the following Monday afternoon and swore out a warrant on Todd for assault
and battery, which was granted by General Sessions judge Paul Summers. 22
By the end of the year everyone seemed tense, angry, and exhausted. Three years
of repression and intimidation on activists, police brutality, and the effective dissolution
of the HCCWL prompted Virgie Hortenstein to reassess what her organization could do
and what it could not. She recognized that the black community in both counties shared
three fundamental challenges. Her observation, written into her informal “Fayette
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Haywood newsletter,” marked a slight departure in tactics and viewpoint, a low
watershed that divides early efforts from later efforts in FHWC’s activism.
The first challenge Hortenstein identified was the high level of adult illiteracy,
which made pursuing “equal opportunity” in a modern world impossible. Former black
sharecroppers could not compete for jobs if they lacked basic competencies. Second, nonfarm employment was nearly nonexistent in an area where the real numbers of all jobs
continued to decline rapidly. Field mechanization and land consolidation pushed large
numbers of black and white laborers out of work. Both counties were full of idle young
people with no prospects for employment and nothing to do. Finally, the desire to
participate in elections was not matched by the development of blacks as informed and
engaged citizens. Many who had registered to vote once did not understand roll purges,
the need to change one’s registration if they moved, or how to follow electoral issues. 23
These large challenges were compounded by at least two other, more intractable
problems. Despite the acceptance that white volunteers now found among blacks, unity
and leadership within the community remained a challenge. “The unity that came with
the eviction crisis and for the voter-registration campains [sic] soon degenerated. Now
not only had registration come to a standstill but those who had registered often did not
vote.” The FCCWL had split into opposing factions in 1961; competing interests, needs,
and opinions completely fractured the HCCWL a few years later. 24 “The first problem,”
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Hortenstein explained, “is one of getting along together in times of quiet desperation after
the times for dramatic courage and excitement are over.” The second was an issue that
plagued American society: “How can the pangs of poverty be relieved without losing the
sense of community? As people get a little for themselves, they begin to think of
themselves instead of others, begin to compromise to keep what they have gained.” 25
American novelist John Steinbeck expressed the same thought a generation earlier: “The
quality of owning freezes you forever into ‘I,’ and cuts you off forever from the ‘we.’” 26
The FHWC and its workcampers successfully avoided most of the direct
confrontations that plagued Fayette and Haywood activists during 1963 and 1964, but
like Operation Freedom, the organization endured its own programmatic metamorphosis.
While service workcamps continued for another decade, during 1964 the FHWC began to
add social and community development to its efforts. The January 1964 workshop was
staged with the involvement of the Highlander Folk School. The meters were attempts to
restart community by creating a situation “in which . . . groups would discover their most
urgent problems, become motivated to solve them and start working on the solution.
Always the program was to let the participants carry out as much of the workshop as
possible. The objective was to help them develop themselves.” 27
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Though voter participation and education remained a priority, the mission of
“helping themselves” required a new set of efforts to strengthen the black communities
through education, organization, and job creation. Hortenstein connected with the
Laubach Literacy Fund training program to begin planning an adult literacy drive. She
also began pushing local activists in an independent job creation effort, since the
businesses being courted by the county governments would not hire black labor. If black
citizens wanted both jobs and to remain at home, they would likely have to create their
own jobs. In September, FHWC sponsored a series of district-level meetings with lapsed
activists in Haywood County, a piecemeal attempt to reassemble a county-level
organization that could revitalize the HCCWL. 28
Despite roadblocks and constant pressure from authorities and individuals, the
FHWC effort began paying off in small ways. In a November 1965 antipoverty meeting
held at the OFFCLW Community Center, forty white citizens unexpectedly joined over
200 black neighbors. The meeting disbanded after electing an unprecedented board of
directors on which blacks held a one-member majority. At about the same time two white
women, both employees in the Fayette County antipoverty program, attended a worship
service at one of the black churches. “Their loyalties were actually with the Negroes and
against the actions of the whites who were ‘hard old nuts to crack’,” Virgie Hortenstein
reported incredulously. 29 There were still years of conflict and confrontation ahead, but
the FHWC operated and thrived on the audacity of such hope.
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Cornell-Tompkins effort
Perhaps the best-remembered and most publicly documented of the organized
efforts in either county was the 1964 voting rights drive organized by “The CornellTomkins County Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Fayette County, Tennessee,”
largely because participants produced their own account of the effort, published by W. W.
Norton, a major U.S. publisher. 30 This project had its origin in the experiences of
organizer Charles A. Haynie, a mathematics student at Cornell University. Like James
Forman of the Emergency Relief Committee two years earlier, Charlie Haynie had family
ties in the South but had come of age as an activist adult while in college. He was also a
member of the New Left, the socially inspired groups of white young people who
typically rejected the Soviet model of history and society but were positively revolted by
the militarism and often morally banal emptiness of suburban materialism in post-war
American society. The New Left branch of American activism seemed populated with
more idealists than ideologues, committed to the abstract promise of democracy offered
to all, not merely the privileged. Haynie was a veteran of nuclear test-ban protests. While
fundraising at Cornell for the Freedom Riders in May 1961, he and friend Paul Green
were shamed by another student into personal involvement with the nonviolence action
they had never experienced personally. The pair contacted CORE’s New York office and
were immediately invited to Mississippi as the organization changed tactics from
orchestrating protest rides to orchestrating mass arrests. Making the drive southward,
Green and Haynie arrived in time to be swept up in the Jackson arrests and spent several
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personally cathartic weeks in jail. Charlie returned north for graduate school and then
taught at Franklin and Marshall University. 31
In the spring of 1963, Haynie attended the SNCC conference in Atlanta. Inspired
by the conference workshops, Haynie “wondered how I could make a personal
contribution other than, at a distance, with financial and political support.” More
experienced activists discouraged him, but their advice did not mollify him. “I am not
black, how would I fit into communities SNCC was trying to mobilize?” he wondered. “I
had no previous experience of southern sharecroppers, nor of the South. I knew nothing
about picking cotton or farming in general.” Toward the end of the conference Haynie
met Anne Braden, the SCEF activist from Louisville, Kentucky, whose family stood
against both firebombs and Red-baiting federal intimidation. She mentioned Fayette
County, Tennessee, L. T. Redfearn, and Eric Weinberger, suggesting that Charlie and his
new wife see if they could reinvigorate voter registration and political activism there.
When the 1963 spring term ended in Pennsylvania, Carl Braden led the Haynies on an
automobile trip to southwestern Tennessee. Walter Tillow, a fellow graduate student and
SNCC conference attendee, and two other companions made the trip in a separate
vehicle. Braden introduced the New Yorkers to their contacts in and around Somerville. It
was the beginning of a life-changing adventure. Charlie and Roena (Bunny) Haynie
stayed weeks in Fayette County with the L. T. and Frances Redfearn, long enough for
suspicion about their activities to grow among other whites in the county. Bunny was
several months pregnant. State law mandated that people staying more than a month in
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Tennessee were required to buy license plates or “tags” from the county, and driving a
Chevrolet, they blended fairly well into the other vehicles on county roads, but their
vehicle was well known. After a few weeks the Haynies left Redfearns and moved in with
James and Fanny Bell Puckett, a few miles south of Somerville outside the small
community of Williston. 32
On the night of 10 July, the Haynies and Tillow stopped to visit with Redfearn and
noticed an unusual number of cars passing the usually isolated yard. When the Haynies
left late that evening they recognized they were being followed. Not wanting whoever
was following them to know where they were staying, they pulled into McFerren’s store,
where the usual contingent of friends cum late-night customers was standing about. The
car that followed the Haynies pulled up across the road, followed by several others. A
number of young white men got out and it became clear trouble was brewing. In the tense
standoff, someone telephoned the sheriff. Clarence Pattat drove out with a deputy, by
which time the cars of whites had loaded up and driven off. Pattat sat in his car and asked
a few questions but made no other investigation, even when one of the cars and its
occupants flew past down the road—twice. Jack McKart’s later account of the
confrontation for The Peacemaker emphasized how neither side wanted trouble. He did
not know what happened a few hours later. 33
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The Pucketts lived at the end of a rough dirt U-shaped road whose ends attached
to one side of the paved county road (cf. Figure 1.4). This U was a community itself, with
houses set along either side. A couple weeks after their move to the Pucketts, the Haynies
returned to visit the Redfearns. On the way they noticed that they had been trailed by a
car, which kept its distance and did not turn on its headlights. Concerned about their
safety, Redfearn offered to loan them a weapon he had carried while running moonshine,
an evil-looking 16-gague pump shotgun with a cut-down barrel and sawed-off stock.
Before they left the house he gave them an impromptu primer in gunning as well. He told
them that rather than stepping out a car door to face someone behind you, to kick the door
open and dive for the ground; roll to make a harder target and use your elbows to keep
yourself up; aim for the middle of a man. More than a little shaken by his matter-of-fact
advice, Charlie drove quickly back toward town and pulled in at McFerren’s store at the
three-way. John was just closing up but told the frightened couple to drive on to
Puckett’s house without turning on their own lights. They did so and were relieved when
no car lights followed them. Haynies got out of their car and were headed toward the
house when they heard car doors slam behind them; the second vehicle’s driver had killed
his lights as well and followed them. Just then the second car and its occupants were
backlit by the blaze of lights from a third vehicle. John had followed them in his car
without his lights on, either. He arrived in time kill his engine and coast up behind them
before they got out and could hear him. McFerren turned on his headlights just in time to
spotlight the occupants from behind, emerging with “all sorts of things” in their hands.
Meanwhile, the Pucketts had been expecting trouble and planned accordingly.
Inside the Puckett house, Fanny saw what was happening in the yard and snatched up a
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shotgun standing beside the door. As she kicked it open and stepped onto the porch she
racked a shell into the chamber. Her fifteen-year-old daughter, Sadie, cued by her
mother’s attention and movements, grabbed up several soda bottles which had been
previously filled with gasoline and plugged with a rag and were sitting by the door—
Molotov cocktails. She hovered behind her mother, who was blocking the door, unable to
see what was going on but waiting for a chance to “warm things up.” Sadie recalled that
when the Haynies had been welcomed by her parents, her mother had solemnly promised
them that she would take care of them like her own family; her present actions
unquestionably suggested she meant to carry through on the promise. As the Haynies
stood exposed beside their car in the yard and an armed, intense black woman stood on
the porch, the blinding headlights of a third vehicle (its driver and potential occupants
unknown to anyone in the yard) illuminated a surprised group that had not expected a
confrontation. For several seconds there was tense confusion among everyone until the
former occupants of second car realized their exposed position. Piling back into the
vehicle, the driver punched the accelerator and the car fishtailed wildly out of McFerren’s
lights as he tried to get out of a certainly fatal crossfire and make a getaway down the
lane. Moving too fast and probably too frightened to handle road obstacles safely, the car
careened across a runoff channel or washout cutting across the dirt road. The car’s racing
motor and sound of its impact with the ditchbank made a terrible racket. Lights appeared
in shacks up and down the lane as the car sped past them and off into the night. From the
safe distance of memory Sadie recalled one regret with a grin—being a little disappointed
that she didn’t get to see how well her “firecrackers” worked. The next day the vehicle of
a well-known local figure (neither Bunny nor Sadie will say who) was in the shop of a
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local mechanic, who was repairing damage to the front end and axle from having run
across an obstacle.
In his posthumously published memoirs, Charlie described the weeks spent
meeting people among the small circle of black activists. When he tried to translate his
frustrating experience of being red-baited in New York into something closer to those
with whom he was associating, John McFerren gave him some advice about this foreign
world of the rural South. “Just like white people, Charlie, we got good people, we got bad
people. Only difference is that we can’t afford the bad people we got. We’re right up
against the wall.” 34 In other words, white activists like the Haynies could afford the
luxury of leaving Fayette County; most black families could not. As personally degrading
as it was, accommodation to segregation and dependence was a survival tactic. Among
the black community it was accommodation rather than segregation by whites that
activists had to overcome.
Charlie and Bunny Haynie returned from Fayette County in September 1963 in
time for him to begin the fall quarter at Franklin and Marshall University. The couple was
physically and emotionally exhausted from their summer ordeal. Though he settled into
the routine demands of an academic classroom, his time in Tennessee put Charlie Haynie
as the intersecting point between a group of acquaintances who would expand on what
had been done in 1963. One small success resulting from the Haynies’ 1963 stay in
Tennessee was a tentative commitment for a slate of black candidates to run in the 1964
county primary election. 35
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Charlie was committed to returning. He also remained in contact with University
of Wisconsin students Robert and Vickie Gabriner. In the aftermath of Bull Connor’s
repressions in Birmingham, Bob Gabriner sent to Charlie a creatively typed reflection
about the situation in Tennessee. Fayette County was overwhelmingly black and had
enough citizens to carry an election. The first step would be to get them registered. “[T]he
more i think of it the more i see fayette and the [1964] election as an important pilot
project for the movement if there is a victory /there\ the tactics and goals can perhaps be
modified and applied to other areas of the south.” 36 Haynie was already committed to just
such a plan. A month earlier Walt Tillow had talked to James Forman, now the Executive
Secretary of SNCC, about securing organizational help. 37 In September and October
Gabriner went a step further and explored the possibility of starting up a local radio
station. Mass media would provide a platform for telling what was happening on the
ground beyond county lines. The 1964 primary was more than just an election. Not only
was L. T. Refearn running for sheriff for the third time, but June Dowdy, running for
county assessor, became the first black candidate for office since Reconstruction. 38 With
enough registered voters from the majority population, civically liberal candidates could
carry important county offices for the first time in a century.
Friend, 1963 Jul 16, 1:3 Haynie papers, WHi. By the time the election came the next year only two
candidates followed through on the commitment to stand for election.
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Haynie reconnected with Dr. Douglas Dowd, a left-leaning economics professor
at Cornell. Dowd became the catalyst for what would happen the following year. Dowd
approached Cornell president James A. Perkins about Cornell faculty members becoming
directly involved with social action beyond the campus. “It just may be that his
conception of a university includes at least intermittent direct involvement in questions so
clearly moral and compelling as this one,” Dowd wrote the Haynies. Perkins did not ask
an inordinate number of questions and gave the go-ahead. 39 “The time has come to get
off the ground on the Fayette County affair, so here goes,” Dowd wrote Charlie in mid
October, three months after Haynie returned from Tennessee.
Dowd and the Haynies’ close friends, Joe and Patricia Griffith, began drumming
up support among Cornell students and faculty. Dowd put together a printed invitation
pamphlet in February for an event advertised at Bailey Hall on 2 March. Attendees were
promised an opportunity to “Meet the candidates and others from Fayette County.” June
Dowdy and L. T. Redfearn travelled up from Tennessee as the drawing card. 40 The
evening news was flooded with the images and commentary about direct action and
repression. Ultimately the group included not only Cornell students, but others from
Franklin & Marshal University, Columbia University, and a few non-university folks
from Ithaca, New York.
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Like most college campuses, Cornell University was not merely a hotbed of
liberal dissent and social criticism. The campus had an equally active group of
conservative students, as committed to their views of American society as were activists
of the New Left. This was the year of not only the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but also the
right-wing resurgence that carried Barry Goldwater to a presidential candidacy. 41 The
strident differences between viewpoints virtually guaranteed that the Fayette County
project would find not only support on campus, but also opposition. Members of the
Conservative Club worked, wrote, and organized to oppose the voting-rights excursion to
Tennessee, particularly after a 5–4 vote by the student government pledged $1,000 from
its discretionary funds to help support the effort. Conservative Cornell University
students Robert D. Reynolds and Steven W. Demster, a Memphis native, made their own
investigation of the situation in Fayette during spring break and brought back unflattering
reports of both men. Those opposing the effort neglected that the activists’ target was a
primary rather than a general election, and instead emphatically called it an opposition
effort to the established order in Fayette County, hinting that activists were formulating a
leftist takeover. Conservative students were able to force a campus-wide referendum on
the allocation, but were voted down by the student body. 42
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The voter registration/education project, which soon included Ithaca citizens and
not only Cornell students, was controversial. Perhaps its most substantive testimonial
came from 102-year-old Cornell professor Walter F. Willcox, who supported the effort
publicly. Willcox told the local newspaper, “I can tell you after 100 years of experience
that I have never seen the world so awake to the subject [of race relations, i.e., injustice]
as it is today. I think this is the best sign you could have and that is what pleases me as I
come to the end of my life.” 43 In the middle of the civil rights movement it was hard to
mount an argument against the opinion of someone who had personally witnessed the
beginning of the Civil War and all of Reconstruction.
The fifteen or so people who had signed up for the summer project by early
March had steeled themselves—at least in an abstract sense—for the possibility of being
personally subjected to repeated violence. For six weeks between mid April and the end
of May, Dowd presided over a short course in activism, a combination of group study,
discussion, and lecture. Dr. Robin Williams of the Sociology Department at Cornell
taught a session on the social structure of feudal society, which focused on dependence
and paternalism. Charlie Haynie discussed Fayette County political history, with Quaker
activist and FHWC workcamp leader David Brown providing a counterpoint about local
non-political issues. The group read and discussed a series of writings by historian C.
Vann Woodward. They held a brainstorming session about potential actions and tactics
they could take once on the ground in Tennessee. They had a brief introduction to the
crops and products sharecroppers raised. Finally, John Ferger provided a reality check for
what they potentially faced, wrapping up their advance preparations with a crash course

43

Donald Greet, “Fayette Election Drive Off to Good Start Here,” Ithaca Journal, 1963 Dec 12.

231

on hygiene, first aid, and emergency medicine. 44 They may have been idealists, but they
were not fools.
Acting as an advance team, the Haynies, trundling along their infant daughter,
Aeron, arrived back in Somerville on 25 May to arrange housing for the Cornell-Tomkins
activists. The thirty-nine workers arrived in small groups and individual carloads between
8 and 25 June. After some inevitable last-minute changes, they were shuttled off to homes
in thirteen of the fifteen election districts. As soon as they were housed, the workers were
paired off with a local individual or two from their assigned district and immediately set
to work walking country roads and talking to people in fields, yards, and on door stoops,
trying to persuade adults to register or renew their registration. Voter registration was
now held weekly on Wednesdays, but deliberation on the part of the clerks still kept voter
registration to a slow crawl. On 1 July, for instance, the last registration held before the 1
August county primary election, approximately 500 people stood patiently in line while
the clerks completed a total of 73 registrations. 45
The Cornell activists had enlisted knowing that violence was possible, if unlikely,
but embarked on the project with full trust in federal protection. President John F. Kennedy complicated the matter of protective federalism when he publicly stated in 1962 that

We shall give every protection that we can to anybody seeking to vote. I
commend those who are making the effort to register every citizen. They deserve
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“Fayette County Project proposed study schedule,” undated [ca.1964 Mar], Haynie papers,
UTK; “Background and Reference Reading for Fayette Volunteers,” undated [ca.1964 Apr], Haynie papers,
UTK, and “Fayette County Project, Summer 1964,” 1:6 Haynie papers, WHi.
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Figure 7.1

An unidentified Cornell-Tompkins volunteer discussing voter registration
with citizens in Fayette County, June 1964. 46

the protection of the U.S. government, the protection of the states, the protection
of the local communities. And if it requires extra legislation and extra force, we
shall do that. 47

At the height of protest demonstrations the previous year Haynie and Tillow had sent a
telegram asking for federal protection, if not direct help with registrations from federal
authorities: “We who are part of a voter registration project working in Fayette and
Haywood counties has begun to meet increase harrassment by law enforcement officers
in Haywood County. Registration workers have been told ‘to get out of the county’, cars
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Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Register
Division, National Archives and Records Service, 1963), 676–677, quoted in Lawson, Black Ballots, 279.
In planning the action, and adviser had written the Haynies “Remember that the federal government is
required to intervene if there is any interference with the services of the federal government” (Saul to
Charlie and Bunny, 1963 Jul 24, Haynie papers, UTK).
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have been followed and hea[v]y [f]igns imposed for alleged infractions of minor traffic
laws. All this harrassment began hours after the negro community of Haywood County
proposed to enter a negro candidate for sheriff in the Democratic primary this August.”
Fearing a repeat of the violence which had erupted in Jackson, Mississippi, only weeks
earlier, Haynie and Tillow asked the Justice Department “to protect citizens who wish to
exercise their fundamental right to vote.”48 To Charlie Haynie's call for federal
protection, the Bureau replied a month later that “Maintenance of law and order in local
communities is the responsibility of local authorities. This Department has no authority to
provide protection and therefore cannot comply with your request.” 49
Now a year later and despite the President’s moral obligation, federal policy left
the Cornell-Tompkins activists exposed to local intimidation—and it came. “The group
has met some harassment already,” wrote the McFerrens to SCEF president Jim
Dombrowski, “sooner than expected.” The catalogue was chillingly impressive.

June 16, two men were arrested for trespassing while talking to a sharecropper, at
his home, about registration. July [actually June] 17 one young man was thrown
out of the courthouse [Dan Packtor, who was physically thrown out by sheriff’s
deputies, they forgot to mention], and was forced off the highway while driving.
July 17, same day, a young man [Danny Beagle] was beaten by five white men
when he stopped at a sharecroppers house to take him to register. Later that same
day, two men were chased and shot at—bullets hit the back of their stationwagon.
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June 22 the same men who were arrested on the 16th, were beaten and their car
window smashed. June 23 some local Negro boys were chased and their car shot
at. June 24 a coke bottle smashed the windshield of the car that was hit by bullets
on June 17. June 28 another young man was beat up. July 3 we learned that a
Negro had been hired to murder four outsiders and one local Negro in District 10.
July 4 a worker was picked up and questioned by deputies at the home of a local
white landowner. 50

Somerville city police and the Fayette County sheriff’s department openly opposed both
the intent and the tactics of activists. Neither body was particularly eager to protect
outsiders from the local folks who had elected them. Deputies and police officers
typically stood by rather than intervene when an activist was threatened or injured. In
some cases they openly participated in harassment. But, this was an election year. With L.
T. Redfearn running for sheriff for a third time and the number of black voters poised to
exceed white voters for the first time, the Cornell-Tompkins effort can be credited for
generating one notable break with local tradition: Sheriff Pattat arrived at carpenter John
Harris’s traditional Fourth of July barbecue, as he always did, but this time he did not
merely visit briefly with Harris and help himself to the food; he campaigned among the
picnicking black families, shaking hands and handing out campaign cards.
Violence, intimidation, and political expedience were not the only threats to unity
and progress. There were corrosive problems within the group, as well. Haynie
discovered that nearly a dozen of his fellow activists privately flouted to a greater or
lesser extent the conduct rules to which all had agreed. A few days before the crucial
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election was held, the offenders were dispatched back to New York or home. “It depleted
our funds, and I felt betrayed by these people,” Haynie recalled bleakly in his memoir. 51
With the voter registration push over at the turn from June to July, effort turned to
voter education and motivation. 52 The workers participated in mass meetings, held group
training sessions, demonstrated how to mark ballots, and organized transportation to the
polls. Conducting these activities pulled the activists slightly out of sight of the white
community and incidents of intimidation fell off as well. By the first week of August
expectations and energy were soaring as high as the thermometer. For the first time poll
watchers had been appointed to each polling station and credentialed on behalf of
individual candidates. Activists and members of the civically aware black community
were ready for the high ceremony of democracy.
On Thursday, 6 August the Fayette County primary election went off as it usually
did, much to the surprise and chagrin of the activists. The district polls opened promptly
at 9:00 am (more or less). Throughout the day the segregated sense of place, defined by
the culture and expectations of segregation even in this most democratic of American
rituals, was firmly maintained. White voters arrived and departed, wandering in and out
of a polling location and chatting in the unhurried cadences and uncrowded spaces due
the privileged. Black voters congregated in what shade was convenient to a polling place,
standing in groups or sitting in clusters on the ground across the road or a short distance
away. Only those actually in line to vote imposed their presence on the privileged in the
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Figure 7.2

Clusters of white voters (left) and black voters (center) watched by white
onlookers (right) gathered in the shade at Sorrel’s Grocery, a rural polling
station, 6 August 1964. 53

store, the gin, the courthouse, or the area. The polls closed promptly at 4:00 pm (or a little
earlier). Redfearn and Dowdy were defeated in a landslide.
Though it had been agreed black voters would no longer be prohibited from
registering or casting a ballot, nothing about elections had been questioned in US v.
FCDEC, and despite the court case, very little actually changed. Until election practices
standardized, no amount of voter registration activism would affect electoral outcomes.
The overarching principle that social activists misread was that local elections were
structured specifically to avoid contests for power. Activists, from James F. Estes in 1958
to the Cornell-Tompkins project in 1964, projected their own façade of shining
expectations onto a very different reality. In practice, every aspect of the electoral process
operated with the casual informality of well-entrenched custom, its practices run more by
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private convenience than by the state election code. It was a simple fact of life that the
local Democratic Executive Committee met the required legal forms but ran elections the
way they wanted, irrespective of election law. Charlie Haynie got a personal view into the
workings of that mechanism shortly after he arrived in May. He went to the courthouse to
see Joe Cocke: County Attorney, County Clerk and Master, local lawyer, and chairman of
the FCDEC. “Mr. Cocke’s secretary turned ashen when I asked to see Mr. Cocke about
the primary,” he recalled. “She said that there were no rules, that Mr. Cocke ran the
primary the way he wanted to, and it was none of my business.” 54 Everything hinged on
that point. Overall, Election Day practices provided a mixed record of misunderstanding,
informality, intimidation, and obfuscation.
In the rural voting districts, where the only non-domestic structures were small
stores or gins, it was common for commercial business to be conducted during polling.
As a result, Mattie Harwood and others noted that individual poll sites opened
inconsistently late, sometimes by an hour or two. Once open, officials were used to
enforcing different privileges between the races and expected voters to operate within
their place. For instance, at the polling station for Rural District 1, John McFerren noted
that election officials maintained strictly segregated lines for voters, allowed only three
black voters at a time to get their ballots, and disallowed them from speaking with each
other; white voters “were allowed to talk to each other and to look at each other's ballots
before they were marked.” 55
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During their stay the Cornell-Tompkins activists had concentrated their effort on
registration and the mechanics of voting, but evidently neglected to investigate precisely
what their subjects understood about it. Many black voters who had registered in 1958 or
1959 but had not voted in 1960 or 1962 were rejected in the 1964 election. Not
understanding routine voter-roll purges, they mistakenly assumed that voter registration,
like other governmental registrations such as the military draft and Social Security,
provided a lifetime credential.
The New York activists did drum into the local people the importance of
oversight. Fayette citizens were recruited in each district to serve as poll watchers. Each
was provided a printed credential, but as sharecroppers-turned-election-activists they
faced a distinct set of challenges. Despite careful assignments, supportive moral effort,
and credential forms, there had been no regular organization or training. On the day of the
election poll watchers were allowed in some districts while others were not. Often, if they
were challenged by an official, they had no idea how to respond, were unwilling to risk a
confrontation, and simply wandered away. Some were told (wrongly) that they should
have presented credentials several days ahead of the election, so they left in confusion,
not knowing what else to do. Some were subject to subtle forms of intimidation, such as
being disallowed from sitting, being warned they would not be readmitted if they left for
any reason, or being positioned as far away from officials and ballots as could be
contrived. Of those who were admitted, the poll-watchers’ effectiveness was
compromised by their lack of sophistication, general suspicion about whites,
inconsistency in applying (or recognizing) standards, and lack of clear understanding
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about the state’s actual voting regulations. Affiants suspected anything that they did not
personally understand.
Not all the irregularities reported by poll watchers reflected an illegality.
Sometimes a questioned practice was merely a convention or circumstantial whim of an
official. Reassured by the comfort of privilege, many election officials seemed uniformly
casual about their service, but observers attested to real, systemic irregularities that
pointed directly to voting fraud. Herbert Bonner was admitted to Piper’s Store early in the
morning and crossed the road to Piper’s Gin when the polling venue was moved there
without notice; the move allowed Frank Piper Sr. of Collierville (not even in the county)
time to make out ballots during the process. Bonner also noticed that Ray Russell was
serving as an official for the primary election while he was a candidate for district office
in the county general election being held at the same time. Lucy Houston reported that
voting officials in her district called a polling recess and did not allow voting to proceed.
John McFerren reported officials in Rural District 1 standing directly over voting areas as
voting progressed. Simon Wilkerson observed that the ballot box in his district had no
lock installed on it until well after voting began. In separate districts Warren Bonner and
January McGee watched non-officials being allowed to help with balloting activities, and
Rena Mae Bates attested that district non-residents were allowed to be present in polling
stations while voting was conducted.
The pattern of informalities, irregularities, and intimidation continued during
voting counting as well. One opportunity ripe for exploitation was absentee ballots. These
were required to be counted and reported by the districts, but virtually no oversight was
required. Activists had neglected absentee ballots entirely. A. A. King noted that poll
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officials repeatedly delayed accepting his poll-watching credential so as to count absentee
ballots without oversight. A few district officials allowed poll watchers to see counts of
ballots cast that day, but most polling locations simply denied them the opportunity to see
absentee ballots at all. During the official count in more than one location, officials
accepted questionably marked ballots for the preferred candidate without challenge,
while ballots with questionable marks for the black-backed challenger were uniformly
disqualified. Many locales flatly denied blacks a presence as the ballot count was made,
while unofficial whites were allowed in. Even if black poll watchers were allowed,
officials often made their role difficult or uncomfortable, telling them to stand rather than
sit, allowing them to occupy only a single location or position, or positioning them as far
away from the balloting as circumstance would allow. Willie B. Hardaway and Jessie M.
Jones complained that officials did not demonstrate ballot boxes were actually empty
after the official ballot count was completed. Charlie Jones, Hosie B. Smith, and Gertrude
Beasley noted that stated vote totals in their districts did not match figures that were later
published. 56
The best-documented Election Day experience was that of District 10, in the
southwest corner of the county, along the Shelby County and Mississippi state line, where
fraud by election officials and FCDEC member Sam Dunn was almost undisguised. Dunn
was asked by several voters for help with their ballots. In the sheriff and assessor races
Herbert Bonner noted that Dunn always stated “Did you want to vote for” and gave
Pattat’s or Jordan’s name without mentioning opposition candidates L. T. Redfearn or
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June Dowdy. Earnest Pool saw Dunn sitting on the ballot box while they waited to vote.
“All the time my wife and I were in line and could see inside [the polling station], . . . He
would raise his leg to slip a ballot into the slot.” J. L. Wright watched voting officials
Dunn, Felix Webb, and Clyde Russell unabashedly filling out ballot applications and
ballots and depositing them in the pasteboard carton serving as a ballot box. When Wright
complained to Russell, the site’s polling chief, his credential as Redfearn’s poll watcher
was challenged and he was told to leave. When he refused, Russell and another voting
official left the polling station and drove him to Joe Cocke’s office in Somerville. The
County Attorney and local Democratic Party leader “said Redfearn couldn’t have a
watcher, I was violating the law, and I would have to leave the polling place. He told Mr.
Russell that Mr. Russell could either fine me or lock me up or carry me back where he
got me.” Perhaps unwilling to risk the fallout from a demonstrably false arrest, Russell
drove Wright back to Piperton. 57
The day was a dispiriting dénouement to weeks of hard work, personal sacrifice,
and occasionally outright fear. Charlie Haynie was despondent, not only because of the
election but because of the endemic problems the black community dragged along behind
them.

Illiteracy was the worst enemy of the Negroes who voted; many were confused by
the printed ballot, which was different from the sample (based on the absentee
ballot) we had distributed, many more were simply overcome by the problem of
walking through a group of white “bossmen” and marking a ballot. In every
polling place there were from twenty-five to fifty ballots which had simply been
folded and placed in the box—blank. Many of the Negroes who had placed blank
ballots in the box told us they did that rather than vote for Pattat.58
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Writing about the project later, Doug Dowd and Mary Nichols made perhaps the truest
observation describing the summer’s experience: “illiteracy is a harsh tyrant.”
The goal for the Cornell-Tompkins effort had been to train a local layer of districtlevel vote-organizing leadership and depart immediately after the election. After a final
barbecue party at the Wagon Wheel campground, most workers left on 7 August, the day
after the election. It was clear that much remained to be done and leaders of the project
decided to commission an on-site representative to maintain a contact and activist
presence in Tennessee. They settled on a friend of one of the Cornell-Tompkins project
members, Debby Rib, a 1962 University of Wisconsin graduate with a record of social
activism. 59 Her central task as an on-site organizer was to hold the district organizations
together for the November general election. She was also the contact and laid the
groundwork for a regional voter-registration effort the following year, the West Tennessee
Voters Project. 60
In late October, a few of the New York activists returned south to help locals with
the general election. Officials’ conduct during the general election was essentially a
repeat of the August primary—polling rules were bent or changed to suit the color of the
voter, disqualifications were handed out seemingly arbitrarily, and poll watchers were
shunted aside or disallowed all together. The activists became increasingly anxious about
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the outcome as the day progressed. One finally telephoned Memphis lawyer A. W. Willis
and asked for help.

I told him that the election officials could do absolutely anything they wanted and
we could do absolutely nothing. He said that was right. He said the only thing we
could do was to collect affidavits after the abuses had happened, affidavits from
‘living witnesses’, and to submit these, and the people if possible, to the FBI. That
was all we could possibly do. The Justice Dept. said the same thing. The FBI, of
course, wouldn’t say anything. 61

Herbert Bonner was once again disallowed from serving as a District 10 poll watcher in
Piperton, for instance, but activist Ron Schneider learned in a conversation that afternoon
that officials’ objection was to Bonner himself and not to having a poll watcher. Bonner
and others hung around the door all day and one of the election judges brought them
sodas and pastries during the day. “Herbert had asked any negro who had a complaint
about anything to come to him before he left the polling area. No one did.” 62 As word
trickled in from the election districts and Debby Rib worked to document purported
abuses, the activists began realizing that election had not gone as badly as they had
feared. “Things looked awfully black,” remembered Schneider.
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yet later that night, we discovered that at most precincts a good approximation of
a fair election was conducted. Hardly any Rossville voter had any kind of
complaint to make except that they had all voted on a counter and could see their
neighbor mark his ballot.
All over the county they didn’t tear off stubs [the numbered tabs used to
keep track of ballots issued], which sounded extremely grave until I discovered
that there was no number written on the stub, as Tenn. election law provides [i.e.,
technically the ballots had not been issued and could not therefore be counted].
The officials were simply doing it all their own way, illegal but apparently just as
fair as the legal way. It was characteristic of many precincts that irregularities
would occur, but they would arise through ignorance or casualness, within what
appears to be a general attempt at fairness. 63

Not all was bleak, either. “District 11 had a perfectly fair election, with a poll watcher,”
concluded Ron Schneider, who returned from New York in time for the general election
in November. The experience had been a patchwork of inconsistencies and personal
whim. “At District 14, voters were not even allowed inside afterwards to watch the count.
At some districts there may very well have been fraud; we don’t know and certainly can’t
prove it.” Collectively the Cornell-Tompkins activists’ and black poll-watchers’ accounts
of the August 1964 primary election and the November general election describe what
seems like opportunistic attempts among white officials to intimidate black voters,
exploit loopholes, and obfuscate voting requirements. It does not read like a coordinated
process of intimidation and fraud, but it was certainly business as usual. Despite US v.
FCDEC, the antiquated and easily manipulated polling processes themselves had never
been questioned before and the employment of regular, uniform, and auditable practices
was consistently low.
For their part, the activists had made several important errors at both elections.
First, they had focused on securing credentials for citizens as voters and as poll watchers,
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while neglecting provisions or training for responding to credentialing challenges.
Second, they neglected to establish a regular, effective method for documenting vote
fraud. Third, they had not trained new voters adequately to handle the new and
intimidating circumstance of voting. In short, activists approached the situation in Fayette
County with trust in a fundamental tenet of American political liberalism: an abiding faith
that the electoral system, which works when people are involved. They had concentrated
on expanding voter rolls in helping create civic identity among the majority segment of
the county population by becoming active in an election. However, they overlooked the
point that elections are a mechanism. Assuming that the engine of democracy ran
smoothly in Fayette County and that they needed just the keys of voting to go forward,
they neglected to notice the ignition had been hotwired and the steering had a lock. They
were entirely unable to formulate an effective challenge to either the party or the arbitrary
rules of custom and personal power exploited by local officials. Even though blacks were
the majority population and were becoming civically active, until they grew more
sophisticated and until election practices in Fayette County met state practice standards,
they remained at the mercy of systems and institutions they could not effectively
challenge.
Did the Cornell-Tompkins effort fail? From one perspective all that was
accomplished was to set up a challenge that openly questioned the local political
establishment and made privilege-sensitive officials dig in their heels and be as
uncooperative as they could manage without crossing the line to outright illegality. They
had managed neither to get an opposition candidate through the primary election nor to
mount adequate pressure to guarantee or document a free and fair election. On those
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counts they failed. On the other hand, Richard Denenberg argued for the relative success
of the overall effort, noting that “Men and women who had never voted before, who did
not know that they could vote, let alone how, cast their ballots and demanded that white
men—of whom they had never before demanded anything—allow them to watch their
votes being counted. . . . [Why] argue about success in terms of political victory? Fayette
County Negroes were victorious the moment they declared themselves into its political
life by depositing their ballots.” 64 Arguing for black access to the civic arena in terms of
rights rather than relationships challenged the informal, personal arrangements that had
long been the social glue in two tradition-bound rural agricultural communities. In those
terms, they certainly succeeded.
***
In 2001 independent filmmaker Fetzer Mills learned of the Tent City story and
produced a documentary on the subject. The film drew upon new interviews with several
surviving participants. The title, We Did It All Ourselves, is taken from an observation by
Harpman Jameson near the film’s conclusion. It encapsulates the struggle by a handful of
poor, inexperienced sharecroppers to motivate a politically and economically repressed
majority population, create a viable organization, and cope with economic and social
reprisals from their former employers and creditors. The statement-cum-title, made forty
years after the major events, highlights the sense of accomplishment felt by those who
sacrificed much in a cause. It also illustrates how first-hand personal accounts collected
years after an event sometimes rest on the shifting sands of memory.
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The disenfranchised black population of Haywood and Fayette counties did, in
one sense, really do it “all themselves.” The Jamesons, the Mormans, the McFerrens, the
Dowdys, Pucketts, Turners, Yanceys, and many others, set their course on egalitarian
principles and did not waver. They endured and eventually faced down intimidation and
economic reprisal to claim their rights as participants in the U.S. electoral system—but
they did not accomplish the task entirely by themselves. It was evident from the outset
that the straightforward, daily battle to encourage citizens to register as voters would be
waged primarily by local people working one-on-one with their neighbors. Yet the
situation complicated quickly and a measure of organization and logistical support was
needed, greater than what was available locally. Jim Crow economics and politics proved
inextricably entwined and too deeply entrenched to be challenged by a racial minority,
even when that minority was a demographic majority.
Laying out his arguments about the success of the Fayette County civil rights
actions in 1969, sociologist Harry Holloway prefigured Jameson's observation as he
wrote that “the struggle for change has taken place chiefly at the local level; outside
intervention on behalf of local Negroes has been of some importance, but uneven and
limited.” 65 Holloway may have been factually correct but he missed the point—the
sharecroppers of Fayette County and Haywood County had so little to work with other
than their will and tremendous sacrifices that any measure of support from outside
became meaningful to their struggle for civil participation. The aid that did come was
critical. The press shined a raking light across the inequities of segregated society and the
dependent/paternal strata. Donations allowed newly unemployed families to stay in the
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area. Activists lent moral support across the racial divide and taught practical
administrative skills. Despite their iron resolve and willingness to sacrifice, the local
organizers in rural Haywood and Fayette counties could only accomplish a limited
amount on their own; no one bucking intimidation to add their name to the county voter
registration lists in 1959 was prepared to face down the complexities of the legal
questions pressing on them. Neither individually nor collectively could they muster the
material or economic support to hold the movement together and buy time for the courts
to act. Economic pressure compounded the problems faced by both Civic and Welfare
Leagues, and the white minorities knew it. To cope, the communities of displaced
sharecroppers and the few black business owners needed help beyond what could be
mustered locally. While they stood on their own feet, they also accepted help gratefully.
The financial, commodity, and moral support of concerned people in Memphis, Chicago,
New Jersey, Ohio, and elsewhere in Tennessee was critical—perhaps a determining
factor—in holding together a community while it began the civil rights struggle in both
Fayette and Haywood counties. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned discrimination in
employment and public places, codified the definition of public space around a modern
liberal definition of society as one of impartial access for its citizens, rather than a
construct of mutually made private agreements. It did not change the circumstances in
these two counties immediately, but it reinforced the views of activists in West Tennessee.
Political activism had a different meaning to the minority population in Haywood
County and Fayette County. The white citizenry had long been stable and reasonably
secure, if not particularly well-off. By the late 1950s, the world of corporate
manufacturing, retailing, and media had crowded in to the point that whites were
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uncomfortably aware that their dependence on the world beyond the county boundaries
was increasing—and the pace of change was accelerating. Locally owned stores around
court square were beginning to close while chains and franchises cropped up on the edges
of town. Perhaps they expected to lose their grip over modernization and economic
change. The voting rights actions, however, meant that they were also poised to lose their
grip over the one social factor they had been certain would never change. For whites, the
problem of blacks voting was not just that the “color line” of privilege was being
challenged, but that it was being challenged at a time when so many other institutions
were weakening. They were coming to see that the line between races and classes was not
fixed. It could be pushed—and if it could be pushed, then they could push back.
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Chapter 8
Expectations in the White Communities:
The Reaction
If the Government tries to decree with whom [we] must associate, then in the
name of “civil rights” we’re denying civil rights—for a man has a right to choose
associates with whom he is most comfortable. 1
A man’s freedom stops when it encroaches upon the freedom of his neighbor. 2
At its heart the conflict over voter registration and voting rights was a collision
between a majority group awakening to the obligations and privileges of citizens, and a
minority group desperately wanting to maintain an exclusive hold over the privileges of
citizenship and everything in the community touched by it. Understanding assumptions
and expectations of the white populations in Haywood and Fayette counties is necessarily
more interpretive than it is narrative, since there is little hard documentation from which
to work.
The actions taken by white officials in dealing with the first applicants determined
at least partially how they could respond as black activism spread. The voting registrar
and Election Commission members stonewalled Currie Boyd and his handful of
interested black Haywood County residents from the outset, which set a standard for
reactions among the wider white community. Conversely, the Fayette County power
structure could no longer assert that “niggers don’t vote” after Joe Patrick, Morgan
Wright, and a handful of others registered without incident in Fayette County. Those who
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simply showed up and registered to vote set a precedent that limited the responses
officials could make as registration requests increased.
In both counties, voter registration challenged the exclusive privileges—certainly
the assumptions and assertions—claimed by those who occupied the dominant place. The
white minority was not eager to lose control. The deeply conservative nature of white
society became evident as local officials, churches, business communities, and elites
coordinated to maintain and reinforce the traditional strata of segregation, struggling to
keep things “as they’ve always been” without resorting openly to measures that would
attract state or federal intervention. Pro-segregation conservatism was not, however,
uniform. The “solid South” was a myth preached by its strident proponents. If
conservatism was a smothering blanket, it was also patchwork of shades colored by
belief, opportunity, scheme, and fear. Mid-twentieth century rural conservatism reflected
a deep history rooted in separateness. One was accepted by who you were (whiteness,
birth); one qualified for leadership by the strength of one’s relationships or what one
controlled. In the view of these modern rural conservatives, America's democratic
sentiment and tradition was personal rather than social.
The South’s rural aristocracy feared popular democracy. The state Redeemer
governments imposed measures specifically to stifle the rising black educated class, the
clearest challenger to the antebellum hegemony. The burden of poll taxes, which
accumulated annually and kept poor voters disenfranchised until they were paid in full,
shackled poor whites—“peckerwoods”—as conveniently as any black field hand. 3
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Neither Tennessee county needed to rely on a poll tax to control its underclass of black
field hands; longstanding tradition simply excluded blacks from elections. The
invalidation of that mechanism in the US v. FCDEC decree chilled folks who really did
not want life to change—or their control of county offices or “property” in the form of
public schools and the local economy. 4 If blacks could participate in elections, then the
white elite’s grip over the community organization and its resources became instantly at
risk. “Sure I reckon it’s all right for a nigger to vote if he wants to and it don’t harm
nothing,” stated one anonymous white citizen of Fayette County. “But what if they all
begin to vote here! We’d be swamped! You put yourself in our place and you’ll see why
we got to keep them in their place.” 5 At an abstract level, the personal, direct intimidation
and warning exercised by whites toward both black tenants and white voting activists
reflected the perspective of place that had fueled white action within dependency/paternal
relationships for decades: you leave because I don't like what is happening in my world.
This was a key premise of paternalism and property-based individualism. Participation of
any sort within society was an extension of personal social authority—place.
Voting rights activists were reminded only occasionally that the struggle involved
losses on both sides. Highlander Folk School’s founder, Miles Horton, was chided by a
supporter after a workshop on “The Place of the White Southerner in the Current Struggle
for Justice” that “the die-hard white southerner is in a sense as much a victim of the
Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South (Birmingham: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1958); Jennings Perry,
Democracy Begins at Home: The Tennessee Fight on the Poll Tax (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1944).
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system as the negro and that respect must also be shown for his infirmity and his
suffering.” 6 Change and the loss of exclusive, dominant place atop segregation’s strata
was uncomfortable. Remembering his experience years later, 1965 workcamper Robert
Hamburger summed up the situation succinctly: “if all the black people registered to vote
in a county with close to seventy percent black people, then a lot of power was going to
shift into the hands of people who had no power at the time.” 7 The white community
understood that perfectly. “Just to be honest, the white people of Fayette County believe
they should have the say-so,” admitted the Commercial Appeal, a conservative Memphis
newspaper in 1960. It quoted “one of the country’s leading and best informed” but
unidentified citizens:

The changing economic climate and the changing political climate are of a piece,
to be sure, but Fayette Countians speak of them differently. Economics are
discussed matter of factly, but when the talk turns to the changing relationship
between Negro and white the tone of conversation takes on a I-guess-it-had-tocome-but-it-really-is-a-shame note.”8

Voter registration among civically excluded and dependent blacks was much more than
just dissatisfaction with a subordinate place under segregation. It represented
dissatisfaction with traditional, beneficent paternalism. “Signing up to register don’t have
anything to do with it,” commented Fayette County’s largest landowner, retired physician
6
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John W. Morris, early in the embargo, “but it got some of us to thinking how maybe they
weren’t happy around here with things the way they were.” 9 The direction of change
stirred a sense of nostalgic loss among many whites. Those who formerly contributed to
black-benefit causes, such as re-roofing a church or outfitting a family whose home had
burnt, began to fear that donations might instead be routed into a political-action fund.
“They recall these things not in a sense of gratitude forgot, but more of a friendship lost,”
claimed a reporter in the Commercial Appeal. “People in Fayette County feel generally
that changes in their way of life are inevitable. They devoutly hope the changes can be
made without unwarranted trouble.” 10 But the Memphis newspaper intentionally softpedaled the issue. Whites recalled the beneficence of personal acquaintance but no real
friendship across the color line: the local white elites planned, organized, enforced, and
acted both individually and in concert to obstruct, punish, or nullify black voters they had
known, worked with, relied upon, and trusted, sometimes for decades. Those on the
lower levels of the communities’ white strata feared losing what little they had and went
along.
Responses to black voting and its challenge to place varied among these rural
white Midsoutherners. After all, whites harbored individual ideas and fears as did their
black tenants, customers, employees, and neighbors. White responses may be grouped
into three loose but reasonably accurate classes: those of assertive conservatives,
embattled moderates, and discrete empathizers. A fourth group, the open supporters,
included distinct and finite members. The assertive conservatism of the local elites, the
9
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uncomfortable stance assumed by moderates, the furtive support by quiet sympathizers,
and the stolid position by supportive families shows how complex racial relations
actually were. Not every white Southern family was a den of fire-breathing
segregationists.
Assertive conservatives
The most visible attitudes and activities are by that class of whites who believed
deeply in their stratified world of separate and unequal tracks of American citizenship.
These were the most vocal or actively opposed voter registration among blacks. “We
don’t eat with niggers, we don’t sleep with niggers, and we don’t go to church with
niggers. Period,” Haywood County sheriff Tip Hunter told the Tennessean newspaper
early in 1960. 11 Little is known about the concerns of the white community beyond
glimpses provided by discrete incidents, so the passive idealist must be considered with
the violent ideologue, the opportunist alongside the true believer. They are commonly
lumped together as “segregationists” though we actually know comparatively little about
their personal attitudes, other than they were uniformly unwilling to allow blacks to
compete with them for political office, economic advantage, or social participation.
Eager members of this class were landowners who exploited federal farm
assistance, the “soil bank.” The program attempted to prevent commodity market-price
depression by limiting the amount of crops grown to what demand could bear. Paying
farmers not to plant some of their land guaranteed the markets would not be flooded with
unsalable goods, but would still provide farmers an income. By law tenants were to
receive a share of an assistance payment, but in practice there was no way to police what

11

James Talley, “Fayette Invokes Economic Force,” Tennessean, 1960 May 8.

256

land was being idled and who had worked it. In practice, the program “enable[d] the
landlord to leave his grain acreage lying idle and draw payment on it, thus cutting down
the total acreage and making less land available for the sharecropper.” 12 In some
instances Fayette and Haywood landowners practiced outright fraud. The law required
that tenants accompany landowners when the latter entered acreage for a soil-bank
subsidy and by law tenants shared the payment. Eugene Knight's landlord simply refused
to document him as a tenant and kept the entire subsidy, then did not evict him but
refused to advance Knight money for seed, fertilizer, or living expenses. 13 More
commonly, local landowners simply used the federal soil-bank program as a pretext for
denying their newly registered tenants land on which to grow either cash or subsistence
crops (notably corn). Prevented from raising even subsistence, families could not feed
themselves. Federal farm assistance thus unintentionally subsidized the repression and
expulsion of landless farm workers; it removed the burden of costs for field
mechanization from those who were generally profiting handsomely while casually
exploiting their hired help. 14
Whether in Haywood or in Fayette counties, those who desperately did not want
social arrangements upset deeply resented the presence of white rights activists. “Anyone
coming in expressing a concern of any kind, no matter how conciliatory in approach[,] is
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Figure 8.1

Fayette County sheriff deputies watching blacks queued in a voter
registration line through the back (north) door of the courthouse, June
1960. 15

regarded as an outsider who can’t know the local problems and should go home and stay
there,” Maurice McCrackin reported. “The Sheriff assured me there was no need in
Haywood County and things will work out just if only the outsiders will keep out.” 16
Sentiments did not improve even when visitors were involved only on cooperative work
projects. Resentment transcended the immediate subject of voting rights. Robert
Hamburger recalled walking with a coworker into a court-square hardware store in
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Somerville in 1965. Recognizing who they were, the proprietor came slowly toward
them, swinging a baseball bat in wide circles at eye level, all the time telling them how
justifiably angry he would be if the snack cake wrappers they were holding “mussed up”
his store. They got the message. 17 As tensions mounted over direct action protests in
1963 and school desegregation after 1964, the confrontations actually increased. As late
as 1969 Nashville minister and peace activist Baxton Bryant was nearly knifed by
brothers John and Frank McQueen on a Somerville street in broad daylight.18
The blame for repression in these two counties transcended a small number of
hard-hearted white officials. County officials and large landowners—those whose place
atop the county establishment was most threatened by black-dominated local
democracy—are the ones most frequently identified as the driving figures in both
counties, but a large number of citizens (seemingly larger by virtue of the noise and
confusion of confrontations) agreed with the measures taken. In fact, Fayette County
adopted a populist approach toward segregation and economic reprisal. An informal,
citizen’s council-like organization had formed and was functioning in Somerville at
around the time the first black sharecroppers registered to vote. 19 During jury selection
for the 1959 Dodson trial the formality and tension of the courtroom was breached when
defense attorney James Estes asked prospective juror Casey Duke Teague if he was or
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had been a member of a White Citizens’ Council. Teague responded that he did not
know. “Asked if he saw anyone in the courtroom who might know,” a Memphis
newspaper reported, “Mr. Teague pointed to Asst. Atty. Gen. Preston Parks and said:
‘Was that what that meeting was about that we attended?’” The courtroom broke up in
laughter.20 The group was functioning openly in Somerville immediately after the August
1959 primary election.
The proto-citizen’s council represented a veritable Who’s Who of the Fayette
County political leaders and business elite. Active membership included former FCDEC
chairman Basil Haddad, county commission member James Harvey “Preacher” Shelton, a
Somerville dentist named Shivers, John Rosser of Rosser & Guthrie Furniture, Murray
Parks, B.F. Goodrich Tire owner Billy Barnes, grocery owner Julian Pulliam, county
sheriff David Myers, filling station owner and deputy sheriff Ted Davis, public
accountant J. T. Greer (who chaired the county grand jury in 1961), general sessions
court judge Paul Summers, and Ben Morris, son of Somerville physician John W. Morris.
As the largest landowner in the county, Dr. Morris was interviewed repeatedly about
local activities by investigators and news reporters. Morris was, as one local put it, “like
an old coon. He’s awful sharp. Never saw him at a meeting in my life. I think he’s smart
enough to stay away.” 21 The coalition was led by Somerville Elementary School
principal and Tennessee General Assembly member David Givens. Its structure reflected
the importance of grass-roots mobilization, the same lesson learned by the two Civic and
Welfare Leagues. Coercive activity in each of the county’s election districts was directed
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by a chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary, who communicated with the fifteen to
twenty-five participants living in the district.
Involving as many prominent individuals as it did, the embargo coalition was able
to coerce other business owners who otherwise did not share its biases or needed
customers badly enough to welcome anyone’s business. The district leaders leaned on
rural store and farm owners to maintain the embargo of registered black voters. Many
who would otherwise have ignored the action in different circumstances reluctantly
participated. A Chicago newspaper quoted one unnamed source in Fayette County, who
“wouldn’t say the smaller businessmen were forced to go along on this thing, but they
know what the consequences are if they don’t.” 22 The threat of reprisal for not
subscribing to the anti-voter agenda was entirely real; even this measure had a curious
fulcrum of moderation. A direct view into the workings of the embargo coalition exists in
a transcript of Somerville drive-in restaurant owner Hayden Williams’s interview with
Justice Department supervising attorney J. Harold Flannery. 23 Williams’s comments
reveal how hard the embargo coalition had to work to keep white businesses suitably in
line. The coalition maintained a grievance committee under the direction of local Rexall
druggist Howard Rhea, which was the enforcement arm of the economic embargo on
fellow whites. Reflecting the conservative perspective of society as a mutually agreed
upon private relationships, the committee provided a forum for negotiations between
boycotted business owners and the coalition members.
22
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Even this activist group had its opportunistic “moderates,” and Rhea seemed to be
one. For instance, several members wanted to include Somerville dry cleaner Herbert
Fisher in its local embargo and called him to appear at a committee meeting to explain his
business practices. Fisher, clearly an embattled moderate, demurred to the point that the
general consensus among committee members was “well hell, if he’s not going to come
to the meeting let’s just boycott him anyhow.” Rhea reportedly asserted that Fisher
should not be boycotted until they had heard from him directly. 24 While the goals and
intent of the embargo were clearly coordinated from above, individual coalition members
and sympathizers seem to have assumed its boundaries could be extended where merited.
Hayden Williams’s Highway 64 Grill was reportedly boycotted by “some of the boys
from the gas company” because he employed the former cook of the Silver Moon Café,
Katy Lee Yarbrough. Williams only found out why his business dropped off
precipitously through customers: Mrs. Richardson, owner of Silver Moon, had personally
telephoned “everybody in town.” 25
Though organized to coordinate economic pressure on black activists, the
coalition also operated as a form of social coercion within the white community,
employing local economics to enforce a traditional view of public service and social
order. Far from being a closed club like the FCDEC, the embargo coalition established a
dozen district-level organizations that involved hundreds of members from across the
county. 26 It provided a strong, integrated, and mutually supportive base on which to
construct first the embargo of 1960 and then the academy movement of half a decade
24
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later. The weekly meetings in Somerville regularly drew 150 to 400 members—
practically all of the town’s merchants, “all of them, every doggone time they met,”
according to drive-in restaurant owner Hayden Williams. “They just about had to go, they
were in the same shape I was in.” 27 Meetings typically featured a speaker, often drawn
from the local business elite. One county-wide meeting held in May 1960 at Somerville
Elementary School featured a guest speaker from the White Citizen’s Council national
organization in Jackson, Mississippi and drew a crowd estimated at 1,500—“all they
could get in the gymnasium.” Supervising attorney J. Harold Flannery confirmed several
times that the Somerville coalition met weekly between September 1959 and May 1960
and only occasionally thereafter. By then the meetings had served their purpose, creating
an exclusive network of awareness and cooperation between like-minded, locally
privileged white people. It is clear that in Fayette County the embargo of black registrants
and white moderates was a broad-based effort that did not result from the actions of a
Star Chamber. These embargo coordination meetings in Somerville were discontinued
entirely in November 1960, as evictions were beginning to draw national news attention.
Organizers were fearful that a reporter might get into the meeting.
The Fayette County Citizens’ Council (FCCC) incorporated in March 1964,
toward the end of the voting rights conflict, specifically to coordinate a response to the
first stirrings of school desegregation. Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 came in
July, just as voter registration ended before the county elections in August and as the
Cornell-Tompkins effort shifted to voter education. In Rhea’s Drug Store in Somerville,
proprietor Howard Rhea posted a sign prominently over its single, previously white-only
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water fountain reading “Fountain closed in protest of civil ‘wrong’ legislation. Act now!
Join your local Citizens’ Council and help get this legislation repealed.” 28 Because of the
size of the group it can be safely assumed that FCCC members, acting in their separate
capacity as Democratic Party election officials, took a prominent role in the election
irregularities documented by activists in August 1964. “The Fayette County Council,” the
national Citizens’ Council magazine commented with pleasure, should be “remembered
for its notable success in the summer of 1964 in offsetting political efforts of ‘invaders’
from Eastern colleges and news media to ‘Negrofy’ Fayette County.” 29
Besides the massive election fraud that sealed reelection for Clarence Pattat, the
August 1964 city/county primary elections also provided a revealing example of the
stratified paternalism among the Haywood County establishment. While June Dowdy ran
for county assessor in Somerville, black former grocer and longtime activist Odell
Sanders challenged the incumbent Democrat for his seat on the Brownsville city council.
The council had made a calculated move to encourage a property-owning (and
predominantly white) counterweight in the city to the growing black voting bloc in the
county by passing an ordinance that allowed county residents who owned property in city
limits to vote in city elections. This made Sanders, who still owned the building in which
the Haywood County Grocery was located, eligible not only to vote in the city election,
but also to stand for city office. After Sanders was defeated in the primary, the newspaper
ran a relieved editorial captioned “Our Negroes Are Good Citizens.” “Good,” in the
context of Sanders’ candidacy, meant that the black electorate did not vote en bloc to seat
28
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the black activist, who it characterized as “unqualified” without an explanation—and
without commenting about candidates with similar backgrounds who served on the
council but happened to be white. 30 However, in April 1964, immediately after Sanders
had filed his candidacy, the States-Graphic editor vigorously advocated the white
citizenry organize bloc voting that they otherwise feared and decried among blacks,
laying out how a candidate in a city election would be elected or defeated in an effort to
preserve longstanding privilege. 31
In Haywood County the middle-class Citizens’ Council movement never did get a
foothold, despite early attempts by Fayette County figures to spark a similar structure in
the county to the north. 32 The Haywood County embargo seems to have been driven by a
comparatively smaller group of county officials and landowners. However, the county
elite were not the ones who carried out the best-known intimidations. Instead,
Brownsville became a locus for the Ku Klux Klan, which drew almost strictly from
lower-middle-class white society. Most of those known to have been Klan members were
low-level managers, small farmers, and wage workers. Overt Klan activity in Haywood
County began in 1965, during the conflict over school desegregation, but a small core of
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Klan members and interested individuals were active in and around the county long
before Klavern 10 was organized in Brownsville. 33
The stridence of segregation activists threatens to divert attention from the fact
that this group of “assertive conservatives,” despite its influence, does not seem to
include the majority of the white population in either county. In 1961 Cincinnati activist
Virgie Hortenstein recorded a poignant example of how unevenly segregation was held
by the white populace. In the first week of July she called upon Mr. and Mrs. W. K.
Dickerson of Brownsville First Methodist Church. In Hortenstein’s telling, the town’s
arguably most important churchman voiced a firm opinion of the racial conflict that
reflected the interests of the establishment partisans. “This is our county and we’re going
to keep it,” he asserted. Later in the conversation, however, Mrs. Dickerson spoke up.

She said she knew a colored woman that she wanted very much to be friends with
and she wanted her to come sit in her living room where I was sitting. There was a
wistfulness in the voice of the minister’s wife, a loneliness newly revealed. She
might have added, “No, it is not proper for us to be friends. This can never
happen.” She could not even add, “Not in my generation,” for here was her
husband, who said, “this is a white man’s county and we’re going to keep it.” 34

Mrs. Dickerson was caught in the situation that faced many, perhaps most, white citizens
during the voting rights agitation.
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Embattled moderates
The embargo of black activists and white fence-sitters divided the counties’ white
society into unequal orbits. At the gravitational center were those who conceived and
coordinated the embargo. This seems to be a fairly small group made up mostly of
elected county officials and those with substantial business interests in the community.
That group invited or coerced the participation of a much larger number of other white
landowners and businesses, an attempt to enforce the idea of common interest and a
single perspective among white citizens. To some extent the white-to-white coercion was
successful. Whether willing, or reluctant but fearful of personal social or economic
consequences, a large number of whites cooperated at least tacitly with the embargo of
civically active black laborers. However the population was neither as uniform nor as
united as its motivators would have wanted to believe. Some landowners quietly refused
to participate in the embargo or pressure their laborers but did not take a public stand
against the measures. Perhaps hoping to remain under the social radar and avoid having
to choose sides, these landowners were vulnerable—and they knew it.
There was little or no middle ground between the competing polarities, a situation
encouraged by activists on both sides of the conflict. Either blacks should vote or they
should not; either one enforced the embargo or one was included in it. Oddly, many
people in each county, both black and white, occupied the position that logically did not
exist, dodging the activists on both sides and going as quietly and anonymously as
possible about their daily business. Whites who did not agree openly with the assertive
segregationists occupied an inherently weak position. Many succumbed to outright
tyranny, accommodating to social pressure under fear of being subjected to the economic
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reprisal meted to the black activist community. This was particularly true in Fayette
County, where the populist nature of David Givens’s segregationist coalition allowed it to
practice intimidation by inclusion. Some may have disagreed either with the
segregationists’ social aims or the economic methods used to coerce activists back into
place or out of the county, but were reluctantly willing to go along with embargo
measures to avoid conflict. These circumstantial moderates recognized and often
admitted the inequities in social arrangements but were interested less in resolving
matters amicably by mutual compromise than in simply avoiding conflict with either
side. These were those caught, as David Chappell put it, “between morality and politics,”
or more precisely in this context, between morality and socioeconomics. 35
Moderates included those who might not have participated in the tactics of
establishment partisans, but caved in to pressure and evicted their registered tenants
reluctantly or unwillingly. The reluctant action of one moderate, E. Bertram Coburn, is a
good example. Countee Wilkes related how Coburn had dodged him for weeks until the
two met by accident in October 1960. Later Wilkes recorded his account of their meeting.

“I’d been wanting to see you, Wilkes, for several days, but I just couldn’t get
around to it.” And I said “Now, Mr. Coburn,” I say, “you ain’t been wanting to
see me that you have been passing my field every day, and uh, you should have
stopped.” He said, “Well, Wilkes, what I had to tell you, that I can’t hardly get it
out,” [he] said, “You have been retained for sixteen years with me. You haven’t
given any trouble. And I’m gon’ have to—” and I said, “Well if you’d been
wanting to see me, you could have told me.” He said, “I didn’t hardly come out
with what I had to say,” I said, “Well, it must not been for me, Mr. Coburn.” He
said, “Well now Wilkes, I’m going to have to let you go,” he said, “but I will give
you a good recommendation anywhere you go.” I said, “Well, now Mr. Bert,” I
said, “I wouldn’t accept a recommendation like that and nobody else would. You
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giving me such a good recommendation is turning me off,” I said. “Other people
would think something else [was] funny about the situation.” 36

Moderates might also include those who declined to evict their tenants despite
pressure. Danceyville grower Katherine Davis refused to evict her long-time tenants after
they registered to vote because they were dependable employees, not because she agreed
with the civic involvement of the black populace. 37 Some who leaned sympathetically
toward the black community (or at least away from repression by elements of the white
community) were able to get around the embargo. One was retired Lt. Colonel and
Fayette County native George B. Cummings. Cummings actually lived in Collierville,
across the Fayette County line in Shelby County, but ran a small rural store with his farm
operation south of Rossville. He told FBI investigators that he had been contacted
“during 1960 by several white persons” who suggested he “cooperate with white people”
and require any tenant who registered to vote to leave. These separate visitors each
invited him to a series of meetings in a group that was never named. These unnamed
persons suggested that “if Cummings did not cooperate with the white people, both he
and his hands would have difficulty ginning their cotton and otherwise.” Cummings
declined to participate, insisting that “he did not agree with their methods and would have
nothing to do with their meeting or their proposals to require Negro tenants to move if
those Negroes registered.” Reprisal was not long in coming. Alva Carpenter, the local
deliveryman for the Curtiss Candy Company, ceased deliveries to Cummings’ store,
followed by the supplier from Dixie Distributing Company out of Jackson, Tennessee.
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Cummings contacted a manager of the latter firm who “indicated he was not aware that
the beer truck was not stopping at Cummings’ store and that, thereafter, deliveries at his
store were resumed.” To minimize conflict, but also to not support those pushing the
embargo locally, Cummings trucked his seed cotton into Shelby County or to Mississippi.
Even Col. Cummings drew the line, however, at open political activism among
his tenants. Cummings refused to evict his registered tenants, fearing that taking such
action compromised others’ civil rights and might invalidate his military pension, but
disagreed just as firmly with the pressure applied by black activists on unregistered
tenants to register as voters. Cummings threatened to void an agreement on a rural church
his family had helped build on land he now owned if voter education meetings or
“discussion of ‘politics’ and racial matters” was held there. 38
Some moderates tried to avoid conflict by avoiding everything. Esther Green
refused to sign the embargo petition presented her by Ko Ko gin operator Shelby Dixon,
but then dodged any other involvement or comment about either side. 39 Whiteville
landowner Albert Emerson, unwilling to evict cropper Thad Turner for merely political
reasons, was pressured to sell the parcel Turner farmed. When the sale was complete, the
buyer, Walter Stewart, promptly evicted Turner.40
While some moderates fell in line with pressure to conform to the embargo, others
resisted the measures individually. Such private interaction—such as a sales clerk oneon-one with a customer—could provide a moderate with a guarded opportunity to
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selectively circumvent economic pressure. George W. Douglass related the experience of
Thaddus Turner, who went to buy an iron at the Western Auto store in Brownsville.
Turner had only half of the $10 price in his pocket and wanted to charge the other half on
account. The manager felt he needed to appear cooperative with the embargo but did not
seem to support the measure; he was willing to extend himself personally to circumvent
the boycott. “The manager told him he could not give Turner any credit on the books of
the store, but that he would personally lend Turner $5.00 from his own pocket to
complete the purchase price.” 41 In other words, the manager was willing to cooperate
“publicly,” or within the closed circle of white business owners, but was privately willing
to ignore the embargo—at least in Turner’s case.
Federal authority dealt the embargo’s architects a telling blow by filing US v
Atkeison and US v Beaty in December 1960. The arguments upon which conservatives
built their social structure was challenged as invalid, but the suits did not reassure timid
moderates who avoided confrontation, and the cases terrified even those not named in the
suits. To that point no local figures, including local attorneys, had experience with
federal injunctive civil actions and did not know what to expect. The only familiar point
of reference was the action of federal criminal courts. “What’s going on now, Mr.
Williams?” Flannery asked Williams at the end of their interview. “Is the boycott still
on?”

Mr. Williams: They have drawn up in a knot, half of them are scared to death.
Mr. Flannery: Is that because of the suit? Because of the case?
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Mr. Williams: That’s right. In other words, when you’re staring the penitentiary
in the face you just get out of the way and try to keep off base,
that’s all. 42

Williams’s comment suggests that many local merchants and business owners were
uncomfortable with the embargo and the rigid segregation it tried to enforce, even as the
other, implied “half of them” were perfectly comfortable standing firm to maintain it.
Though the informal citizens’ council ceased meeting in November 1960, the law suits
undercut widespread support for concerted conservative economic repression among the
white population. However, tenant evictions continued unabated and the boycott
effectively continued on an individual basis for several more years. In 1962 the Justice
Department looked a second time into white economic pressure, but took no action.
More common were interactions like the one workcamper Linda Lynes
experienced during her stay in Haywood County. The family hosting her was one of the
few black families that owned a tractor. While she was working there, the tractor
belonging to her host needed repair.

He told the girl who was living with me in his home that she and I had better stay
indoors. He had called a white man to do the job, and while the white man was
willing to include a Negro’s tractor among his jobs (because as Mr. Tom put it,
“A Negro’s money is the same as a White Man’.”) yet Mr. Tom said, “This man
is mean, and he might not like it, you livin’ with us. 43

Others were caught between fear of isolation and moral imperative. They opted to sit
quietly, doing nothing. They did not support the segregation agenda, but “refused to give
help to the Negroes because they felt the white people would resent it and they did not
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want to arouse that resentment.” 44 “If only a dominant few would take the pressure off,”
wrote Bill Schiller, “then a lot of people who are afraid to speak up now would be willing
to see the Negro get an even break.” 45 The dominant few did not act, however. The
moderates had no visible example to follow.
One clear indication of the deep division in white viewpoints was described by
Cincinnati activist Virgie Hortenstein in the summer of 1961. Though she sympathized
with the plight of poor field hands, she tried to understand both sides of the conflict. Over
three days in July she visited and interviewed eight white ministers in both counties. 46
She found, unsurprisingly, that ministers reflected the interests of their communities. Of
the eight ministers, W. H. Dickerson, mentioned earlier, was an unabashed segregationist.
One other was in the same camp. Five expressed comments that suggested their status as
timid circumstantial moderates, foreseeing change as constructive and perhaps right, but
unwilling to take the activists’ side. The last, Robert Rickard of Brownsville, might have
been a quiet supporter of social progress until Hortenstein suggested he meet with the
Rev. June Dowdy. Rickard hesitated; “He said he didn’t think he should see him just
now, and he couldn’t exactly say why.” 47
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In a society dependent on hierarchical personal relationships and obligations, it is
remarkable how long relationships that crossed the racial line remained superficial. While
dependence/paternalism relationships might generate a measure of trust between
landowners and tenants, particularly long-term tenants, it rarely engendered friendship.
To maintain their own standing in the embargo enacted by the public to which they
belonged, some landowners had little problem releasing people who had worked their
land for decades. Place was place. A few white landowners faced pressure to compromise
long-standing relationships that almost looked like actual friendship. Jesse Jones, for
instance, was served with an eviction notice, although he had been with this white
landlord since 1925 and he was sixteen.

He and his landlord had for years eaten together at the table, slept in adjacent
rooms. They had often saddled their horses together and then gone off each his
own way to “court” his lady friend. And now Jesse Jones had been asked to move.
But later the landlord repented, asked Jones to stay, as well as the other tenants
who had registered. He gave Jesse Jones his customary loan and made it higher
than before. And, Jesse Jones told us with his face all smiles[,] that the farmer had
hired him for about $200 worth of odd jobs as well!” 48

Maintaining contact with the black community was a quiet way of taking a stand while
minimizing risk.
Coordinated coercive pressure was necessary for the embargo to have any effect.
The solvency of many rural grocery owners hovered around the break-even point and
they could not be choosy about customers. “Taking the dollar” from someone irrespective

48

Operation Freedom, “Newsletter No. 2”, 1961 Jun 25, taken from [Richard Haley], “A first
day’s impressions [Wed., 1961 Jan 11], 22:36 McCrackin papers.

274

of color was simply financial survival. 49 A few of these moderates were willing to give a
frank opinion off the record. “Don’t quote me because it would ruin my business,” one
unidentified merchant told a Nashville Banner reporter in January 1961, “but I think the
Negroes and whites ought to get together on this thing. It’s the law that Negroes can vote
and we might as well get along with it.” 50 But such moderates as existed in the county
lacked cohesion and dared not risk what place they themselves occupied. In the context
of these rigidly stratified societies, place did not refer merely to the social situation of
black tenant laborers. It referred to whites as well. If it was the place of the local elite to
protect the interests of the community (and their place atop it), then it was the place of
those whites who were not elite to support them without question.
Reasons not to support the embargo varied. Some business and landowners feared
the consequences from a loss of business. Some were ideologically influenced; they
accepted segregation as a practical fact but believed in the inherent rightness of fair play.
A few simply did not agree that segregation should be a matter requiring enforcement;
segregation accepted by both sides as tradition was one thing, but attempting to enforce it
from only one side of the relationship was not right. If there were only few of this latter
group in either community, there were at least a few. The population of urban areas
provided greater support for like-minded individuals; in rural towns an anti-segregation
stance put the holder in a vulnerable and often lonely position.
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Maintaining a moderate stance within a rapidly polarizing community left one in a
lonely and exposed position. Whites who could be identified as moderates, like Hayden
Williams, found themselves added to the segregationists’ social and economic embargo
not because they supported black voting, but because they did not support white tactics. 51
Moderates employed a conservatism that was more temporal than social or political.
They did not seem either to support or fear change. A “new normal” was not the
problem—even if it involved a black electorate—but they disliked sharp or direct
interruptions to daily life. They hoped comity and stability could be maintained, even at
the expense of allowing a black civic and economic identity to grow and be adopted into
the public community.
Discrete empathizers
The assistance contributed by activists’ external groups and volunteers was
important, but a few white citizens within the counties were willing to stand outside the
cultural norm. Almost ignored in the Fayette/Haywood story are the white citizens of
both counties who refused to stand up with their segregationist neighbors in repression.
They were also unwilling to throw visible support behind the integrationist cause. A thin
and irregular line existed between circumstantial moderates, who were unwilling to
challenge convention but likewise unwilling to join the repression, and those few who
quietly ignored or countered “public” pressure to participate in the embargo. Sociologist
Harry Holloway called them “embattled moderates” but they are perhaps better described
as discrete empathizers. None seem fired solely by ideology. Most simply felt that
51
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pressuring someone to move because they wanted to vote crossed a dividing line between
fairness and unfairness. These quiet empathizers typically countered pressure within the
limits of their private affairs, and they took some sort of action against evictions or the
embargo on their own.
One of Hortenstein’s churchly informants reported the story of a rural
Presbyterian minister named Hyatt who preached in churches at Oakland and Hickory
Withe and had taken an open stand against economic pressure. His Oakland church said
nothing, but prominent members of the Hickory Withe church began leaving until there
were not enough members to pay his salary. When he still refused to leave, they charged
him before the presbytery with neglecting certain members of the congregation. The case
was dismissed and Hyatt stayed on for a few months, but eventually he left to accept
pulpits in Shelby County. The loss of a vocal supporter was a setback to activists. “The
man was young and unmarried and would have made it so much easier for other ministers
to speak out more,” stated Hortenstein’s informant. 52
The Haywood County landowners willing to enforce control of the black labor
force by eviction were evidently not a majority. Not all landowners were cowed by
pressure. If most did not take a stand against it, some did. Katherine Rawlins Davis and a
neighbor, Mr. I. S. Carter, drove from Brownsville to Memphis on their own initiative to
furnish federal investigators with first-hand information about the pressure tactics
imposed on them: an informal group of businessmen, including neighbor Robert
Archbell and Brownsville banker F. R. Chapman, had been urging landowners one-onone to evict field hands who had registered. Stanton landowner Bond Morgan was
52
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presented with a petition that he would “remove from his farm any Negro who caused
trouble.” The document was merely a paragraph long and did not specifically mention
voting, but he signed his name because a large number of prominent neighbors had as
well—he “went along with the majority.” Later, however, when personally approached
by an unidentified individual who asked him specifically to “remove from his farm any
Negroes who wanted to register in Haywood,” he took a stand and declined explicitly, but
by then it was easy—his one registered tenant had left for Chicago. 53
Occasionally someone was willing to act quietly but openly, simply standing
against public (i.e., white) sentiment. Stanton undertaker Gillem Jones advanced crop
loans to blacks denied loans by their landowners. 54 Retired farmer Robert R. Dulin
picked up a load of wholesale stock from outside the county for Brownsville grocer Odell
Sanders before the embargo finally choked off Sanders’s business. “He ought to have his
right to make a living, same as white folks,” Dulin told a reporter from Nashville. “I’ve
been criticized for what I did for Odell, but just like I told the sheriff, I’m not sorry.” 55
Activist landowner Shepherd Towles’ mortgage was carried in a private contract by a
woman who refused to change the terms. “She has been approached by segregationists on
the matter of foreclosure of the mortgage, but has refused to accede to such pressure. So
far,” wrote Richard Haley. “Several white people in the county have held fast to their
refusal to enter the segregationist covenant. None (so I’m told) has gone so far as to
testify in court, but there is obviously less than 100% support of the White Citizens’
53
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program. Furthermore, there is reason to believe a substantial part of the support has been
achieved through coercive social pressure, even the threat of inclusion in the boycott.” 56
There is no record of how many whites quietly supported their black neighbors in
the struggle for civic individualism, dodging notoriety because the social and economic
stakes were too high. Among the larger white community the number of this third class
was certainly small, but not nearly as small as the number of whites who simply flouted
pressure and supported black efforts for participation.
Open supporters
A tiny class of local whites brazenly refused to cooperate with the programs of
economic pressure or massive resistance to investigations and the courts. These
nonconformists can be counted on one hand; in both counties only three couples, all
mentioned in earlier chapters, are known by name: Leo T. and Frances Redfearn in
Fayette County, and Oren and Sara Lemmons in Haywood County; Art and Carolyn
Emery moved their family from Iowa to Tennessee specifically to cultivate an economic
structure in the hands of black activists. 57
In 1960 the Redfearns and Lemmons shared the lowest level of privilege in the
white community. Oren and Sarah Lemmons had moved from Memphis to rural Stanton
for the sake of his health and shared an interest in three local businesses with his brother.
Their retail store and dry cleaning business in Stanton had long catered to both black and
white clienteles, as most small-town stores did. Like most rural families they lived in
56
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cyclical debt, yet they were relatively stable and moderately successful if compared to
tenant farmers. Both were drawn into the voting rights actions in the early days of the
white embargo. When fellow businesses owners presented the Lemmons with the
agreement to embargo black families who had registered to vote, the couple refused to
participate. At the preliminary injunction hearing under US v. Beaty in December 1960,
Sara Lemmons was the only white person to testify in court about the coordination and
aims of the white business community. 58 She, said one activist, “is an individual who got
into this situation in the first place out of a simple impulse to do the right thing. I don’t
think she foresaw all that would happen—although she knew it was a dangerous course.”
“But she knows now that she stands 100 per cent with the Negroes in their quest for
freedom—and this battle is of personal importance to her.” 59 “It has practically ruined my
business,” she later told Maurice McCrackin, “but I feel like that people should take a
stand, and stand up for what’s right in the community they live in, and then they might be
an example to somebody else that would come forward and be—wouldn’t be afraid to
take that same stand.” 60 The Lemmons stood up, but no one joined them. Despite
financial help from Operation Freedom, by 1963 their three previously successful retail
and dry cleaning establishments in both Stanton and Mason were among the business
casualties of the economic boycott.61 With Operation Freedom’s support the Lemmons
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bought a farm outside Mason and moved a few miles south and west to Tipton County.
There they hoped, idealistically but rather naively, to provide farmland for some of the
families evicted from Haywood County. The strength of the Lemmons’ support for their
black neighbors did not equate with ability to plan, enact, or manage their affairs. The
Bradens and Operation Freedom tried to help the Lemmons solidify themselves
economically. Accustomed to both a life of cyclical debt and to an unsustainable model
for economic paternalism, the Lemmons barely held themselves together with donated
funds as they in turn made crop loans and extended run money to virtually all who
asked. 62
In Fayette County, Leo T. Redfearn, on the other hand, was one local white man
willing to stand openly with his black neighbors in their effort. “Red” farmed and had
brushed with the law over moonshining. He and wife Frances Redfearn owned and
farmed over 500 acres outright and their half-dozen tenant families farmed nearly 500
more on which they were making payments. Years later detractors argued Redfearn only
supported black voting rights because he saw an opportunity to ride the voting bloc into
local power against political rivals in the Democratic Party. He did run against the local
establishment candidate in three county sheriff elections. In the reported election results
he was soundly defeated each time, despite nearly wholesale support from the black
community. He was also the only local white man willing to be photographed or
cooperate openly with his black neighbors. If he was acting out of self-interest,
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Figure 8.2

Fayette County Economic Development Committee, ca.1964. One of the
six standing men is unidentified, but it is not known which (from left):
Square Mormon, Houston Malone, Simon Wilkerson, Isaiah Harris,
Boston Bledsoe. Seated: unknown (out of image), L. T. Redfearn,
Harpman Jameson, James Carpenter, John McFerren, Rufus Abernathy, E.
V. Braswell, NSF rep Allen Yancey. 63

Redfearn's stand was at least constructively opportunistic. 64 His huge and very costly
gamble never paid a dividend. His visible support for black neighbors and white activists
compromised the family’s ability to maintain their hold over their property as well.
Plagued by ill-health, Redfearn lost to foreclosures all farmland which he did not own
outright, but he remained a citizen of Fayette County until his passing in 1996. 65
The stance taken by both families isolated them from the rest of the white
community. After the Bradens first visited the Lemmons in early 1963, Sara wrote Anne
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Braden that “Meeting you and Carl meant so much to me. We do not have any one to talk
to over our problems with and give advice except the Redfearns.” 66
***
David Chappell observed that Southern black rights-movement activists “understood white southerners well enough to take advantage of covert white sympathy, and of
fatal divisions among segregationists, in a wide variety of ways.” 67 That comment
probably cannot be generalized to either the Fayette or Haywood branch of the struggle
for two reasons. First, the relationships between urban whites and blacks was
qualitatively different than that between rural whites and blacks. In agricultural settings
there seems to have been very little interaction between members of the groups beyond
individual dependence/paternal obligations and occasional service contacts in retail
establishments. In urban areas, domestic labor offered opportunities for confidential oneon-one conversation, a private, negotiable world where cross-class and cross-race
interaction could be much more personal. 68 Very few opportunities existed for that sort of
labor in rural towns. Second, despite repeated attempts to solidify their organizations,
activists in both counties were too dispersed and loosely coordinated. The HCCWL was
too fragmented to draw upon the threads of support it found in Stanton and Brownsville;
the Lemmons remained impotent champions, commanding neither assets nor tactical
savvy for an extended conflict. In Fayette County, John McFerren’s deep-seated fear of
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being manipulated and his suspicion of almost any white face made it all but impossible
to build coalitions of any sort. Fragmented and isolated, the potential strength that a
coordinated effort might have had simmered in the conflict until it boiled away.
Half a decade later, as social gains made under civil rights activity became
socially entrenched and the Black Power movement radicalized black political discourse,
Richard Nixon perceived the growing fearfulness of the privileged families who had fled
cities. Nixon saw an opportunity to rally a dissatisfied and fearful “silent majority” fueled
by fears that white suburban enclaves might be required to integrate public services with
the blacks that had flocked from mechanizing Southern farms to cities looking for
work.69 The right-ward movement of conservative Southerners was already in motion. As
early as 1963 an ideological realignment became visible in West Tennessee and merited
an editorial in Brownsville’s States-Graphic. 70 As the counties geared up machinery for
the post-Kennedy presidential election, the States Graphic ran an editorial marveling at
the number of local Democratic voters intending to cross previously inviolable party lines
to vote for Barry Goldwater. 71
Whether conservative, moderate, or empathetic, the single most substantive
change for rural white society was to repudiate their side of dependency/paternalism
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relationships. Once severed, local whites began denying outright that their traditional
practices had played any part at all in creating the conditions of rural poverty endured by
their former laborers. Surrendering paternalism stripped local conservative discourse of
its only basis for direct social obligation. At the same time, the negative language used to
describe blacks as dirty, uneducated, shiftless, and lazy became teleologic assertions that
tarred the underclass as an unsuitable “other,” while insulating conservatives from prior
responsibility for the poor’s circumstances. Under this line of reasoning the poor were in
that condition not because they had long been denied opportunity, access, or education,
but because the poor did not share the individual qualities conservatives ascribed to
themselves.
Faced with roiling economic changes, feeling attacked politically, uncomfortably
seeing their premises of exclusive public wither in court, white society in Haywood and
Fayette Counties was in terrific flux. Surrendering paternalism to seize new forms of
employment and agricultural production, generally whites wished the debate over black
voting rights would just go away and everything would go back to “normal.” Of course,
the conflict only broadened and intensified. As the debate over poverty and race became
tangled in political discourse in the 1960s, these two West Tennessee counties provide
microcosms of the nation’s larger struggles.
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Chapter 9
Economic and Political Discourse in One Corner of Rural America:
The Issues
Social equilibrium of the United States [is] an unstable equilibrium, always in
passage from one state to another. 1
It can be argued that the beginning and end of all attempts to understand the
American past center around the effort to comprehend what Americans have
meant when they used the words liberty and freedom. 2
Historians necessarily think in terms of period or geography for the convenience
of study and to stay within the limits of publication, but life does not have boundaries.
Human society is a biome, complex and organic, with varied actors and circumstances
both feeding and drawing upon the time, place, circumstance, and ideas. As in nature,
there is no truly independent variable or permanent structure in human society. Social
constructs such as segregation can never be absolute or impermeable, and no tradition
passes unchanged into the future. In these two West Tennessee counties, the larger
changes over the half-decade between 1959 and 1964 are an important context for the
meanings at play in the question of both tradition and voting. The political question did
not occur in a vacuum. Appreciating the human stories and the ideas that fueled them
invites a return to some of the hard, impersonal numbers that create a contextual
framework on which to hang them.

1

Bernard DeVoto, “The Meal in the Firkin,” The Literary Fallacy (Port Washington, N.Y.:
Kennikat Press, 1969), 154.
2

J. W. Cooke, “Jefferson on Liberty,” Journal of the History of Ideas 34, no. 4 (1973 Oct–Dec):

563.
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Economic discourse
As the voter registration effort began to take hold, Somerville grocer J. L. Howse
asserted, “We don’t care what nobody else out there thinks. There’s nobody can help us
and nobody can hurt us.”3 The view that his rural community was insular and
functionally independent was about to endure a wrenching transformation by factors far
beyond the issues of local politics. Fayette and Haywood counties were two of the last
bastions of the South’s century-long traditional manual-labor cotton culture. James F.
Estes argued early that “There is no great need for mechanization of farms in these
counties because of the size of the farms and the terrain.” 4 That assertion is difficult to
sustain: terrain could be reshaped, and field size could change in a single season; in fact,
field mechanization was poised to be a major factor in labor displacement. In the spring
of 1960 one white farmer borrowed half the assessed value of his entire farm operation to
buy a self-propelled cotton picker. “He figures he can pick his own cotton, plus some for
his brothers, and make the investments worthwhile—but he figures that in any event he is
forced to mechanize or lose out altogether.” 5 By the end of the same year the local
newspaper commented on the stark economies of manual v. mechanized labor. Using
tractor-drawn field equipment, Aubrey Parks and a single field hand worked for a month
to harvest sixty bales of cotton, “a good corn crop,” and other farm products.

3

“Cold War in Fayette County,” Sepia (1960 Sep): 27.

4

“Minutes of a Meeting of a Group of Interested Individuals,” LeMoyne College, 1961 Jan 21,
III:A280, NAACP records.
5

Thomas Michael, “Whites Anticipate Change In Uneasy Fayette County, But Hope For No
Friction,” Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn. ; Press-Scimitar morgue file 80137), 1960 Mar 31.
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Experienced local growers later estimated that the same crops harvested by manual labor
would have required at least seven hands working for two months. 6
Agriculture changed more quickly in the twentieth century than at any earlier time
in its 10,000 year history. Sprayer-delivered pre-emergent herbicides eliminated the need
for weeks of laborious manual “chopping.” Insecticides reduced crop losses to boll
weevil and corn worm. New techniques and fertilizers increased crop densities and
boosted yields. Field equipment continued to specialize and grow larger; self-propelled
single-crop combination harvesters (combines) reduced harvest times on acreages to
mere days or hours. If local farms were to remain viable they had to adopt the equipment
and practices. Traditional methods and technologies were obsolete. Farming, like
industry, was quickly becoming subject to economies of scale.
But mechanization was only part of the equation. At least two other factors
contributed to the rapid decline in manual farm labor. As shown in Table 9.1, one factor
was clearly crop diversification. Cash-crop-producing commercial farms had not been
self-sustaining production units for decades. Sharecroppers, however, still produced
subsistence crops of corn and garden provender, so the decline of tenancy may be the
chief factor in the drop in corn acreage planted in both counties. If corn was chiefly a
subsistence crop, the acreage figures suggest how dependent both local economies were
on cotton—and thus on tenant labor—at the cusp of the voting challenge. 7 Laborintensive but highly profitable upland cotton had been the single cash crop in both
6

“Mechanized Farming In County Growing Trend,” Fayette Falcon, 1960 Dec 15.

7

Four years later the Somerville newspaper noted that cotton and corn had become cash crops of
almost equivalent value to county farms, but the statistics to which I have access do not suggest that the
anecdotal report was accurate. However, with the decline in sharecropping, it is likely that corn shifted
quickly from a subsistence to cash crop, and then became significant. “Corn Could Vie With Cotton As
Top Cash Crop,” Fayette Falcon, 1965 May 13.
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Table 9.1 Agricultural diversification over time, by planted acres. 8
a. Haywood County.
Census

cotton

corn

1959
1964
1969
1974

41,130
40,156
35,409
60,808

25,148
20,794
15,557
5,322

soybeans
14,526
42,526
74,591
74,878

hay

total
acres

388
493
5,426
3,965

81,192
103,969
130,983
144,973

hay

total
acres

807
1,518
10,261
10,726

79,859
96,577
119,765
133,934

b. Fayette County.
Census

cotton

corn

1959
1964
1969
1974

41,479
41,562
32,384
43,369

32,513
27,401
20,820
6,509

soybeans
5,060
26,096
56,300
73,330

counties for over a century. That changed in a decade. Table 9.1 shows that between 1959
and 1969 soybeans clearly became a cash crop on a par with cotton. Even the Freedom
Farm effort had to face the practical realities promised by crop diversification. By August
1961 its three relocated families had put 45 acres in cotton, but 185 acres in soy beans,
“which will net a neat profit.” 9 By 1969, soybeans had topped cotton in percentage of
farm-allotted acreage. That would not have been possible with manual field labor. From
an economic standpoint, field mechanization-borne crop diversification—not crop

8

“Acreage, Quantity and Sales of Crops Harvested,” Table 13, US Census of Agriculture: 1964,
v.1 pt.31 (GPO, 1967), 378, 388, 408, and 376, 386, 406; “Crops,” Table 10, US Census of Agriculture:
1974, Final report, v.1, pt.42 Tennessee, section IV (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1977), 149, 233. Figures
include corn harvested for all purposes, but not soybeans cut for silage. The numbers for 1959 and 1964
reflect only alfalfa and grass hay, while those for 1969 and 1974 aggregate all hay crops. Grains are not
raised in significant acreages in any year.
9

“Pay Off Baptists’ Freedom Farm Debt,” Memphis World, 1961 Aug 5.
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succession—was a key factor in both economies. These changes in crops hastened the
dispossession of the rural labor force.
A second effect was a dramatic expansion of agriculture in both counties. Table
9.1 also shows that planted acreages nearly doubled in both counties between 1959 and
1974. 10 Such an expansion suggests that additional land was cleared from woodland to
productive cropland. For example, black farmer Shepherd Towles owned 200 acres, but
only about a third of the property was worked in crops of any sort (including hay) in
1960; the rest was either fallow or in woodland. One reason Art Emery chose to buy a
bulldozer rather than go into farming himself was a ready demand for clearing and
leveling land to expanded agricultural acreage.
The third effect of field mechanization, as tables 9.2 and 9.3 demonstrate, was
land consolidation. By 1960 it was clear everywhere that small farms were no longer able
to compete as independent producers against larger operations. As a result, tenancy
evaporated. The reasons had nothing to do with race or crop: increasingly large and
specialized field equipment was too expensive to acquire for small operations, and a
small farm did not manage enough cropland to generate an adequate return on the
equipment investment. As a result, adopting mechanization resulted in both field
expansion (the size of individual agricultural plots) and land consolidation. Under
sharecropping arrangements, landowners were able to get a cotton crop grown on small
plots for rates close to nothing. Once they chose to divest themselves of their traditional
power source, the cost involved in mechanization meant a financially stable operation

10

The total acreages in the counties are about a third larger than the figures shown for these four
crops, and would have included pasture land and minor crops like grains. House lots and gardens were not
included.
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Table 9.2 Land consolidation over time, by farm size in acres. 11
a. Haywood County.
Census

1–9

10–49

50–99

100–
499

500–
999

1000–
2000

1959
1964
1969
1974

469
444
117
36

2,159*
1,363
414
254

271
221
250
168

174
229
296
308

4
30
109
93

0
2
29
43

5
11

2000+

2000+
**
**

b. Fayette County.
Census

1–9

10–49

50–99

100–
499

500–
999

1000–
2000

1959
1964
1969
1974

604
490
133
61

2,314*
1,407
407
226

236
192
273
169

149
207
461
375

8
32
102
66

2
6
39
53

**
**

27
34

* Figure includes 1,007 farms of 10–19 acres in Haywood County, and 1,267 in Fayette
County.
** Class not enumerated in the census.

needed to distribute its per-acre cost as close as possible to a similar level. That required
a farmer to either open or reclaim new land, or acquire cropland from another property
owner by purchase, or more commonly, by rental. In Fayette County, the acreage
allocated to cotton remained fairly stable, while in Haywood County, cotton acreage
increased by a third. The expansion of agriculture either opened or reclaimed land for
11

“Farms and Acreage,” Table 4, US Census of Agriculture: 1964, v.1 pt.31 (GPO, 1967), 286,
288; “Farms, Land in Farms, and Land Use,” Table 1, US Census of Agriculture: 1974, Final report, v.1,
pt.42 Tennessee, section IV (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1977), 145, 229. During this period of rapid change
the census data may be skewed downward from the actual, as it was reported from farms active two years
after the census date, after evictions began. No direct farm-size comparison across time is possible since the
1964 classes divide to account chiefly for farms under 100 acres, and the 1974 classes are divided to
account farms over that acreage. Class data has been aggregated for comparison, a factor which somewhat
obscures the stark changes to farms between 100 and 500 acres. These totals account for cropland,
woodland, fallow, and pasture, not merely acres harvested.
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Table 9.3 Declines in farm operators and tenancy, by color. 12
a. Haywood County.
white

black

Census

all ops.

tenants

all ops.

tenants

1959
1964
1969
1974

1,173
976
823
670

491
315
198
106

2,037
1,456
526
243

1,666
1,109
181
36

b. Fayette County.
white

black

Census

all ops.

tenants

all ops.

tenants

1959
1964
1969
1974

1,041
884
780
740

378
204
125
93

2,410
1,611
652
244

1,968
1,201
163
49

field crops, or took it from other crops. The data suggests that field mechanization
allowed acreage for these four crops to increase by nearly 60% over fifteen years. Voting
rights coincided with the shift in agricultural production. The “price” of manual labor
rose above what the white landowners were willing to allow. Field mechanization
eliminated the social cost of traditional agriculture.
The most precipitous decline in the numbers of small farms and tenants in these
two counties occur not during the major conflicts over voting rights from 1959 to 1964,
but between 1964 and 1969, which coincides with the period of tension over school
desegregation in both counties. The sharp decline might be incidental, however, since by
12

“Farms and Acreage,” Table 4, US Census of Agriculture: 1964, v.1 pt.31 (GPO, 1967), 286,
288; “Farm Operators—Tenure and Characteristics,” Table 2, US Census of Agriculture: 1974, Final
report, v.1, pt.42 Tennessee, section IV (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1977), 145, 229.
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1964 it was clear that field mechanization and expanding one’s farm operations was the
only way for a farmer to survive economically; the process favored those who had access
to ready capital—white landowners. Thus, while the struggle for voting rights is an
important story, it is not the only story of change or conflict in these two rural counties.
Black Americans’ pursuit of civil rights has been told typically in terms of political
struggle. In Haywood and Fayette counties, it is clear that economic and technological
change were also key factors in social and political change. The process was already well
under way before the voting rights issue was raised in either county. Agricultural
diversification and the shift to mechanized agriculture looks like means of increasing
production and diversifying investment to compete with growers in other states, but there
is little question that the decision to mechanize field production was pushed over the edge
by the sudden appearance of black faces at the voter registration clerk’s desk. 13 Voting
rights provided a political catalyst for socioeconomic change; it was not the change itself.
In the end, James Estes was wrong. Estes looked too closely at circumstance
rather than trends or direction. Field mechanization was not only suitable for the hilly
land of Haywood and Fayette counties but also represented the only hope for maintaining
a viable agricultural industry in either county. The real problem facing Southern farmers,
black and white, historian Gilbert Fite pointed out, “was not how to develop a progressive
and productive agriculture, but what to do with surplus farmers who had no place in the
rapidly changing rural economy.” 14 The key was to keep the population in balance with

13

“Mechanization Has Been Beneficial” (editorial), Fayette Falcon, 1965 Feb 11.

14

Gilbert C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More: Southern Agriculture, 1965–1980 (Frankfort:
University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 209. On the other hand, by comparing data between cotton-growing
areas, an entirely different view emerges. Craig Heinicke and Wayne A. Grove, “Labor Markets, Regional
Diversity, and Cotton Harvest Mechanization in the Post-World War II United States,” Social Science
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available resources. Either there needed to be more and different work opportunities, or
fewer farmers, or both. To the deeply traditional, exclusively-liberal rural societies in
West Tennessee, color and class simplified the preferred solution, but the fight for an
inclusive political setting complicated its application.
Political discourse
“I'm exasperated,” one supporter wrote Carl Braden about Tennessee, “with those
who don’t see the vote as a ‘right’—an immediate ‘right’ and not some favor to be
granted in the bye and bye.” 15 By the time James Estes spoke and Currie Boyd wrote in
West Tennessee, the Supreme Court had already decided that the country’s founding
documents did not countenance conservatives’ definition or defense of exclusive rights
on these terms, finding in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision that
segregation’s premise of “separate but equal” was grounded in privilege rather than right,
and was therefore inherently unequal. The decisions of the Warren Court enforced a
reformulation of social assumptions not only about the terms in the U.S. Constitution, but
of socially applied language as well: if one wished to conduct a “public” business, then
privately held ideas about acceptability could not limit others’ participation—a business
could not, in fact, choose to whom to sell. One person’s private rights, grounded in the
dominating power of property or privilege or color, did not trump another’s “civil” rights
based upon nothing besides their citizenship.
Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred segregation in public
accommodations. More importantly, it redefined the concept of the American civil public
History 29, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 269–297. One shortfall of this sophisticated mathematical study is that it
considers market forces exclusively.
15

Ruth Rosenwald to Carl [Braden], 1963 Apr 29, Subject file, Operation Freedom,
Correspondence, 1963–1966, 57:1 Braden papers.
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from exclusive to inclusive in the legal code, making an accessible, inclusive civic public
a collective and enforceable reality. The actions in both directions over voting rights in
West Tennessee reflected that reinterpretation. Individual rights could no longer negate
the open, accessible function of public amenities. In Brownsville and Somerville, liberal
activists assumed that a rational, objective application of law would resolve evolved
inequities. An acquaintance wrote the Gabriners just after the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was signed into law, asking how people in Tennessee felt about the measure. “The
answer is self-evident,” Vickie wrote back, “the Negroes of Fayette County look toward
the law for their salvation.” 16 What activists failed to understand was that their opponents
could mount a similarly rational, systematic attempt to counter legal change and stymie
social change by abandoning their formerly held concept of an exclusive public and
reorganizing around a different principle—exclusive private institutions rather than
newly inclusive public ones. If de jure separate-but-equal public sphere could no longer
be maintained, and if the traditional de facto definition of public space as a collection of
exclusive and at-will private spheres was dismantled, then in private academies and
clubs, conservatives could at least have separate institutions where individual privilege
could be defended and the status quo maintained. After 1964, social conservatives in
Haywood and Fayette counties set about constructing new institutions that could meet
their definition of society as an exclusive preserve of like-qualified individuals. The $300
annual membership fee to the new country club organized in Brownsville in the middle of

16

Bob and Vicki to Dear Folks, 1964 Jul 18, Gabriner collection SC1203, WHi.
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Figure 9.1

Commercial Appeal editorial cartoon illustrating one perspective of the
conservative-liberal discourse over the nature of rights and governance 17

1965 was far above what most of the county’s white citizens and virtually all its black
ones could afford. 18
In April 1964, shortly before the Civil Rights Act was signed, the Memphis
Commercial Appeal published one of the clearest illustrations of the argument about the
nature of rights in American society. A figure resembling former U.S. Attorney General
Robert Kennedy swings a paddle labeled “political ‘civil rights’” (i.e., federally imposed
rights) toward an Everyman figure representing “Constitutional Private Rights.” Politics
17

Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.), 1964 Mar 11. Used by permission.

18

“Country Club Organized With 175 Stockholder Members,” States-Graphic (Brownsville,
Tenn.), 1965 Jul 9.

296

is forcing an artifice on a figure with “certain inalienable rights.” The conservative,
exclusive liberals of these two Tennessee counties joined millions of others who feared
that dismantling their exclusive public necessarily challenged the existence of personal
relationships at every level. “If the Government tries to decree with whom [we] must
associate,” wrote radio personality Paul Harvey as the bill which became the Civil Rights
Act was in its first debates, “then in the name of ‘civil rights’ we’re denying civil
rights—for a man has a right to choose associates with whom he is most comfortable. 19
Civil rights-era conservatives in West Tennessee argued that the country’s founding
document should be interpreted primarily as a guarantor for the rights of an individual to
be free from interference by others, and particularly the government. 20 This was partly an
argument of convenience, since those who did not wish to interrupt the nature of private
rights were those with substantial private means, whose means gave them personal
influence and standing. A challenge of the status quo, whether of segregation or of local
party politics, was thus a challenge of an exclusive public’s “private rights,” which an
objective outsider might more accurately characterize as privilege that matched their
means.
Partly because society had been so rigidly stratified between a dominant minority
and subordinate majority, the minority adopted a definition of rights that explicitly
reinforced the one-sided justice of color-defined segregation. In this fight over civic
participation, economics, or place, both sides invoked the Constitution to support their

19

Paul Harvey, “Choice of Friends Is Still a Personal Matter,” Citizen 6, no. 5 (1962 Feb): 10.

20

This was the position of the Anti-federalists of the Constitutional period, among them Patrick
Henry, Samuel Adams, George Mason, Melancton Smith, Richard Henry Lee, and future President James
Monroe. Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America,
1788–1828 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999).
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invocation of rights. 21 Black sharecroppers’ assertion of being included in the right to
vote, a right to participate in civic society, put differing interpretations of rights into
direct conflict with each other. Those who held to exclusive view of the American public
saw the Constitution as a guarantor of individual right against social demands. Liberals
regarded the Constitution as a protection of collective rights against exploitation by the
individually privileged within society. It is no accident that at the same time that access to
voting was being argued and resolved in these communities, access to community
accommodations was also at stake, including the local bus stations, courthouses, and
libraries. Securing the right to vote did not secure access in an all-or-nothing triumph.
Still to come would be access to community swimming pools, employment, housing,
public offices, and government services—particularly public education. It proved to be a
stuttering process, fought every step and filled with protest and symbolic efforts
intermixed with genuine progress.
In 1964 Lyndon Johnson picked up the torch of Franklin Roosevelt’s liberal
federalism and attempted to clear the protective privilege obstructions thrown up by
entrenched individuals and corporations. His solution was to Constitutionally and

21

English thinker John Stuart Mill expressed the idea of a “tyranny of the majority” and the
primacy of individual rights. Constitutional author James Madison’s fears of majority tyranny focused on
the uneducated backcountry populace which, if handed a direct franchise, threatened to electorally
overwhelm the property owners, the educated, and the informed minority—those suitable to govern. The
Progressive school of history in the early twentieth century, Charles Beard, Carl Becker, and others, were
among the first to see the national founding in terms of an economic elite maintaining economic stability by
controlling the political structure. More recently the national context for Federalist concerns is illustrated
by Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang,
2007). Though now viewed as an exercise in inclusive liberalism, at the time it was written, the document
was a conservative response to the threat of a very real “tyranny of the majority.” In the context of the time
it is an example of exclusive liberalism that was nearly defeated. cf. Richard Labunski, James Madison and
the Struggle for the Bill of Rights (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006). In Tennessee, Constitutional
invocations on both sides are too numerous to list separately, but for examples of the arguments see
“Strengthening Constitutional Government” (editorial), Memphis World, 1960 Apr 27; Henry M. Wriston,
“Freedom For The Individual,” Kingsport Times, 1960 Dec 21.
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statutorily objectify “civil” rights, rights which had no other basis than citizenship upon
which to be claimed and which specifically did not require personal assets or private
power to exercise. The function of government was to offset the weight that wealth and
privilege imposed on the existence of common citizens. For liberals, poverty and
disenfranchisement of the sort which characterized Haywood and Fayette counties were
social constructs and not strictly a result of the poor’s personal failings. Provide a
modicum of economic opportunity, objectify the processes of power, and the
hardworking poor would solve poverty themselves. Securing for citizens the right to vote
was one of several fundamental tasks.
***
After the unsubtly rigged local primary election re-seated Fayette County’s
“establishment” sheriff in 1961, Maurice McCrackin asked John McFerren if he and the
other local activists were discouraged by its outcome. “We see it differently down here,”
McFerren responded. “We have lived here all our lives. Through the years things have
been so bad that we are encouraged by a little progress. We have made progress and we
don’t feel downhearted or discouraged.” 22 Had he known how long the struggle would go
on he might have been less optimistic.
The voting rights efforts in rural West Tennessee’s Fayette and Haywood counties
was merely the first salvo in a decade-long struggle over dominance and subservience,
exclusiveness and inclusiveness, tradition and progress which escalated for a decade. In
1964 the set pieces for the next and harder-fought stage of the conflict, school

22

Mac [McCrackin] to Virgie [Hortenstein, 1961] Nov 2, Hortenstein papers.
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desegregation, were already in place. 23 In 1965 the voting rights struggle would change
gears (and tactics) with the West Tennessee Voting Project. The patient lines of black
sharecroppers of 1961 and 1962 would be a memory by 1967, dignified shadows of a
struggle now borne by lines of chanting young marchers. By 1969 the image of progress
would include fire hoses and mass arrests. In 1965 the contest for school desegregation
would also begin, and each county would resolve the matter in different ways. Haywood
County agreed to desegregate, and systematically integrated its school system over time;
Fayette County reinstituted racial segregation by creating nearly a dozen private
academies as the county desegregated its schools, and then fought a rearguard action to
maintain social control as the public schools were slowly re-segregated.
Change would be fought from both sides every step of the way, but the sun rose
and set over the expanding cotton, corn, and soybean fields without interruption. Both
counties were modernizing and place was changing. Despite stubborn resistance from
county officials and the counties’ elites, even in 1964 the sharp bounds between civic
strata breaking down, the hard edges of segregated life were already blurring. Ron
Schneider returned to Fayette County with other Cornell-Tompkins activists in October,
just before the 1964 presidential election:

We were driving past the lily white Lewis’s Drive-In. Our eyes drifted toward it
as we passed, for young whites often gathered there. Four negro young people
were walking toward the door! Our heads jerked around. A young white couple
was approaching the same door from the other direction. The couple let the
negroes go in first, and followed after.24
23

Segregation in public education in Fayette County would not be resolved until 2012 in the
McFerren v. Fayette County Board of Education consent decree.
24

Charles Haynie, letter dated [1963] Jun 25, in “Letters from Tennessee: Background of a Civil
Rights Movement,” Trojan Horse (Cornell Univ.) 4, no. 1 (1963 Sep): 19; Ron Schneider, “Return to
Fayette County,” 1:8 WTVP records.
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While they learned much in the voting-rights activities, the general population of
black citizens in both counties remained poor, marginally literate, and unsophisticated.
Most of the non-participating and unregistered adult majority still accommodated to their
place. “The one quality that they tend to lack at the present, as a group,” Charlie Haynie
wrote, “is resistance. They are still of the opinion that there isn’t much they can do for
themselves, that surely some benevolent god, like the NAACP or SNCC or SCLC will
come in and do all the work and make life better for them.” A year later, Ron Schneider
had to agree. “The majority of the Citizen’s Committee doesn’t know what it can do, or
how to do it, or doesn’t want to, and looks to the McFerrens as Mama and Papa,” he
observed. “They need education and experience.” Both the education and the experience
would come—after a time and at a price. Though there was still a long way to go, the
hard boundaries of place would erode. By the close of 1964 the black majority population
of Fayette County and Haywood County, Tennessee could, as John McFerren had said, at
least be “encouraged by a little progress.”
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Appendix
Chronological Context of the Fayette-Haywood Experience, 1940–2012
1940 May 6

Five black men inquire at the Haywood courthouse about voter
registration procedures, aiming to vote in the presidential election;
decide to wait until the July or August registrations

1940 May 23

Burton Dodson arrest/lynching attempt: Olin Burrow killed, Dodson
flees

1940 Jun 15

Groups of Brownsville whites led by Tip Hunter begin hunting NAACP
members in Haywood; Elisha Davis and Jack Adams are abducted,
Davis is banished by threat and Adams is severely beaten

1940 Jun 20

Elbert Williams detained and lynched outside Brownsville
***

1956 Jul

Five black farmers attempt to register to vote in Brownsville in time for
the presidential election and are put off by county officials

1958 Apr

Burton Dodson extradited to Somerville from East St. Louis, IL

1958 Jun

Estes speaks about citizenship and voter registration at Mt. Zion Baptist
Church in Piperton
Currie Boyd attempts to transfer voter registration from Decatur to
Haywood County; is rebuffed by clerk and stalled by election
officials

1958 Jul 12

Currie Boyd writes Justice Dept. about being denied voter registration
in Haywood County

1958 Oct

Joe Patrick, Morgan Wright, and four others register to vote in
Somerville
***

1958 Nov 4

Whispering campaign dissuades registered black voters from
participating in the Fayette County general election

1959 Apr 14

Estes represents Dodson at trial; asks venire about objection to black
voter registrations

1959 May 18

Civil Rights Commission investigation of Fayette voter registration
books
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Omar Carney caned in the Brownsville courthouse when picking up
HCCWL charter documents
1959 Jun 20

FCDEC resolves to hold white-only primary in the upcoming
Democratic primary election

1959 Jul 21

Estes drives a Haywood delegation to Nashville to meet with State
Election Commission members

1959 Jul 29

Fayette County Democratic Executive Committee secretary Joe Cocke
instructs election officials to deny black participation in the “white
primary”

1959 Nov 16

US v FCDEC filed, first voting rights suit under Civil Rights Act of
1957

1959 Dec 2

Estes presents seven affidavits about registration denials in Haywood to
US Attorney Rives A. Manker

1959 Dec 10

Asst. Attorney General Joseph M. F. Ryan Jr. orders additional
investigation into Haywood situation
***

1960 Jan 31

Estes, McFerren, Jameson, Boyd attend Volunteer Civil Rights
Commission hearings in Washington, DC; Boyd and McFerren
testify

1960 Feb 28

Fifth round of State Election Commission appointments seats a
commission in Haywood

1960 Mar 2

First massive voter registration effort by blacks in Fayette

1960 Mar 15

Civil Rights Commission officials ask to see Fayette voter rolls; County
Election Commission resigns protesting federal interference

1960 Apr

Whites begin to refuse service/credit to black registrants on Fayette
County blacklist
Stanton business owners O.M. and Sara Lemmons refuse to participate
in the boycott, driven out of business by fellow whites

1960 Apr 25

Consent decree in US v FCDEC removes race-based registration and
voting barrier in Fayette

1960 May 6

Civil Rights Act of 1960 passed
Public notice posted of pending district-level voter registration
locations in Haywood
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1960 May 16

Malcolm Smith halts Haywood voter registrations at his store

1960 May 17

First successful voter registrations by black citizens of Haywood at
Hopkins’ store in Tibbs (dist. 11) and Clark’s Store in Forked Deer
(dist. 10)

1960 May 20

Fayette election officials choose to serve to avoid missing the
opportunity for an industrial development bond referendum

1960 May 23

Tense confrontation over registrations at Hunter’s store in Dancyville

1960 May 12

Landowners post the first eviction notices to registered Haywood
tenants

1960 Oct 21–28 Justice Dept. attorney John Doar visits Haywood to collect evidence
specifically for suit
1960 Nov 18–20 Doar in Haywood a second time
1960 Nov 18

Doar files US v. Beaty in federal district court

1960 Nov 22–26 P. Sterling Stuckey and James Forman of the Emergency Relief
Committee, a branch of the Chicago CORE chapter, visit Fayette
1960 Dec 1

Doar files US v. Atkeison, asking for preliminary injunction against
pending sharecropper evictions

1960 Dec 14

Tents pitched on Shepherd Towles’ land; Early Williams’ family moves
into tents, followed shortly by other evictees from Bynum
Leatherwood’s farm

1960 Dec 21

Mahalia Jackson sings by telephone at a Fayette County fundraiser

1960 Dec 23

Judge Marion Boyd denies petition for temporary injunctions on
evictions; case appealed to Sixth Circuit Court

1960 Dec 28

Sixth Circuit Court issues the temporary injunction and a mandamus to
the district court on the Beaty filing, but refuses to consider Atkeison
First drive-by shooting at Tent City; Early Williams wounded
***

1961 Jan 3–5

Peacemakers delegation under Cincinnati cleric Maurice McCrackin
visits Tent City

1961 Jan 11

Operation Freedom Fund chartered to collect/disburse Ohio donations
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1961 Jan 25

JFK blindsided in a press conference about Fayette County food
situation

1961 Jan 27

“Kenwood-Hyde Park Committee to Aid Fayette County” organized in
a racially mixed Chicago neighborhood

1961 Feb 6–12

June Dowdy and John McFerren make speaking trip to Chicago’s
Kenwood-Hyde Park neighborhoods

1961 Feb 11

Relief coordination meeting in Dayton, Ohio; CORE assigns field
organizer Richard Haley temporarily to Brownsville

1961 Feb

Packinghouse Workers Union coordinates visit to Tent City
Disagreements over aid fund distributions splits FCCWL leadership;
FCCWL chartered, OFCCWL chartered
Informants report whites’ goal to move 500 black families out of
Fayette annually for five years

1961 Mar 18

National Baptist Association buys 400-acre Freedom Farm
Haywood County Grocery, a black-owned cooperative, opened in
Brownsville

1961 Apr

Tent City—Home of the Brave published by AFL-CIO
They Chose Freedom album released by Operation Freedom
Charlie Butts wanders in, helps Haley in Brownsville

1961 Apr 25

Consent decree in US v Beaty, extended to Atkeison, resolves evictions
over registering to vote but not future evictions; clears action for trial
on the merits

1961 May 7

NAACP chapter organized in Brownsville; ceremony presided over by
Haywood native Mildred Bond, who had fled with her family in
1940

1961 Aug 3

Fayette primary election; Redfearn defeated for sheriff a second time

1961 Oct 29

Maurice McCrackin jailed in Brownsville on “intent to peep and spy”
and stages a hunger strike through November that is covered in the
national press

1961 Nov 7

Richard Hudson detained without charge or warrant in Brownsville;
released later in the day

1961 Nov 14

Activist David Henry arrested for speeding, held incommunicado in the
Brownsville jail
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1961 Nov 16

Ernest Bromley asks Sheriff Hunter to see Henry and is knocked
backwards through the doorway; Henry is beaten in jail by an
unidentified man (released Nov 18)
***

1962 Feb

Eric Weinberger (Committee for Nonviolent Action) and Jeffrey
Gordon (CORE) establish Haywood Handicrafters as an employment
opportunity

1962 Mar 3

Weinberger and Gordon jailed without charge when leaving
Brownsville

1962 spring

HCCWL dissolves into competing factions

1962 Mar 22

Biracial committee in Haywood discusses black expectations for civil
participation

1962 May 2

Haywood defendants agree to be bound by the terms of the proposed
injunction enjoining landowners from interfering with employees’
voting; Justice Dept. drops US v. Beaty

1962 May 8

Fayette County commission proposes a zoning plan which effectively
excludes blacks from building homes on rural house lots

1962 May 25

Commission of Inquiry in the Administration of Justice in the Freedom
Struggle, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, held in DC; takes testimony
from Haywood deputy sheriff George “Buddy” Sullivan

1962 Jul 20

OFCCWL Community Center site dedication

1962 Jul 26

Fayette defendants agree to terms identical to May decision; district
judge Marion Boyd issues a decree closing US v. Atkeison

1962 Jul 24–28 Three French and Swiss kids work in Somerville through International
Voluntary Service
1962 Sep 29

Operation Freedom board elects to broaden its relief-loan services to
Mississippi and to end sponsorship of volunteer work-camp projects

1962 Nov

First FHWC work camp: setting blocks in OFFCWL Community
Center
***

1963 April

Biracial committee established to discuss community concerns in
Haywood County
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1963 Jun

Tent City disbands; evictions continue under the mechanize field
production
FCDEC begins requiring candidates to pay a $150 registration fee for
participation in the primary
Flannery submits report to Burke Marshall on Fayette-Haywood
situation

1963 Jul 10

John McFerren’s paternity case goes to trial; open harassment of voter
registration workers begins in Fayette
Haynies ambushed in James and Fannie Pucketts’ yard

1963 Jul 11

John Lewis of SNCC addresses a crowd of 700 in Somerville

1963 Jul 20

Prayer vigil at courthouse results in intimidation reprisals and arrests in
Somerville; Art Emery and David Brown jailed

1963 Aug

Somerville city council enacts an ordinance prohibiting meetings on the
courthouse grounds

1963 Aug 5

First demonstration march in Brownsville results in Eric Weinberger’s
brutalization and arrest

1963 Oct

Eric Weinberger returns to Haywood for trial; drummed out of
Brownsville
***

1964 Jan

Hortenstein expands FHWC mission to include literacy/citizenship
education

1964 Jan 25

Highlander opens first of three workshops in rural Haywood

1964 Apr

Bruce Hicks arrives from Oberlin College to take over direction of the
Haywood Handicrafters
McFerrens secure a construction loan for a new store through the Small
Business Administration with help of Bradens, after being turned
down locally

1964 May–Jun

Coordinated by Dowd and Haynie, the Cornell-Tomkins effort conducts
a pre-primary registration drive

1964 Jul 17

Shooting by Tinsley’s Grocery in district 3
Danny Beagle, Paul Seidel beaten up at Doyle farm
Dan Packtor physically thrown from Fayette courthouse by deputy
sheriffs
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1964 Aug 6

Fayette County local election; Redfearn defeated a third time for
sheriff; Odell Sanders defeated in bid for Haywood county alderman
seat

1965 Aug 7

Most Cornell-Tompkins activists leave Fayette for home

1964 Aug 10

Debby Rib begins service as on-site coordinator in Fayette

1964 Aug

Fannie Puckett files sues JMcF for personal injury during construction
on his new store

1964 Oct

Small group of Cornell-Tompkins activists return to Fayette to monitor
the general election

1964 Nov

General election; Johnson defeats Goldwater, but the latter polls highly
in Fayette and Haywood
***

1965 May 1

Desegregation of individual restaurants tested in Somerville; scattered
violence

1965 Jun 2

NAACP files McFerren v. Fayette County School Board in federal
court seeking mandated public school desegregation in Fayette

1965 Jul 1

Fayette’s incremental school desegregation plan is accepted by the
federal district court; segregated private Fayette Academy
established the same day

1965 Aug 6

Black Fayette parents meet with Tennessee State Education
Commissioner demanding immediate school desegregation
Voting Rights Act signed by Lyndon Johnson

1965 Aug 11

White parents begin a public-school boycott protesting racial
integration in classrooms; expires after about two weeks

1965 Sep

First cross-burning in Brownsville

1965 Nov

Ku Klux Klan klavern 10 organized in Brownsville
***

1966

Fayette Community Center completed
Viola McFerren appointed to the National Advisory Committee for the
U.S. Office of Economic Affairs

1966 Apr

Fayette Academy secures land for construction
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1966 May 16

Klan rally outside Brownsville; Odell Sanders’ home bombed

1966 May 27–28 Tennessee Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights holds hearings on employment and schools in five West
Tennessee counties
1966 Jun 23

First consent decree in McFerren v. Fayette County School Board
commits Fayette to substantive pupil apportionment toward school
desegregation

1966 summer

Thirteen homes bombed or burned in Haywood

1966 Jul 23–28 West Tennessee Freedom March
1966 Aug 4

Six black citizens win seats on Fayette county commission; the Election
Commission disqualifies both District 10 winners on technicalities

1966 Sep 6–7

Tennessee Christian Movement formed in Haywood and Fayette
specifically to support non-violence

1966 Dec 15

Virgie Hortenstein jailed on a pretext in Brownsville to pressure FHWC

1967 Apr

Hayward Brown family arrives in Fayette from Michigan, planning to
open a series of manufacturing cooperatives as job-development
ventures

1967 summer

Ten homes and the Willow Grove Baptist Church burned in Haywood

1967 Jun 12–16 Judicial testimony in US v. Haywood County Board of Education
1967 Aug 4

District judge Bailey Brown rules against plaintiff in US v. Haywood
County Board of Education
***

1968 Apr 4

Martin Luther King Jr. killed at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis

1968 May 1–Jun 22 The Mule Train marches from Memphis in the Poor People's March
on Washington, but is not admitted to Resurrection City on the
National Mall
1968 Nov

Hortenstein completes a proposal for West Tennessee Experimental
Rural Community Human Development Centers to OEO
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1969 Apr

Hayward Brown opens the Fayette Cooperative Stamping and Machine
Co. in Rossville

1969 May

Organization of the Haywood Consumers’ Cooperative stalled by state
officials

1969 Jul 9

FHWC brings black children to the Brownsville City Pool; policeman
Homer Lovelace and constable T. J. Mize harass the leaders

1969 Aug 12

Precilla Hobson and daughters Vernell and Vester are assaulted and
beaten in Somerville by father and son Julian and Gerald Pulliam

1969 Aug 16

Fayette’s black community begins a county-wide boycott of whiteowned businesses on Saturdays

1969 Aug 20

Judge Robert McRae orders Fayette Board of Education to significantly
revise the county school desegregation plan and provide for
integration rather than tokenism

1969 Aug 24

Somerville police break up a public march

1969 Sep 6

Somerville police use fire hoses and tear gas to break up a protest
march; curfew instituted

1969 Sep 19

Federal judge Bailey Brown lifts the city’s limit on protest marches in
Somerville

1969 Sep 25

Marches in Somerville

1969 Oct 4

Tense day of protests in Somerville over school desegregation; Rev.
Baxton Bryan nearly knifed by the McQueen brothers

1969 Oct 14

Fire destroys the main building of W.P. Ware High School, the black
facility, south of Somerville

1969 Nov 24

Fayette grand jury fails to indict the Pulliams for the attack on the
Hobsons

1969 Dec 15

John McFerren severely beaten by five men on Fayette courthouse lawn
***

1970 Jan

White parents refuse to allow children to attend a formerly black school
in Oakland as part of court-ordered desegregation, but eventually
agree to do so

1970 Feb 7

Fayette submits a revised desegregation plan for public schools
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1970 Apr 23

Fayette Board of Education dismisses 21 teachers without notice, all
who had taught at predominantly black schools

1970 Oct 23

John McFerren Jr. is pushed into teacher Georgene Fowler by a white
girl; Fowler slams him against a wall demanding an explanation and
sets him a disciplinary assignment

1970 Nov 5

John McFerren Jr. suspended from school by the Fayette Board of
Education for failing to complete his disciplinary assignment;
NAACP Legal Defense Fund eventually files a case on his behalf,
touching off a round of court actions about prejudice and reprisals in
Fayette public schools

1970 Nov 6

Federal judge orders 12 of 21 Fayette teachers reinstated

1970 Dec 21

Scott Franklin murdered and store torched
***

1972

NAACP requests subpoenas of Fayette’s private-academy officials over
allegation that while serving as county board of education members
they had abetted circumventing public school desegregation order
Two Catholic nuns found Just Organized Neighborhood Area
Headquarters (JONAH) as a community organization in Haywood,
which evolves into a platform to back black candidates to Haywood
county office

1973

Privately funded Fayette-Haywood-Hardeman Legal Services
organized as a not-for-profit corporation
Meharry/Vanderbilt Health Clinic project held in Rossville

1982

Currie Boyd, William King, and Roy Bond elected to the Haywood
County Commission

1983

Habitat for Humanity/Mid-South chartered for Shelby, Fayette,
Hardeman, Haywood, counties

1985

Virgie Hortenstein dies; Fayette Haywood Work Camps disbands

1988

Currie Boyd loses a state senate race

1990

Currie Boyd loses his seat on Haywood commission

2012 Aug 21

Fayette signs a consent decree to settle McFerren v. Fayette County
School Board and agrees to reorganize county schools to end defacto
segregation in public education
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